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Businesses need consumers to trust that their products and services will live up to 
expectations and trust their corporate claims to, for example, protect customer data or act 
sustainably. A rich literature in economics, marketing, management and behavioural science 
offers models of trust-building and potential interventions, but little practitioner guidance on 
how businesses should build trust in different situations. Moreover, ways of measuring trust 
differ across the literature: interpersonal trust research uses risky games to measure trust, but 
research with consumers relies on risk-free surveys. 
 
In Study 1 a novel risk-based measure of consumer trust is developed and used by 2,042 UK 
consumers to measure trust in nine companies across three sectors. For eight of these 
companies, the new measure leads to different conclusions than those reached using a 
standard measure. Trust correlates strongly with positive affect on the standard measure, but 
not on the risk-based one.  
 
A theoretical framework based on a dual process model of cognition explains why this 
correlation should change for the two different measures. It predicts that a relevant but 
complicated reason to trust a business, its highly competitive environment, will increase the 
risk-based measure of trust, but not on the standard measure. It also predicts that an irrelevant 
reason to trust a business, its simplicity, will do the opposite. In Study 2, pre-registered 
hypotheses in line with this proposal are largely supported in an experiment involving 1,762 
UK consumers. 
 
Based on these findings, a consulting model is proposed which advises businesses to consider 
the cognitive process that consumers use when they form trust judgements. While specific 
contexts vary, this model advises that when consumers are using fast processes businesses 
should focus on heuristic trust-building interventions, while, when consumers are using 
slower processes, businesses can deploy more complex and nuanced evidence of their 
trustworthiness.  
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Introduction and literature review 
 
“Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction 
conducted over a period of time.  It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the 
world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence…”. 




According to the OECD (2017a, p.126) “trust is a multi-billion dollar headache for 
companies... [and] gaining and regaining trust is a commercial imperative”. There is 
substantial evidence that businesses that are more trusted by consumers have a competitive 
edge: more trusted sellers have an advantage in terms of consumer consideration (Erdem & 
Swait, 2004), purchase intention (Elfenbein, Fisman, & McManus, 2012; Johnson & 
Grayson, 2005; Li & Miniard, 2006; Morhart et al., 2015; Reynolds-McIlnay & Morrin, 
2019; Sichtmann, 2007; White & Yuan, 2012;), willingness to pay higher prices (Resnick, et 
al., 2006), and to be loyal (Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001; Ding, Veeman, & Abamowicz, 
2013; Harris & Goode, 2004; Paulssen, Roulet, & Wilke, 2014). More trusted brands and 
other advocates have an advantage when promoting their products in ways that persuade 
consumers (Aguirre et al., 2015; Bleier & Eisenbeiss, 2015; Klucharev, Smidts, & Fernandez, 
2008; Ohanian, 1990; Payan & McFarland, 2005; Vlachos et al., 2009). Public trust is needed 
for apparently risky technologies, such as nuclear power, to be accepted (Slovic, 1993; 1999). 
New technologies – from driverless cars to smart speakers – may be reliant on new and 
different trust relationships (Botsman, 2017), especially if they depend on the secure 
management of personal data (Chakravorti, Bhalla, & Chaturvedi, 2018), and as the pace of 
innovation and product development intensifies customers have to be won again and again to 
trust new products (Lampel & Shamsie, 2000). As companies increasingly make ethical or 
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environmental claims, on top of claims about their product’s quality, consumers must judge 
the veracity of these too (Atkinson & Rosenthal, 2014). 
 
Together, this means that marketing and communications practitioners are frequently asked to 
increase public trust in a company and its products. They might even create a specific 
strategy that is designed to build trust. For example, when Dave Lewis became CEO of the 
UK’s largest retailer, Tesco, in 20141, he set out a turnaround strategy around three pillars, 
the third of which was focussed on trust (Tesco, 2014) and, as he approached the end of his 
time as CEO, Lewis reported back to the market on the shift in consumer trust he had 
achieved (Tesco, 2019). Many trust-building strategies can be expected to focus on marketing 
(Li & Miniard, 2006), or on Corporate Social Responsibility (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2010; 
Ellen, Webb, & Mohr, 2006). But businesses can pursue different routes to consumer trust. 
For example, Dave Lewis cited “a lot of pricing inconsistency” that was “eroding trust 
perhaps more than anything” and led him to “dramatically [reduce] the number of price 
changes in our store” (Tesco, 2015, p.4). At the same time, Lewis has talked a great deal 
about trust in Tesco’s supplier relationships (Lewis, 2016). This suggests that the keys to 
unlocking trust for some businesses might lie in unexpected places. 
 
Despite, or perhaps because, of how complex the question is, practitioner experience suggests 
that there is no well-established road map to identify the most effective trust-building strategy 
for a business.  In 2002, Sirdeshmukh, Singh and Sabol, directed researchers to focus on 
questions that included “How can firms build trust?" (p.32) in The Journal of Marketing. 
Fifteen years later, Pirson, Martin and Parmar (2017, p.1) noted that “research in the area of 
 
1 Throughout this time, the author’s employer has been an adviser to Tesco, and the author has worked on 
several projects for the company. 
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stakeholder2 trust in business is nascent; therefore the trust formation process has been rarely 
examined at the stakeholder level”. As the following literature review will argue, despite its 
great breadth, the academic management and marketing literature still does not provide a 
clear, actionable answer to Sirdeshmukh and colleagues’ question, and “scholars have little 
insight to offer business leaders with respect to such questions” (Wicks, Moriarty, & Harris, 
2014, p.4). This lack of well-developed insights for trust-building practice stands in contrast 
to the situation where a business has somehow lost trust during a crisis. Gillespie and Dietz 
(2009) propose a model to rebuild lost trust based around three core elements: diagnosis, 
intervention, and evaluation, rooted in a body of research on how trust is rebuilt after it has 
been broken (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim, Dirks & Cooper, 2006; Kim, Dirks & Cooper, 2009). 
But these models start from a response to a trust-breaking incident (Poppo & Schepker, 2014; 
Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009), making them less helpful to businesses who suspect they are 
broadly trusted, or that they have lost trust in numerous small incidents over many years. 
 
In order to conduct an effective diagnosis and evaluation, companies need to be able to 
measure consumer trust. Practitioners and academics are both reliant on survey measures that 
ask consumers whether they agree or disagree with statements like “This is a company I 
trust”. However, as discussed in the literature review below, such measures miss out a 
defining element of trust: the concept of taking a risk and making yourself vulnerable. A risk-
based measurement approach is, however, widely used when behavioural scientists and 
experimental economists measure interpersonal trust, generally using variants on Berg, 
Dickhaut, and McCabe’s (1995) ‘trust game’ (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). The commercial 
advantages of being trusted that are described above all connect to a customer’s willingness 
 
2 They look at two specific stakeholder groups: potential customers and potential employees (Pirson, Martin & 
Parmar, 2017). 
13 
to make themselves vulnerable, for example, by paying for a product on the basis of 
advertising rather than experience or handing over their personal data to a company. But, as 
far as the author is aware, no attempt has ever been made to incorporate risk-taking into 
measures of consumer trust. 
 
Even if the measurement and evaluation problem is put to one side, what should a business 
do to increase consumer trust? As Harris, Wicks, and Moriarty (2014, p.362) argue “both 
executives and researchers… need to better understand how to ‘move the dial’” on questions 
of public trust, and to do so they need have a good understanding of how consumers come to 
make trust judgements. The available models in the economics, management and marketing 
literature are discussed in the literature review below. Specific interventions that are proposed 
and evidenced by the literature are clustered around these different models.  
 
Outside of these models, there has been a surge in behavioural science research on 
interpersonal trust in recent years3 (see reviews such as Balliet & Van Lange, 2012; Evans & 
Krueger, 2009; Fehr, 2009; Johnson & Mislin, 2011) so that the science of trust in business is 
“in its infancy” by comparison (Pirson, Martin, & Parmar, 2017, p.2) This interpersonal trust 
literature could be a rich source of novel potential interventions to help companies that wish 
to build trust with their consumers, and so is explored in depth below. In this paper, a new 
model of consumer trust-building is set out, rooted in this work and the broader theory of 
 
3 Many other studies, not discussed here, focus on interpersonal differences in the propensity to trust (for 
example, Croson & Buchan, 1999). Given that businesses cannot easily choose their potential customers, these 
differences are not the focus of this review. Research has been conducted on differences between trustees, but 
ones that have no obvious organisational analogue (for example, Gervais, Shariff, & Norenyzayen, 2011; 
Rezlescu et al., 2012). There is also a vast literature on reciprocity (for example, McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith, 
2003), but the focus of this paper is on the consumer as the first-mover – the trustor – who puts the company in 
a position to reciprocate. How the company might do so in an optimum way is too large a question to fully 
address here, although the idea of reciprocity is discussed in connection with some of the trust-building models 
described below. 
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dual process models of cognition. The ambition is to allow for the integration of the insights 
from this research agenda to be built into a new series of practitioner interventions. 
 
The remainder of this chapter, after introducing the key concepts, focusses on reviewing the 
literature around trust measurement and approaches to increasing trust. Chapter 2 then 
describes a correlational piece of research designed to trial a new consumer trust 
measurement tool which incorporates risk-taking. Chapter 3 describes an experimental study 
which tests a set of potential interventions in a consumer trust context, both to understand 
their potential viability and to test hypotheses based on the dual-process model of trust 
formation. Chapter 4 discusses how this evidence can underpin a consulting model that can 
be applied in many different business organisations. Finally, Chapter 5 offers some 




TRUST IN A CONSUMER CONTEXT 
 
Trusting a company? 
 
We cannot fully predict the behaviour of other people. As a result, we might seek to be 
entirely self-reliant in our economic activity. In doing so, however, we would miss out on a 
vast array of potential benefits that could come from collaborating with others (Arrow, 1972; 
Ostrom, 2003). Instead, we often make ourselves reliant on the actions of another. This 
reliance is the most common theme in the many different definitions of trust which have been 
used across disciplines as varied as philosophy, psychology, economics, sociology, marketing 
and management (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998; Castaldo et al., 2010; Das & 
Teng, 2004; Deutsch, 1958; Kee & Knox, 1970; Rousseu et al., 1998). Often, by putting 
ourselves in this trusting position, we can achieve something advantageous, if everything 
turns out as hoped.  For example, we run the risk of ending up with a “lemon” when we buy a 
used car, but we hope for a great bargain (Akerlof, 1970). How confident we feel in our 
purchase, and whether we make it at all, depends crucially on how much we trust the seller. 
 
Much writing about trust focuses on the case where trustee and trustor are peers4. Such 
interpersonal trust is directly relevant when we think of trust between members of society 
(e.g., OECD, 2017a) or trust between colleagues inside an organisation (e.g., Colquitt et al., 
2011). Increasingly, peer-to-peer business models, such as eBay, rely on us to trust others 
who are in the same situation as us (Mazzella et al., 2016). Sometimes a model economy, 
 
4 When we talk about trust we usually mean risk-taking where one person relies on another in a way that is 
manifest to the trustee (Pettit, 1995). Bohnet and colleagues have shown that behaviour is very different when a 
risky task is dependent on another person, and when it is dependent on impersonal chance, even when the 
probabilities of success are the same (Bohnet et al., 2008; Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004). 
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using similar peers, can help to identify underlying dynamics with a wider relevance (for 
example, Aghion et al., 2010).  
 
However, the focus of this investigation is not on interpersonal trust but on a consumer’s trust 
in a company. This is distinct from the important question of trust within a business or other 
organisation– i.e. between colleagues, or between managers and workers (as represented, for 
example, in Creed & Miles, 1996) – although the consumer trust literature often borrows 
concepts from the study of interorganisational and intraorganisational trust (for example, in 
Schlosser, Barnett White, & Lloyd, 2006). It is also distinct from trust in business overall, as 
a sector or an institution, though of course one’s level of trust in business overall may be a 
starting point from which to make judgements about the trustworthiness in specific 
businesses (Harris & Wicks, 2014). 
 
There is an important difference between the idea of trusting a business, and the idea of 
trusting the people who work in a business. Legal scholars Henderson and Churi (2019) note 
the importance of the ‘legal fiction’ of the corporation in allowing people to participate in 
trust relationships that run well beyond their own local experience: 
 
“If you’ve ever taken a bite of a hamburger at a fast-food joint, sipped a Coke, 
pumped gasoline into your car, or bought anything online, you have trusted a 
business. More specifically, you have trusted in individuals you’ve never met because 
of the existence of a business standing in between you and them. After all, there is no 
such thing as McDonalds, the Coca-Cola Company, ExxonMobil, or Amazon. These 
are just labels we use to describe individuals of all sorts – employees, investors, 
suppliers, lenders, and so on – cooperating together for a specific objective.” (p.36). 
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There are commercial interactions that are still interpersonal: for example, when employing a 
sole trader to do some work on a house (Nooteboom, 2002). But in most consumer 
interactions today, we take risks connected to those large legal fictions. Even when we can 
look the McDonald’s employee in the eye over the counter, we are trusting that the training 
and incentive structure created by the company will mean we receive a tasty, safe meal, 
rather than just relying on the goodwill of that individual person. 
 
The problem of unobservable product quality can be analysed through the prism of trust 
(Kirmani & Rao, 2000; Nelson, 1974). Often this is thought of from a product perspective: 
some products can be inspected and aspects of their quality, like an ugly design, can be 
determined pre-purchase (Erdem & Swait, 1998). Many, perhaps most, products and services 
are not like this, however: whether it is the film that promises to entertain you (Lampel & 
Shamsie, 2000), the lawyer that promises to win your case, the hairdresser that promises the 
latest style (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988), or the car that you hope won’t break down (Thomas 
et al., 1998), the quality is only going to be clear to you after you have handed over your 
money. 
 
However, in all these situations, we aren’t trusting the – often inanimate – product. The 
counterparty – the trustee – is actually the company selling the product: what is in question is 
the trustworthiness of the company - or, in more marketing terminology, the brand’s 
credibility (Erdem & Swait, 1998). When I scratch off the front of a lottery scratchcard, I’m 
taking an impersonal risk on whether or not my numbers come up – and because it is 
impersonal, that risk-taking is not an act of trust. But when I bought the scratch card, I did 
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engage in an act of trust towards the lottery vendor: I am trusting that they run an unbiased 
game, will pay-out if I win, and so on. 
 
Product quality is not the only thing that we might be trusting companies over: in many trust 
situations, our trust is multifaceted, depending on the nature of the vulnerability involved 
(Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). While we might try to restrict our trust in a company to 
certain domains, trust cannot be completely domain-specific for the same reason that 
contracts must always be incomplete (Ouchi, 1980): the uncertainty that makes trust 
necessary.  I trust Amazon to deliver my packages on time, to prevent anyone from seeing my 
credit card details; I trust that Alexa will tell me the correct weather and won’t record my 
private conversations. I trust that they will react in some appropriate way if an unforeseen 
crisis stops them from delivering my package. Of course, I may trust Amazon more with 
some of those tasks than others. But it seems sensible to expect that these decisions will be 
linked: that if my packages never arrived, I might start to worry about whether my credit card 
details are safe. If it is possible to draw these links across multiple interactions, then it is 
worth considering our relationship with Amazon overall, and how much we trust it (Dwyer, 
Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Fournier & Alvarez, 2012). This concern for the trusting relationship, 
over the individual instances, is a theme in the managerial discussion of trust (including, for 
example, Nettleton, 2019) and echoes a similar approach in considering interorganisational 
trust (Barney & Hansen, 1994). 
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Different definitions of trust 
 
At the level of a commercial transaction, there is no observable difference between a trusting 
behaviour, and one that is not excessively distrustful, nor between one that has been 
considered deeply, and one that is spontaneous. Either way, I either purchase the used car or I 
don’t.  But many definitions of trust make the “psychological state” of the trustor a crucial 
element of what defines trust (Rousseau et al., 1998, p.395). Often, it is helpful to be able to 
talk about trusting beliefs or intentions (Kim, Dirks & Cooper, 2006; McKnight, Cummings, 
& Chervany, 1998). But this means that the definition of trust must include something of 
what is happening in a trustor’s mind when they make themselves vulnerable. 
 
For some authors, trust is risk-taking based on a deliberate and strategic consideration of 
what the trustee will do (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998; Hernandez-Lagos & 
Minor, 2015). From this perspective, trust is like any other risky decision, except that the 
risks stem from the reliability of the trustee (Das & Teng, 2004). It has also been further 
specified as “trust in reciprocity” (Bellucci et al., 2017, p.1234), emphasising the need to 
calculate, predict, and understand the trustee’s intentions (Doney & Cannon, 1997). In 
accounts of this sort, the idea that trusting is the normatively superior action is rejected 
(Flores & Solomon, 1998; Hardin, 1996). In this vein, trust is contrasted with “confidence” - 
equivalent behaviour that is produced without consciously acknowledging or reflecting on the 
“possibility of disappointment” (Luhmann, 1988, p.97).  
 
However, other authors argue the opposite, viewing trust as a leap of faith that by definition 
goes beyond the evidence and calculation of interest (Carpenter, Daniere, & Takahashi, 2004; 
Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; Ring & Van De Ven, 1992; Sabel, 
1993; Williamson, 1993).  In this telling, trusting actions based on knowledge of your 
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partners’ incentives are just “assurance”, while “real trust” expects trustees to go beyond self-
interest (Nooteboom, 2002, p.48-49). This can be taken to the point of being “blind trust” 
(Flores & Solomon, 1998). Trust can then be contrasted with distrust as two distinct 
dimensions (Sitkin & Roth, 1993), with distrust an equally “blind” assumption that the trustee 
is suspect and unreliable (Bachmann & Hanappi-Egger, 2014; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 
1998). 
 
How can we resolve these conflicting viewpoints? Interpersonal trust studies do not provide a 
conclusive answer: finding that trust behaviour can be changed both by changing the strategic 
incentives (for example, Bracht & Feltovich, 2007) and changing to the normative status of 
different acts (for example, Bicchierri & Mercier, 2013; Dunning et al., 2014). Mal, Davies, 
and Diers-Lawson (2018) attempt to answer the question in the corporate context by 
examining how consumers talk about trust in brands during semi-structured interviews, 
finding that the themes in discussions of brand trust and brand distrust tend to be similar, and 
do incorporate some consideration of risk.  
 
A resolution can be engineered by subdividing the concept of trust (Dunning, Fetchenhauer, 
& Schlosser, 2012; Hardin, 2003; Uslaner, 2013). Reflecting the two different views 
summarised here, Dunning and colleagues propose that trust can be either “expressive” or 
“instrumental”. The key difference is the consideration of trust’s consequences beyond the 
act of trusting itself, whether minutes or years later. Where this consideration of 
consequences is present, trust is instrumental. By contrast, expressive trust is based on the 
“immediate ‘payoff’ they receive once they perform the action [of trusting]”, for example, 
feeling good about oneself because you have made the normatively desirable or socially 
approved choice (p.690). 
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This provides a practical way forward that is easily applied in a consumer context. For the 
purposes of this paper, trusting behaviour is behaviour which makes a consumer vulnerable to 
the actions of a company (Das & Teng, 2004). Using Dunning and colleagues’ (2012) labels, 
trusting beliefs, expectations or intentions are expressive if the act of expressing those beliefs 
is immediately sufficient in itself, while they are instrumental if they involve some kind of 
strategic assessment of the best approach given the likely response of the trustee. Either way, 
the content of those trusting beliefs or expectations are defined by Ben-Ner and Haroldsson 
(2010, p.65) as: 
 
“… a multifaceted expectation or belief by A that: (1) B will not take advantage of the 
situation to make a gain while imposing a loss on A, (2) B will not act maliciously 
towards A, (3) B will be willing to make small sacrifices for A, and (4) B is 
competent to act favorably towards A.” 
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HOW IS CONSUMER TRUST MEASURED? 
 
The challenge for approaches using survey items to measure trust 
 
Being able to measure trust is crucial to any consulting model, and is also a topic of growing 
practitioner interest: for example, following an independent review, members of the 
Australian Banking Association agreed to publish performance indicators to demonstrate 
progress in rebuilding consumer trust (McPhee, 2018). Practitioners commonly evaluate 
public trust in a company with surveys that ask participants whether they agree with 
statements like “This is a brand I trust” (e.g., Appleton, 2014; Sterne, 2010). Facebook has 
recently started to use a similar approach when asking users to rate different news sources 
(Zuckerberg, 2018). In management and marketing studies the approach is similar, albeit 
often with more items, asking for agreement with statements such as “This brand delivers 
what it promises” (Erdem & Swait, 2004).  
 
These measures are used because, as Rao, Qu, and Ruckert (1999 p.263) put it, “measuring 
the perceived quality of unobservable attributes is infeasible”. Some authors go so far as to 
argue that “trust cannot be objectively measured as it is only sensed by individuals. Therefore 
collecting self reported data (e.g., through a questionnaire, as in our case) is the only means to 
measure trust” (Calefato, Lanubile, & Novielli, 2015, p.475). Similar measures have been 
designed to the represent models or aspects of trust that are discussed later in this chapter, 
including perceptions of ability, benevolence, and integrity (Davis et al., 2000; Ingenhoff & 
Sommer, 2010; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Schlosser, Barnett White, & Lloyd, 
2006) and cognitive and affective trust (McAllister, 1995).  
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One objection to all of these existing measurement approaches is that they fail to measure 
trust, or at least they fail to measure a crucial element of trust. As discussed above, 
definitions of trust commonly include some element of risk-taking or vulnerability (Castaldo 
et al., 2010; Das & Teng, 2004; Kee & Knox, 1970; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; 
Rousseau et al., 1998). The inclusion of some element of risk in a situation – even if it is only 
minor or hypothetical – has been found to affect the importance of trust or trust-related 
perceptions to decision-making (Balliet & Van Lange, 2012; Paulssen, Roulet, & Wilke, 
2014; Rafaeli, Sagy, & Derfler-Rozin, 2008; Schlosser, Barnett White, & Lloyd, 2006). Even 
when survey items are deliberately designed to reflect a definition of trust based around 
willingness to be vulnerable (Mayer & Davis, 1995; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007), the 
participants do not take any kind of risk when they answer them (Bogliacino, Grimalda, & 
Jimenez, 2017). 
 
This is a minor problem if these measures correlate well with behavioural evidence of making 
oneself vulnerable to others. For the practitioner, if consumers’ willingness to make 
themselves vulnerable, for example, by adopting a new technology, is predicted by these 
attitudinal measures, then there is no need for any additional measurement. However, there is 
substantial evidence that trust as measured in standard survey items cannot be assumed to 
correlate with trusting behaviour in risky or ambiguous conditions. Surveys covering 
participants’ trust in others have repeatedly produced different trust levels from experiments 
on interpersonal trust behaviour conducted with the same participants (Ashraf, Bohnet, & 
Piankov, 2006; Bellemare & Kroger, 2007; Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010; Ermisch et al., 
2007; Glaeser et al., 2000; Holm & Nystedt, 2005; Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, 
&Martinsson, 2009; Karlan 2005; Lazzarini et al., 2004; O’Higgins, Mazzioni, & Sbriglia, 
2018; Samson, 2018; Sapienza et al., 2007; Wilson, 2018; for contrary evidence, see Fehr et 
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al., 2002; Johnson & Mislin, 2012; McEvily, Radzevick, & Weber, 2012). This mismatch has 
also been observed in other contexts: people who say they trust their leaders might be 
expected to be willing for those leaders to use their own judgement to decide complex policy 
issues. However, one study found that respondents who say they are more trusting are more 
likely to demand that their politicians stick closely to the mandates they have been given and 
do not overrule these with their own judgement (Sigelman, Sigelman, & Walkosz, 1992).  
 
A mismatch between attitudinal statements and behaviour often comes down to the limited 
correspondence between the attitude elicited and the specific behaviour analysed (Ajzen & 
Fishbein 1977; McEvily, Radzevick, & Weber, 2012). On one hand, trust behaviour might 
not be solely driven by a belief that the counterparty is trustworthy – other factors might also 
play a role, such as appetite for risk (Li, Turmunkh, & Wakker, 2019; McEvily, Radzevick, 
& Weber, 2012). But it could also be that the standard measurement approach only reflects 
expressive trust, and ignores instrumental trust – and this might partly explain the apparent 
disconnect with interpersonal risk-taking behaviour. For this reason, these survey item-based 
measures, like “This is a brand I trust”, will be called expressive trust measures in this paper. 
 
The potential of field or hypothetical behaviour-based measures 
 
Restricting ourselves to examining consumers’ trusting behaviour in the field could side-step 
the questions raised about surveys as measures of trust. For example, the OECD (2017b) has 
suggested that consumption of bottled water might be used as a way of directly measuring 
trust in the water supply. Field experiments have been conducted to look at interpersonal 
consumer-to-consumer selling (Elfenbein, Fisman, & McManus, 2012; Resnick et al., 2006) 
or peer-to-peer lending (Duarte, Siegel, & Young, 2012). But at the level of the consumer 
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brand, there are huge potential confounds: if sales of Evian go down, that could be because 
the public water companies are more trusted, but it could be for a host of other reasons too. 
While many economic interactions have an element of trust, as argued in the famous Arrow 
(1972) quote that opens this chapter, few are only about trust. We could, for example, 
imagine a bank that offers to hold our money in its vault. In that case, we are only trusting the 
security of the vault and the willingness of the bank to honour its commitments. But as soon 
as the bank starts paying out interest or offers us some sort of easy payment facility, it is 
offering value on other dimensions other than trust. That prevents us from saying that the 
bank with more savings deposits is necessarily always more trusted than its competitors. 
 
An alternative approach has been to ask hypothetical questions, where participants say what 
they would do in different realistic situations (in a consumer context, Buskens & Weesie, 
2000; Morhart et al., 2015; Pirson et al., 2014, 2017; Schlosser, Barnett White, & Lloyd, 
2006; in an interpersonal trust context, Brooks, Dai, & Schweitzer, 2015; Buchan & Croson, 
2004; Montano et al., 2017; Veszteg, Funaki, & Tanaka, 2015). In the arena of political and 
social trust, participants have been asked to estimate how likely they think different trust-
violating events are to occur: for example, answering on a scale of likelihood, “If a member 
of [country’s parliament] were offered a bribe to influence the awarding of a government 
contract, do you think that the member of parliament would accept the bribe?” (OECD, 
2017b, p.206). Chaudhuri and Holbrook (2002) ask for similar estimates of risk in a 
consumer product. Obviously, this only incorporates the idea of risk-taking if participants 
embrace the fiction and believe their answers have some consequence. Comparisons between 
hypothetical and real interpersonal trust experiments suggest that they do not do this 
consistently (Holm & Nystedt, 2005).  
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Other alternatives to measuring trust try to measure the degree to which people associate a 
target with the concept of trustworthiness. The association can be measured in the speed with 
which people sort words in an implicit association test, with the implication that if 
participants quickly place the word trust alongside a target, then they must associate the 
target with the idea of trust (Murtin et al. 2018). Or it can be measured in the degree to which 
participants make a logical error, the conjunction fallacy, that implies they associate the 
target with being untrustworthy (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenyzayen, 2011). While these are 
measures of behaviour, they are more properly thought of as measures of behaviour 
associated with trusting beliefs, rather than of trusting behaviour, as they still do not involve 
any risk-taking on behalf of the participant. 
 
The Trust Game 
 
“A revolution in experimental economics” (Murtin et al., 2018, p.17) has created games that 
incorporate risky decisions into the measurement of interpersonal trust (Bogliacino, 
Grimalda, & Jimenez, 2017; McEvily, Radzevick, & Weber, 2012). The most prominent5 
attempt to incorporate risk-taking into a measure of trust has been the trust or investment 
game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In this game, Player A is endowed with some 
money and can choose to transfer it to Player B. What Player A transfers is tripled, but Player 
B decides whether or not to return any of this to Player A. Player A’s transfer is considered a 
measure of A’s trust in B (Camerer, 2003). Variations on this game have now been used in 
scores of experimental designs (Johnson & Mislin, 2011), both in the lab and as part of 
 
5 A number of alternative methods have been trialled which follow Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe’s (1995) 
introduction of risk into the measurement: for example, the “envelope drop” game (Glaeser et al., 2000), testing 
which advisers are consulted in a virtual maze (Hale et al., 2018), or offering participants a chance to pay to 
reduce their exposure to the decisions of another (McEvily et al., 2012). 
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nationally representative surveys (Bellemare & Kroger, 2007; Ermisch et al., 2007; Fehr et 
al., 2002). The two-stage design means that Player B has complete information when they 
make their decision to be trustworthy or not. This means it is possible for Player A to focus 
her attention on entirely on the question of whether B will repay the money or not, ensuring 
that the game is more focussed on trust than prisoner’s dilemma designs that were used in 
early research on trust (for example, as used by Deutsch, 1958), where there is a large 
element of coordination needed even between ‘trustworthy’ players who would want to 
cooperate if possible (Kee & Knox, 1970). Because it incorporates genuine risk-taking for the 
experimental participant, these approaches will be referred to as risk-based measures of trust. 
 
Few have seen a way of applying a risk-based measure of trust to organisations and 
institutions (OECD, 2017b). The only example I am aware of is to hold trust games where 
Player B (the trustee) is an employee of a particular public body (Carlsson et al., 2018). This 
provides compelling insight, but only into trust in the average employee of an organisation - 
not in the organisation as a whole. The trustworthiness of the average employee might be an 
important variable, for example, if we are considering questions of corruption, but is less 
relevant in most consumer contexts. In a consumer context, the trustworthiness of a whole 
organisation, and its top decision-makers in particular, is usually the more important 
question.  
 
Using Dunning and colleagues’ (2012) terminology of “expressive” trust and “instrumental” 
trust helps clarify the potential of a risk-based measure of trust, such as the trust game. The 
standard measures of trust based on survey items can only ever reflect expressive trust, 
because they do not include any prospect of wins or losses to be instrumental about. A risk-
based trust measure, like the trust game, can reflect both expressive trust and instrumental 
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trust (Dunning, Fetchenhauer, & Schlosser, 2012). For example, Player A might make a large 
transfer in the trust game because of the substantial gains to be had from trusting, or because 
they wish to show respect towards Player B (Dunning et al., 2014; Schlosser et al., 2015). In 
that sense, the risk-based measure captures a larger definition of trust, and one that reflects 
the many potential reasons to trust that might exist in the real world. 
 
The range of factors which might influence behavioural measures of trust can, however, be a 
disadvantage: it makes it difficult to disentangle the instrumental and expressive trust in risk-
based decisions (Dunning, Fetchenhauer, & Schlosser, 2012). Authors repeatedly ask whether 
the transfers in the trust game can really be considered to represent trust if they reflect social 
preferences such as altruism or inequality aversion (Cox, 2004), an obligation to trust 
(Buchan, Croson, & Solnick, 2008) or showing respect to the trustee (Dunning et al., 2014). 
A purely instrumental view of trust would have to reject transfers based on such preferences. 
However, by taking the view that trust can be both expressive and instrumental, these 
objections become less problematic. In addition, these criticisms might be less relevant in the 
context of large, corporations seeking to win the trust of their consumers, where we might not 
expect strong social preferences that lead to greater trust – indeed, some authors argue that 
the “societal narratives about business tend to be overwhelmingly negative….[ensuring that] 
people are generally quite sceptical of business… particularly when it comes to integrity and 
goodwill” (Harris & Wicks, 2014, p.197). 
 
Das and Teng (2004) divide the vulnerability involved in a trusting action into two 
categories: “relational risk” where the risk is in the choices of the trustee, and “performance 
risk” i.e. their ability to carry out a task even if they choose to. A clarifying example in a 
corporate context might be when we hand over our personal data to a company: there is a 
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relational risk that they sell the data on without our permission, and a performance risk that 
their security systems are breached and the data is stolen. In the classic trust game, proposed 
by Berg and colleagues (1995) the risk only stems from the choices of the trustee i.e. the 
relational risk. However, performance risk can be easily incorporated into the trust game by 
allowing trustors to take risks based on the performance of trustees: for example, betting on 
how accurately a trustee will estimate the number of rocks in a jar (Harris, Wicks, & 
Moriarty, 2014) or selecting one representative to answer trivia questions that could win our 
team a prize (Brand & Mesoudi, 2019). 
 
A criticism of the trust game is that it reflects preferences for risk: suggesting those who 
transfer larger amounts are better thought of as gamblers, rather than trustors (Eckel & 
Wilson, 2004; Karlan, 2005). This is a similar objection to the idea that instrumental thinking 
does not belong to trust decisions (Sabel, 1993; Williamson, 1993). Again, if we allow trust 
to take expressive or instrumental form then this criticism becomes less problematic. In a 
consumer-to-business context, the objection also seems less relevant: the distinction between 
trusting a company and taking a risk on a company seems to collapse in many contexts: for 
example, when trying a new product or choosing to invest. 
 
Another criticism is that experimental measures of trust have little external validity 
(Nannestad, 2008), a charge that has been levelled more broadly at experimental games for 
many years (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez (2017) make this 
critique of a number of experimental economics techniques, although they also find that 
behaviour in a trust game is correlated with being willing to donate to an unfamiliar charity, 
which others have considered a trusting behaviour (Rafaeli, Sagy, & Derfler-Rozin, 2008). 
The question can only be fully resolved in the consumer-to-business context by comparing 
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field data with any new measure of risk-based trust in a company, which is very challenging. 
In Chapter 2, below, the risk-based measure of trust is examined alongside a measure of 
behavioural intentions, but this is clearly not the equivalent of “real world” observations. The 
point is picked up again in Chapter 5, as a potential avenue for future research. 
 
Measuring trust – or measuring positivity? 
 
Whether a risk-based or more standard expressive measure is used, one of the trickier 
problems in this area is to distinguish trusting from liking. The two concepts are distinct 
(Nicholson, Compeau, & Sethi, 2001; van der Merwe & Puth, 2014), with the latter 
sometimes referred to as “brand affect” (Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001, 2002; Sung & Kim, 
2010). For companies, being liked is likely to be profitable for different reasons to being 
trusted. At an interpersonal level, people can feel less favourable towards those they see as 
more intelligent than them (Jonason & Hughes, Forthcoming), but these more intelligent 
types might be worth trusting, at least for certain intellectually demanding tasks. It seems 
plausible to imagine a company that is trusted but disliked, or one that is liked, but not trusted 
(Power, Whelan & Davies, 2007).  
 
Mercier (2020) also raises the intriguing possibility of behaviourally-relevant and 
behaviourally-irrelevant beliefs, where a person might agree that they believe, for example, in 
a conspiracy theory about an ethnic group that they dislike, but do not act as if they genuinely 
thought these beliefs were true. In his example, people who spread antisemitic rumours of 
Jews kidnapping gentiles do not rush to the police to report their concerns in the way they 
would if they genuinely thought people in their town were up to no good. In a business 
context, we could imagine a similar mismatch between survey responses that condemn a 
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disliked business and consumer behaviour that implies some level of trust; for example, if 
people were to agree in a survey with a statement like ‘Technology companies are happy to 
spy illegally on people’ while also not removing every device with a microphone from their 
home. 
 
Given the apparent ubiquity of the “halo effect” (Cooper, 1981), we should expect some 
correlation between liking and trusting. For example, more attractive players can receive 
more in the trust game (Wilson & Eckel, 2006; Winkielman, Olszanowski, & Gola, 2015). 
But to understand trust, measurement approaches need to find a way of isolating trust from 
overall positivity or attraction. When examining international trust attitudes, Bottazzi and 
colleagues (2016) looked at Eurobarometer data on the degree of trust in people from 
different European countries but felt it necessary to include a control variable that represented 
positive feeling between countries to try to avoid having their analysis confounded6.  
 
In the management and marketing literature, the standard measures of trust are often very 
strongly correlated with measures of positivity or brand affect: from r=.59 (Chaudhuri & 
Holbrook, 2002); r=.66 (Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001); r=.75-.80 (Nicholson, Compeau, & 
Sethi, 2001), r=.79 (Sung & Kim, 2010) to r=.89 (Lau & Lee, 1999). Halos have also been 
found to spread from a relational-risk question to a performance-risk question, when using 
both risk-based and expressive techniques (Harris, Wicks, & Moriarty, 2014).  This raises the 
suggestion that a trust measure with greater discriminant validity vis-à-vis liking could have 
some greater practitioner value – or, to put it another way, that a cost-conscious practitioner 
might abandon trust measurement altogether unless it tells them something different from a 
measure of overall positive feeling towards the brand. 
 
6 Ingeniously, they use public votes cast in the Eurovision Song Contest. 
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HOW TO INCREASE TRUST IN A COMPANY? 
 
Practitioners need to know what they can do – if anything – to increase trust in a company. 
An exhortation to increase trust, without specificity on how, has little practitioner value 
(Butler, 1991; Cho & Ringquist, 2011; Pirson & Malhotra, 2011). And, just as a mechanic 
needs to know how a car works to fix it, a consultant needs a model of what causes consumer 
trust, in order to increase it. The models of McAllister (1995) and Mayer and colleagues 
(1995) have come to dominate academic discussion in management and marketing (Baer & 
Colquitt, 2017). Both were originally developed to understand organisational trust, often 
based on the latest psychological and sociological literature at the time, and have been more 
recently adapted to consumer trust (e.g., Schlosser, Barnett White, & Lloyd, 2006). However, 
more contemporary psychological, behavioural, and experimental economics research has led 
to further insights into trust-building at the interpersonal level (Evans & Krueger, 2009; Fehr, 
2009), which has sometimes been drawn into the marketing and management context (e.g., 
Benedicktus et al., 2010). In addition, economists and especially game theorists, have 
considered the question of trust in economic interactions from more of a rational choice 
viewpoint (e.g., Arce, 2006), and these findings have sometimes been tested in experiments 
(e.g., Slonim & Garbarino, 2008). 
 
To compare these different perspectives and understand where their predictions might differ, 
four key differences are analysed in the forthcoming discussion:  
 
• Company heterogeneity. The degree of difference amongst trustees – in this case, 
companies or brands. 
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• Company trust antecedents. The specific attributes of the company that lead to 
increased trust. 
• Processing style(s). The way that the trustor’s trusting beliefs or intentions are 
influenced by the trust antecedent.  
• Process-style determinant. If there are different processing styles potentially at work, 
what determines which one is more important. 
 
Using these difference, it is possible to categorise the different approaches into four stylised 
models: a “classical liberal” model of trust where only the incentives created by the 
environment matter; a “type-signalling” model where there are some trustworthy companies 
and they must try to signal their trustworthy status to consumers; a model I have labelled 
“affective/relational”  where the consumer sometimes makes a considered judgement and 
sometimes an affective reaction, especially when in a close relationship; and finally a model 
based on dual-processing approaches to cognition which, in honour of Kahneman (2011), 
could be called “trusting fast and slow”.  It is in this last model where processing styles and 
the determinants of those styles play an important role in determining the predictions of the 
model, and therefore on the best interventions for particular contexts. These models are 
summarised in Table 1.1 and explored in depth in the subsequent sections. 
 
Each of the different trust-building models suggests particular areas where a practitioner 
might make a successful intervention to increase trust.  This allows us to link specific models 
to successful interventions to increase consumer trust, albeit that there are not that many 
(Morhart et al., 2015; Schlosser, Barnett White, & Lloyd, 2006; Van Boom, Desmet, & Van 
Dam, 2016; Waytz et al., 2014). But, perhaps more usefully, the large number of findings 
from the interdisciplinary literature on trust can also be grouped based on the trust-building 
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model they fit with. There may be some ‘nesting’ within the lists given here: for example, the 
‘trusting fast and slow’ model detailed below would expect that the interventions that involve 
trustors making complex inferences, either in the classical liberal or type signalling model, 
could be successful, but only when consumers are able and motivated to make such 
inferences. 
 
Authors often note the implications of interpersonal studies for the business world, but few 
replicate their studies in this context (for example, Arce, 2006; Kim et al., 2013; Zurn & 
Topolonski, 2017). There are reasons to think that a consumer context may be very different: 
for example, trustees act differently when dealing with groups rather than individuals (Holm 
& Nystedt, 2010) and when there is a power imbalance between trustor and trustee (Kim et 
al., 2017). 
 
The interventions presented here are not designed as an off-the-shelf menu. Each intervention 
needs careful development and testing, as discussed further in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Nevertheless, by gathering potential inspirations for intervention around different models, we 
can help break down the question: if one model is shown to be more plausible than the others, 
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Classical liberal model and related interventions 
 
The political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1668/1994) helped to found modern liberal 
thought with his conceptualisation of a society of atomic individuals who have roughly equal 
abilities and an identical goal: their own self-interest (Moehler, 2009). In this view, at least in 
caricature, trust is only possible through the enforcement of a strong external actor (Akerlof, 
1970; Hardin, 1996; Ostrom, 2003). Returning to the contemporary world of consumer trust, 
we can imagine a situation where regulators can punish brands that make false promises – in 
which case, trust in the company is possible, provided that the regulators are sufficiently 
vigilant and forceful (Jain & Posavac, 2001). The source of trust needn’t necessarily be the 
state – provided it can monitor behaviour and exclude defectors, it could be a non-state body 
like a trade association that provides the seal of approval (e.g., Casado-Aranda, Dimoka, & 
Sanchez-Fernandez, 2019). 
 
Outside of such regulation, there is also the potential for businesses to somehow bind 
themselves against the incentive to betray trust, like the celebrated story of Odysseus having 
himself tied to the mast to avoid the temptation of the sirens (Elster, 1984; 2000). A company 
could enter into a contract with a satisfaction guarantee (Akerlof, 1970; Andreoni, 2005), that 
changes what is in the trustee’s self-interest, ensuring that the interests of the trustor and 
trustee are better aligned. As with Odysseus, trust is dependent on the strength of the ropes: if 
the new incentives can be easily changed back to the old ones, then they offer no basis for 
trust (Hardin, 1996). Note that such behaviour can also act as a signal – but this concept is 
captured in the following section on type-signalling. 
 
Writing almost a century after Hobbes, the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers Adam Smith 
and David Hume advanced the idea that trust was possible because of the need to maintain a 
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good reputation (Bruni & Sugden, 2000). Hume suggests that the need to maintain one’s 
moral reputation can mean it is in one’s interest to keep onerous promises (Hume, 
1740/1978). In Smith’s telling, if an individual can specialise in some area of activity and 
acquire a reputation for doing it well, perhaps initially through free gifts, then they can make 
a living from this activity (Ashraf, Camerer, & Loewenstein, 2005). Then the rest of us can 
rely on the incentive to maintain that reputation (Akerlof, 1970; Kreps, 1993; Ostrom, 2003; 
Schelling, 1960). Fast forwarding to today, if customers avoid a brand with a bad reputation, 
then trustworthy behaviour can be in the company’s self-interest (Nelson, 1974; Weigelt & 
Camerer, 1988).  Instead of the sanction coming from the state, the untrustworthy company is 
punished as its customers go elsewhere. This requires two things: firstly, an effective 
reputation mechanism allowing untrustworthy businesses to be identified, and secondly, the 
existence of alternative competitors. As Bruni and Sugden (2000) note, Smith (1763/1978) 
identified the different market opportunities in England, Scotland, and The Netherlands as 
leading to different levels of “probity and punctuality” in different countries. At the extremes, 
a completely anonymous trader, by definition can’t have a bad reputation, while a monopolist 
has, by definition, nothing to fear, although as Hill (1990) notes, a bad reputation in one 
market where a company is dominant, may still follow it into other markets where it is not. 
 
All of these potential routes to trust require the trustor to understand the trustee’s incentives 
and make inferences about their future behaviour. It is this strictly self-interested backwards 
induction that predicts a non-trusting Nash equilibrium for the one-shot trust game (Berg, 
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). While this may well be possible, it is potentially quite 
cognitively demanding. For example, one trust game experiment found that a number of 
participants needed to see others’ successful use of backwards induction in order to make the 
optimal choice to build a reputation for themselves (Bohnet, Harmgart, & Tyrna, 2005). 
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In this model, no company is inherently better than another: the executives at Coca-Cola are 
neither more skilled or nor more moral than their rivals at Pepsi. Nevertheless, a company 
can increase trust.  Table 1.2 identifies a range of potential interventions that a company 
could make to build trust within this paradigm, based on a review of the multidisciplinary 
trust literature. It can deliberately change its own incentives – for example, by offering a 
guarantee – and this fits most neatly into this model of trust, but can tend towards the trivial. 
It can also affect the institutional environment, for example, by proposing a regulatory body 
that ensures all soft drinks are safe to drink; increasing trust, albeit for the whole sector rather 
than a particular business. Stretching slightly beyond the strict assumptions of perfect 
information and reasoning (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944), we can imagine an 
intervention that seeks to assist the process of induction, for example, by reminding 
consumers that a market is competitive and that a good reputation is necessary for success. 
Such interventions might still benefit one company if they were sufficiently targeted, for 
example, if they were made just when a customer arrives at a Coca-Cola vending machine. 
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Table 1.2 Potential consumer trust interventions within a “classical liberal” model of 
trust-building 
 






guarantees increases trust 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust 
Andreoni, 2005; Andreoni 
& Varian, 1999 
Offering guarantees and 
communicating how they 
will be enforced by an 
external authority 
Certification from an 
independent third party 
increases trust 





Participate in credible 
certification schemes 
Increasing the salience of competitive and reputational reasons for trust 
Ensuring that competition 
amongst trustees for 
scarce reputational 
benefits is present and 
visible increases trust 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust and 
trust behaviour on a peer-
to-peer market websites 
Abraho et al., 2017; 
Barclay, 2004; Bohnet & 
Huck, 2004; Bolton, 
Katok, & Ockenfels, 
2004; Huck, Ruschala, & 
Tyran, 2006; 
Keser, 2003; Resnick et 
al., 2006; Slonim & 
Garbarino, 2008 
Communicate the fact that 
the company faces tough 
competition and operates 
in a market where 
reputation matters, as well 
as encouraging reputation 
mechanisms such as 
online reviews 
Trustors will trust more if 
they understand that the 
trustees’ interests and 
goals are cooperative 
 
(NB - this is different 
from sharing their values, 
as discussed below) 
An experimental study of 
interpersonal trust and a 
correlational study of 
interorganisational trust 
McCabe, Smith, & 
LePore, 2000; Sohn, 1994 
Explain why being 
trustworthy is good for the 
business 
The fact that reputational 
information is available, 
at some cost, increases 
trust 
An experimental study of 
interpersonal trust 
Duffy, Xie, & Lee, 2013 Communicate the fact that 
key information is 





(like McDonald’s) are 
more successful, 
especially if the name is 
unusual, with the 
inference that this is 
because of the extra 
incentive to maintain a 
good reputation 
Analysis of a large dataset 
of company performance 
Belenzon et al., 2017 Use an unusual or 
eponymous corporate 
name 
Membership of a brand 
(e.g., a chain) is 
associated greater demand 
as bigger brands have 
more at stake from 
reputational damage and 
so will provide higher 
quality 
Theoretical model and 
analysis of a hotel 
industry data 
Chung & Kalnins 2001; 
Shapiro, 1983 
Maintain, join and grow 
membership of a wider 
brand or chain 
Trustees that have made a 
long-term commitment to 
a relationship or situation 
are more trusted than 




Experimental studies of 
consumer trust and a 
correlational study of 
interorganisational trust 
Benedicktus et al., 2010; 
Buskens & Weesie, 2000; 
Sako & Helper, 1996  
Companies should put 
down physical roots, offer 
long term contracts, and 
suggest in marketing and 
communications that they 
intend to continue to serve 





Type-signalling model and related interventions 
 
The modelling of information in the economy has been described as “perhaps the most 
important break with the past” in economics (Stiglitz, 2000, p.1441). Questions of trust can 
also be seen as problems of asymmetric information (Connelly et al., 2011; Stiglitz, 2000). 
This asymmetry might be that the seller knows the quality of a product and the buyer does 
not (Akerlof, 1970; Shapiro, 1983). This is exemplified in Akerlof’s classic model of used car 
sales, which seeks to model the asymmetry between a seller, who knows how well their car 
works, and the buyer, who only has the seller’s word that the car isn’t a ‘lemon’. In the so 
called ‘principal-agent problem’, the asymmetry stems from the idea that business owners 
cannot monitor everything done by the managers they employ, meaning that managers can 
pursue strategies that reflect their own interests rather than the owners’ interests (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). In Spence (1973)’s model of the labour market, employees can 
be more or less productive, but their employers cannot identify this before they make a job 
offer, meaning that “to hire someone, then, is frequently to purchase a lottery (p.356).”  
 
Each of these models stands somewhat apart from the simplest classical economic approach, 
in part, because they envisage some extra diversity amongst the potential trustees (Connelly 
et al., 2011; Nelson, 1974). There are less productive workers in Spence (1973), who may 
also be the ones manufacturing Akerlof’s (1970) unreliable “lemon” cars. These are 
“selection problems” for the trustor (Stiglitz, 2000, p.1447). Stiglitz (2000) distinguishes 
these from “incentive problems” which focus on the future of incentives of the trustee. 
However, such incentive problems can also be approached from a selection perspective: the 
principal-agent problem can also be thought of as depending on “the tastes of managers for 
non-pecuniary benefits” (Jensen & Meckling, p.330), with some managers caring about their 
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share of the same profits enjoyed by the owners, while other managers care about how 
comfortable their office is and how much respect they receive in society. More simply, if we 
think of agents as always promising to look after their principal’s interests, then the question 
becomes one of identifying an honest promiser over a dishonest promiser (Camerer & 
Weigelt, 1988; Tellis & Wernerfelt, 1987). These two approaches, focussing on trustee ability 
and trustee interest or choices, align to the idea of two different kinds of interpersonal risks, 
discussed above: performance risk and relational risk (Das & Teng, 2004). But the focus, 
from the company’s perspective, is always on how they can show to the consumer that they 
are the trustworthy type (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988) or, in the terminology used in some 
marketing research, are a credible brand (Erdem & Swait, 2004). 
 
From a different perspective, authors focussed on the trust in management and marketing 
have also suggested that there is diversity among potential trustees. Butler’s (1991) list of 
potential variations includes availability, competence, discreteness, fairness, integrity, 
loyalty, openness, promise fulfilment, receptivity. Similar lists of characteristics have also 
been produced in considering what makes a source of information credible (Giffin, 1967). 
Such an abundance of concepts might hamper the development of a clear understanding 
(Bigley & Pearce, 1998). Today, the most commonly used group of characteristics (Baer & 
Colquitt, 2017) is Mayer and colleagues' (1995) tryptic of ability, benevolence, and integrity7. 
While they were developed to analyse trust relations between employees or partner 
organisations, this model has been applied to the consumer-company trust relationship too 
(e.g., Ingenhoff & Sommer, 2010; Schlosser, Barnett White, & Lloyd, 2006; Sucher & Gupta, 
2019). 
 
7 A similar set of three concepts has also been developed in the risk communication literature (Peters, Covello, 
& McCallum, 1997). 
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Whether building from the problem of asymmetric information or analysing trustworthy 
characteristics, these two approaches share a focus on the idea that there are different types of 
trustee. Ability is clearly analogous to the idea of productive or unproductive employees in 
Spence (1973). Benevolence and integrity fit more with the idea of a principal-agent conflict 
of interest, as in Jensen and Mecking (1976): the more aligned interests are, the easier it is to 
cooperate (Ostrom, 2003).  
 
There is some debate over whether benevolence and integrity are distinctive enough 
concepts. Some authors simplify the approach to just two dimensions: one related to ability 
and one related to goodwill (including Calefato, Lanubile, & Novielli, 2015; Fournier & 
Alvarez, 2012; Harris & Wicks, 2014; Hsiao et al., 2010; Mal, Davies, & Diers-Lawson, 
2018; Munuera-Aleman et al., 2003; OECD, 2017a; Poppo & Schepker, 2014; Siegrist, Earle, 
& Gutscher, 2003; Tinsley, 1996).  In a qualitative study, Mal and colleagues (2018) 
suggested that benevolence and integrity are closely paired, and evaluated after a company’s 
ability. This also mirrors the distinction between warmth and competence assessments 
(Aaker, Garbinsky, & Vohs, 2012; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007) and apparently aligns with 
the distinction between cognitive and affective trust (McAllister, 1995; Calefato, Lanubile, & 
Novielli, 2015), although as discussed below, the two approaches are actually quite different 
(Baer & Colquitt, 2017). One experimental study used the idea of “prosocial lies” – where A 
makes a false statement to altruistically help B – to show that integrity and benevolence can 
be teased apart in behavioural terms (Levine & Schweitzer, 2015), and Pirson and Malhotra 
(2011) also argue for maintaining the distinction because of the apparent differences in the 
impact of benevolence and integrity depending on the depth of the relationship. Related, 
though not identical, distinctions might be drawn between generalised benevolence and 
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integrity – ‘I would not lie’ – and specific bonds – ‘I would not lie to you’ (Nooteboom, 
2002). Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis (2007) acknowledge the difficulty, but suggest that 
benevolence is only relevant where parties have an established relationship. 
 
While the signalling and the trust characteristics approaches broadly agree on how trustees 
differ, they have different perspectives on how trustors can identify the better trustees. In 
management and marketing discussions that focus on trust rather than signalling, including 
Mayer and colleagues (1995), this process is not discussed (Malhotra, 2014). The implication 
is that it is obvious: the trustor observes the trustee and comes to a judgement. As Sucher and 
Gupta (2019, p.8) put it simply: “Be trustworthy and you will be trusted.”  To distinguish this 
approach from the later discussion, this ‘what you see is what you get’ approach is labelled 
‘naïve observation’, where there are no complicating factors between perceived 
trustworthiness and actual trustworthiness. The practitioner simply has to reveal their 
business’s high level of ability, benevolence and integrity, to be trusted. For example, in 
Pirson and colleagues’ work (2017) consumers are expected to judge a business’s ability 
when they learn how profitable it is. This still allows assessments of benevolence and 
integrity to be asymmetric: a small amount of negative evidence might outweigh a large 
amount of positive evidence (Kim, Dirks & Cooper, 2006). There are also some suggestions 
that contextual factors, like the trustee’s affective state, might affect how an observation leads 
to trust, and in particular which of the different trust aspects is most important (Schoorman, 
Mayer, & Davis, 2007; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). 
 
In contrast, advocates of signalling theory might worry that a trustee attempting to display its 
ability, benevolence and integrity might just be engaging in ‘cheap talk’ (Ben-Ner, 
Putterman, & Ren., 2011). As the joke goes, “the key principle in selling is honesty. Once 
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you know how to fake that, you’ve got it made” (Huber, 1971, p.263)8. In Spence’s (1973) 
model, employers are willing to pay higher wages to the more productive employees. But that 
higher pay means that every potential employee has an incentive to claim they are highly 
productive. The employer can’t offer the higher wages to anyone, because they don’t know 
who is really going to be more productive. Because the employees’ claims are can’t be 
treated as credible, they can’t benefit, even if they are in fact more trustworthy. 
 
The route out of this problem is to focus on credible signals. Returning to Spence’s (1973) 
model, education can act as a credible signal if low productivity employees find education 
more costly and difficult than high productivity employees. An equilibrium can exist where 
the high productivity employees invest in education to mark themselves out from the low 
productivity employees. The situation is stable because, for the low productivity workers, the 
costs and difficulties of education are so big that they are not offset by the high wages that the 
employer offers.  
 
The idea of credible signalling has then been applied extensively in marketing (Erdem & 
Swait, 1998; Kirmani & Rao, 2000) and management (Connelly et al., 2011). The 
diagnosticity of any signal depends both on how easily mimicked it is, and on the amount of 
noise in the environment (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998; Cox & Deck, 2006; 
Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009; Shinya, Yusuke, & Hiroki, 2016).  From the consumer 
perspective, the opportunity for people to learn the true quality of a product and either stay 
loyal or switch brand is critical in establishing the nature of a credible signal (Erdem & 
Swait, 1998). In the consumer marketing context, these signals can be divided into those 
 
8 The line has been variously attributed to Groucho Marx, Samuel Goldwyn and others (Quote Investigator, 
2011). 
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which are costly whether or not the company lives up to its promises, such as introductory 
offers or advertising campaigns, and those which will prove expensive for a business of 
untrustworthy type, such as a generous money-back guarantee (Kirmani & Rao, 2000).  
 
Credible signalling in a consumer trust context requires the kind of inferential reasoning that 
was also critical to the classical model (Kirmani & Rao, 2000). The consumer must infer that 
only companies that are particularly confident in their skills can make voluntary offers that 
would be risky for lower skilled companies, whether that is in more generous guarantees, 
offers of transparency, or other forms of voluntary hostage posting (Boulding & Kirmani, 
1993; Nakayachi & Watabe, 2005), or large investments in their brand which will only 
recoup their value if customers remain loyal (Erdem & Swait, 1998). An apparently simple 
example might be a large charitable donation, as exactly the kind of hard-to-fake, costly 
signal that indicates a benevolent type (Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002). However, 
if, for example, only companies who make large charitable gifts are considered for lucrative 
public contracts, then suddenly the donation reveals nothing about the underlying company 
type. This can make the returns to signals discontinuous (Stiglitz, 2000), as can be seen in 
Spence’s (1973) education-signalling model, where a certain amount of education wins you a 
high paying job, but any additional education beyond that is wasted. Indeed, signals are so 
dependent on the underlying context that both high and low prices have been considered to be 
potential signals of unobservable product quality: high prices suggesting confidence that 
consumers will happily pay for quality, while low, introductory prices, might suggest that 
sellers believe they will earn consumers’ confidence if they try the product, and so the 
introductory offer will quickly pay for itself (Kirmani & Rao, 2000). 
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While credible signalling requires inferences from the trustor, it does not have to be a deeply 
considered and strategic move on the part of the trustee. Frank (1988, p.5) makes the 
intriguing argument that the trustee’s own emotions can act as credible signals to trust:  
 
“Consider, too, the person who ‘feels bad’ when he cheats. These feelings can 
accomplish for him what a rational assessment of self-interest cannot – namely, they 
can cause him to behave honestly even when he knows he could get away with 
cheating. And if others realize he feels this way, they will seek him as a partner in 
ventures that require trust”.  
 
From a more positive perspective, if someone gets pleasure from being thought trustworthy, 
then that could provide a reason to trust them (Pettit, 1995). This model only holds if 
emotional mimicry is imperfect or more costly for the untrustworthy type, otherwise 
untrustworthy people would display these emotions and their signalling value would 
disappear (Frank, 1988; 2004; 2011). Displays of emotion have been identified as a 
potentially fruitful research avenue to understand interpersonal and intraorganisational trust 
(van Knippenberg, 2017).  
 
Companies do not have the ability to reveal their emotional state by smiling with feeling 
rather than in a fake way (Scharlemann et al., 2001). However, there is a developing literature 
on brand authenticity which speaks to this point, focussing on how a company shows what 
intrinsically motivates it (Becker, Wiegand, & Reinartz, 2019; Morhart et al., 2015; Moulard, 
Raggio, & Garretson Folse, 2016). Authenticity is also a prized quality in political candidates 
(Valgarðsson et al., 2020). At the same time, there is evidence that false signals or inauthentic 
displays are treated harshly, both for interpersonal trust (Jordan et al., 2017) and consumer 
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trust (Cheshin, Amit, & van Kleef, 2018; Houston, Grandey, & Sawyer, 2018; Wagner, Lutz, 
& Weitz, 2009). 
 
What is the relationship between ability, benevolence, and integrity? Mayer and colleagues 
(1995, p.721) appear to suggest that, to be “deemed quite trustworthy”, a trustee should be 
perceived as having all three characteristics. Consumer and intraorganisational trust studies 
can find very strong correlations between all three (Cho, 2006; Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 
2007). However, from a credible signalling perspective, a signal of ability provides no 
information about a trustee’s benevolence. For example, an advanced degree signals that 
someone has high ability in some field and so should be able to perform related tasks in a 
competent way. The degree is only relevant to performance risks and has no bearing on 
relational risks (Das & Teng, 2004), unless we imagine it includes some sort of ethical 
training, as in a medical degree. A qualitative study of physician-managers, using the ability, 
benevolence, integrity model, suggested that medical professionals saw potential conflicts 
between managerial competence and integrity and benevolence in patient care, as well as 
suspecting that managerial responsibility was associated with reduced medical skill (Cregard 
& Eriksson, 2015).  
 
There is also some evidence that these different aspects have different levels of importance, 
at least in certain context. Ability, benevolence and integrity can be expected to play different 
roles depending on what vulnerability is most important at the time (Colquitt et al., 2011), 
which then leads different stakeholder relationships to be more dependent on different aspects 
of trust: for example, with employees highly dependent on a business’s benevolence  (Pirson, 
Martin, & Parmar, 2017). At an interpersonal level, more powerful people tend to use 
competence-based arguments, and also tend to be persuaded by such arguments, while those 
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who have less power tend to use and respond to benevolence-based arguments (Dubois, 
Rucker, & Galinsky, 2016).  One study found that businesses tended to be less trusted for 
their benevolence than other institutions, but that trust in their benevolence was the strongest 
predictor of overall trust in business (Peters, Covello, & McCallum, 1997). 
 
Another key potential difference between these different aspects is what information is 
needed to diagnose their absence. A single example of bad faith might lead to strong 
conclusions about a person’s lack of benevolence or integrity, while a single failure of 
competence might not have such a strong effect (Kim, Dirks & Cooper, 2006). This could 
explain why ‘attack ads’ in US politics are more effective when aimed at a candidate’s 
character rather than their job performance (Homer & Batra, 1994). However, at the stage of 
trust-building, rather than trust-repair, questions of character and of ability are more similar: 
repeated positive performance is often not fully diagnostic of full trustworthiness, and such 
positive events, such as a nuclear power plant operating without a problem for a day, can lack 
visibility or definition (Slovic, 1999). 
 
Signals to trust or ‘antecedents’ of trust, the term used by Mayer and colleagues (1995), both 
imply a causal story over time: first we receive the signal or assess the antecedents, then we 
form our trust judgement. The correlational research designs that are often employed in 
measuring the perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity of companies (for example, 
Pirson and Malhotra, 2011, who recognise this issue) make it difficult to tell this causal story 
from the evidence. For this reason, throughout this paper, ability, benevolence and integrity 
will be referred to as ‘aspects’ of trust, which might correlate with trust but don’t necessarily 
precede it, unless they are being discussed as clearly pre-dating and leading to trust. 
 
50 
Table 1.3 lists a range of potential type-signalling interventions that a business could make, 
based on the findings in a range of different trust studies, spanning experimental economics, 
behavioural science, marketing and management. The type-signalling approach draws 
attention to a key question for each one, however: how credible is it as a signal? In one 
market, with one set of incentives, a particular signal might be highly revealing of type, while 
in another, it might not. 
 
Table 1.3 Potential consumer trust interventions within a “type signalling” model of 
trust-building 
 
Relevant findings Research contexts Author, Year of 
Publication 
Potential interventions 
Naïve signals of ability 
 
A statement asserting a 
business’s reliability can 
increase trust 
Experimental studies of 
consumer trust 
Li & Miniard, 2006; 
Schlosser, Barnett White, 
& Lloyd, 2006 
Communications should 
assert the company’s 
trustworthiness 
A higher quality website 
can increase trust 
Experimental and 
qualitative studies of 
consumer trust 
Baumann, 2017; 
Schlosser, Barnett White, 
& Lloyd, 2006 
Companies should invest 
in high quality website 
design 




perceptions of quality in a 
consumer durable 
An experimental study of 
consumer trust 
Boulding & Kirmani, 
1993 
Introduce guarantees or 
use marketing campaigns 
to ensure they are seen as 
binding 
Independent expertise or 
independently set quality 
standards can lead to 
higher trust or overcome 
problems of unobservable 
quality 
 
Experimental studies of 
source credibility and 
correlational studies of the 
manufacturing and motion 
picture businesses 
 
Klucharev, Smidts, & 
Fernandez, 2008; Lampel 
& Shamsie, 2000; Terlaak 
& King, 2006; Wilson & 
Sherrell, 1993 
 
(although Bohner, Ruder, 
& Erb, 2002, show the 





from recognised experts in 
consumer-facing 
marketing and 
communications, seek out 
reviews and certification 
from recognised 
authorities, invest in “star 
names” that suggest 




Being trusted by others 
increases the probability 
that a particular trustee 
will be trusted   
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal and 
consumer trust and a 
correlational study of 
intraorganisational trust 
Benedicktus et al., 2010; 
Buskens & Weesie, 2000; 
Ferrin, Dirks, & Shah, 
2006; Wei, Zhao, & 
Zheng, 2019 
Highlight the number of 
customers who trust the 
business 
Profitability increases 
trust, at least in relation to 
competence, and more 
noticeably amongst 
ideological conservatives 
Experimental studies of 
stakeholder trust 
Pirson et al., 2014, 2017 Publicise company profits 
Specialist website and 
online assistants were 
more trusted 
Experimental study of 
trust in an online purchase 
context 
Koh & Sundar, 2010 Emphasise the business’s 
specialisation 
Spending on advertising 
signals that a company’s 
goods are of such good 
quality that customers 
return to them and pay the 
price premium 
Theoretical model and 
econometric study of 
quality, price and 
advertising in the car 
industry, of different 
spending levels on 
advertising by product 
types and a correlational 
study of consumer 
perceptions of quality and 
advertising expenditure 
 
Erdem & Swait, 1998; 
Milgrom & Roberts, 
1986; Nelson, 1974; 
Thomas et al., 1998 
If the company does have 
a higher quality product, it 
should invest in 
advertising and other 
conspicuously expensive 
status symbols like offices 
in desirable locations 
Partnering with another 
brand can signal trust, 
provided the second brand 
has much to lose if they 
endorse an untrustworthy 
partner 
Experimental study of 
consumer assessments of 
unobservable quality 
 
Rao, Qu, & Ruekert, 1999   Partner with other brands 
who are exposed to a 
potential backlash if your 
company is untrusworthy 
Higher prices signal that a 
company’s goods are of 
such good quality that 
customers return to them 
and pay the price 
premium 
 
Theoretical models and 
meta-analysis of 
price/quality correlations 
in consumer report 
studies, econometric study 
of quality, price and 
advertising in the car 
industry 
Milgrom & Roberts, 
1986; 
Rao & Monroe, 1996; 
Tellis & Wernerfelt, 1987; 
Thomas et al., 1998 
 
 
If the company does have 
a higher quality product, it 
should charge a price 
premium for it 
Naïve signals of benevolence and integrity 
 
Irrelevant apologies like 
‘I’m sorry about the rain’ 
increase perceived 
benevolence 
Experimental study of 
interpersonal trust 
Brooks, Dai, & 
Schweitzer, 2015 
Apologise when a 
customer is suffering, 
even when the problem is 
nothing to do with your 
company 
Drawing attention to 
potential drawbacks or 
negatives in a product can 
increase trust (though this 
does not always lead to a 
product being chosen) 
Experimental study of 
consumer and employer 
trust 
Keren, 2007 Draw attention to the 
downsides in your case or 
frame products in a way 
that seems scrupulously 
honest (e.g. “25% fat” 
rather than “75% lean”). 
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Specific arguments about 
a company’s 
environmental claims 
increase trust in 
environmental credentials 
Experimental study of 
consumer trust in 
environmental product 
claims 
Atkinson & Rosenthal, 
2014 
Make specific, rather than 
vague, arguments for 
trustworthiness 
Co-op business models 
are more trusted 
Correlational study of 
B2B relationships 
James & Sykuta, 2006 Communicate any 
cooperative element of the 
business model: for 
example, employee share 
ownership 
Trustees demonstrating 
trust in a third party 
increased trust, sometimes 
demonstrated through 
telling a personal story of 
hardship or vulnerability  
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust 
Charness et al., 2011; 
Hagman, 2020 
Show the company’s trust 
in employees or other 
customers 
Nationals and products 
from specific countries are 
trusted more than others 
Experimental study of 
consumer trust as well as 
cross-national study of 
venture capital investment 
behaviour 
Bottazzi, Da Rin, & 
Hellmann, 2016; 
Kabadayi & Lerman, 
2011 
Make an effort to 
showcase employees or 
operations in particularly 
trusted countries, even 
outside their home market 
Trustors show greater 
trust in consumers of 
“natural” foods and in 
companies using solar 
technology 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal and 
consumer trust 
Pirson et al., 2014; Taylor 
& Stevenson, 2018 
Associate the company 
with natural food and 
farming and renewable 
energy 
Companies with a mission 
statement focussed on 
increasing employment 
are more trusted than 
those who focus on 
profitability 
Experimental study of 
consumer trust 
Pirson et al., 2014 Prioritise job-creation 
over profitability in the 
company’s mission 
statement 
Promises and other non-
binding contracts can 
increase trust, pledges to 
keep prices low increase 
perceived benevolence if 




Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust and an 
experimental study of 
consumer trust 
Abbink, Irlenbusch, & 
Renner, 2000; Schweitzer, 
Hershey, & Bradlow, 
2006; White & Yuan, 
2012 
Make pledges to act in a 
particularly trustworthy 
way 
Potentially credible signals of benevolence and integrity 
 
Trustees that are 
perceived to be 
deliberately more 
transparent are more 
trusted 
Correlational study of 
interorganisational trust 
Sako & Helper, 1996 Deliberately invite 
scrutiny and publish data 
beyond legal requirements 
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Charitable donations can 
increase trust, as do more 
longerstanding, and freely 
chosen, CSR programmes 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust and 
consumer trust 
Elfenbein, Fisman, & 
McManus, 2012; Fehrler 
& Prezpiorka, 2016; 
Milinski, Semmann, & 
Krambeck, 2002 
Companies should make 
large charitable donations 
and publicise the fact 
When prices are 
unpredictable, price match 
guarantees make a retail 
business more trusted 
Experimental study of 
consumer trust 
White & Yuan, 2012 When prices are 
unpredictable, pledge to 
match competitor prices 
Those who do not seek to 
hedge outside the trust 
relationship are more 
trusted, as are those who 
voluntarily post some 
form of hostage 
 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal and 
consumer trust 
Bracht & Feltovich, 2007; 
Keren & Raub, 1993; 
Malhotra & Gino, 2011; 
Nakayachi & Watabe, 
2005 
Make decisions which 
deliberately make the 
company dependent on its 
target customers 
A more unique way of 
working or product 
increases perceived brand 
authenticity 
Experimental and 
correlational studies of 
consumer trust or brand 
authenticity 
Morhart et al., 2015; 
Moulard, Raggio, & 
Garretson Folse, 2016; 
Emphasise an 
idiosyncratic approach, 
scarce knowledge and 
ingredients or other 
elements that make a 
brand unique 
Emphasising longevity 
and heritage increases 
perceived brand 
authenticity, while 
perceived consistency of 
approach is associated 
with greater brand 
credibility 
Experimental and 
correlational studies of 
consumer trust or brand 
authenticity 
Erdem & Swait, 1998; 
Morhart et al., 2015; 
Moulard, Raggio, & 
Garretson Folse, 2016 
Emphasise a long and 
unique heritage behind a 
company and deliver 
marketing messages in a 
consistent fashion 
Frontline employees using 
inauthentic emotions 
reduces trust 
An experimental study of 
consumer trust 
Houston, Grandey, & 
Sawyer, 2018 
Discourage 
representatives of the 
company from making 
inauthentic emotional 
displays 
Guilt aversion preferences 
can lead to trustworthiness 
A theoretical model of 
interpersonal trust 
Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 
2007 
Suggest that the business 
would feel guilty if it let 
customers down, both in 
marketing and 
communications and in 
sales interactions  
Trustees deciding quickly 
or acting cooperatively 
without considering the 
potential costs or benefits 
can lead to increased trust 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust, an 
evolutionary model and a 
field study of decisions on 
a television gameshow  
Critcher, Inbar, & Pizarro, 
2012; Capraro & Kuilder, 
2016; Hoffman, Yoeli, & 
Nowak, 2015; Johnsen & 
Kvaloy, 2015; Jordan et 
al., 2016b; Van de 
Calseyde, Desmet, & Van 
Dam, 2014; Van de 
Calseyde, Evans, & 
Demerouti, 2020 
Increase the speed of 
decision-making or 




-control in a separate 
context increases trust 
An experimental studies 
of interpersonal trust  
Righetti & Finkenauer, 
2011 
Communicate the 
company’s record of 
resisting temptation  
More extreme political 
positions are more trusted 
Theoretical model Kartik & McAfee, 2007 
 
(Although Pennycook & 
Rand, 2019a, find less 
trust in highly partisan 
news source) 
 
Take extreme positions on 
issues 
Trustees displaying a 
deontological moral code 
(in a separate context) 
increased trust 
An experimental studies 
of interpersonal trust 









Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust 
Jordan et al., 2016a; 
Jordan & Rand, 2019 
Criticise other companies 
that are untrustworthy 
 
- although be careful you 
don’t act hypocritically in 
doing so, as this can have 
the opposite effect (Jordan 
et al., 2017). 
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Affective/relational model and related interventions 
 
McAllister’s (1995) model of “affect-and cognition-based trust” was published in the same 
year as Mayer and colleagues and has been almost as influential (Baer & Colquitt, 2017). It 
takes the division of affective and cognitive dimensions of trust proposed by sociologists 
Lewis and Weigart (1985) and applies it to trust within organisations. It has since been used 
quite frequently, with different degrees of reinterpretation, in management and marketing 
studies of consumer trust (including Calefato, Lanubile, & Novielli, 2015; Johnson & 
Grayson, 2005; Sekhon et al., 2014). 
 
At first glance, this model looks similar to Mayer and colleagues’ (1995), albeit with two 
rather than three areas of focus. Cognitive trust is associated with good reasons to trust, 
particularly competence, responsibility, reliability and dependability (McAllister, 1995). 
Affective trust is associated with “genuine care and concern for the welfare of partners” i.e. a 
similar idea to benevolence (McAllister, 1995, p.26). As the different types discussed above 
are relevant to different kinds of trust problems, so cognitive and affective trust have different 
antecedents and different behavioural consequences. Using Das and Teng’s risk terminology 
(2004), when a risk is relational it is a matter for affective trust, while when it is a 
performance risk then it is a matter for cognitive trust. However, there can be strong 
correlations between measures of affective and cognitive trust (van Knippenberg, 2017). 
 
The first important difference between the models becomes clear, however, if we consider the 
question of how trust judgements are formed (Bigley & Pearce, 1998). In the models 
discussed up to this point, all trust judgements either depend on naïve observation – which 
Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, (2007) make clear is cognitive – or on complex inferences 
about trustee incentives and future behaviour. In McAllister’s (1995) model, the cognitive 
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trust judgements are arrived at in the same way, but affective trust is different. The exact 
process is not made very explicit by McAllister, but Zajonc’s (1980) concept of an affective 
evaluation is cited. For Zajonc, the affective reaction occurs before, and independently of, a 
cognitive assessment, meaning that “we can like something... before we know precisely what 
it is” (p.152).  This means that affect plays a very specific role in McAllister’s model: he is 
not suggesting that “affect as information” biases all trust judgements, as in Schwarz & 
Clore’s (1983) model (Baer & Colquitt, 2017; van Knippenberg, 2017). Instead, McAllister’s 
model appears to suggest that when questions of trust focus on goodwill and intention, the 
affective reaction determines the trust judgement. The topic or type of risk (relational or 
performance based) determines the type of processing (affective or cognitive) that trustors 
use. Taking this one step further, Williams (2001) proposes that affect towards a group can 
provide a sufficient reason to trust (or distrust) people in that group. 
 
The second key difference is the role of the relationship between trustor and trustee – 
prompting van Knippenberg (2017, p.8) to propose renaming this entire approach as 
“relationship-based trust”. The strength of the relationship determines the role that affect-
based trust plays. McAllister (1995) suggests that affect-based trust is impossible in the first 
stage of a relationship, but that, when the relationship is very advanced, then the affective 
evaluation will dominate all trust questions, even ones related to performance risk. This 
echoes a longstanding interest in close relationships, identification, value congruence, and 
social distance in questions of trust across numerous different fields (Buchan & Croson, 
2004; DeBruine, 2005; Deutsch 1958; Pirson & Malhotra, 2011; Pirson, Martin, & Parmar, 
2017).  It means that the topic only determines the type of processing at some mid-point in 
relationship development: trust in strangers, whether relational or performance-based, is 
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processed through cognition, while trust in close friends, whether relational or performance-
based, is processed by an affective reaction (Nooteboom, 2002).  
 
Developing a relationship based on reciprocity is a key route to coordination in social 
situations, including in questions of trust (Abdulkadiroğlu & Bagwell, 2013; Bolton, Katok, 
& Ockenfels, 2004; Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Charness & Haruvy, 2002; Jones & 
George, 1998; McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith, 2003; Misyak et al., 2014; Ostrom, 2003; Rabin, 
1993). This could be a question of signalling – as more experience of interaction provides 
more evidence of partner type (Ostrom, 2003). Biased information processing, where new 
information is more likely to reinforce our like or dislike of a trustee may help reinforce this 
effect (Cvetkovich, et al., 2002; Zarolia, Weisbuch, & McRae, 2016). But researchers have 
repeatedly found that before someone increases their trust in a fellow in-group member, they 
need to know that the trustee is aware of their shared identity (Foddy et al., 2009; Platow et 
al., 2012). This suggests that reciprocity might be based less on a rose-tinted view of the 
people we like, and more on an expectation that, if they know we share a bond, then they will 
act in a trustworthy way. Whatever the exact mechanism, the affective-relational model 
allows relationships to start in terms of “tit-for-tat” but to progress beyond that pattern to one 
that is less calculating and more forgiving (Jones & George, 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996).  
 
The frequent assumption in the trust literature is that trusting relationships have to develop 
over time (for example, Lewicki & Bunker, 1996).  However, research on ‘swift trust’ has 
suggested that trust can sometimes occur quite quickly when, for example, a diverse set of 
freelancers all work together to create a movie (Corritore, Kracher, & Widenbeck, 2003; 
Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer,1996). The idea of swift trust involves deliberate rule-following 
(Baer & Colquitt, 2017), where people are “vigilant social perceivers” who can then leapfrog 
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the normal stages of relationship development when they identify particular cues about their 
trust partners or contexts (Kramer & Lewicki, 2010, p.257).  That makes it a different idea 
from trust heuristics (Baer & Colquitt, 2017) or the phenomena of immediate trust for 
complete strangers in interpersonal experiments (Dunning et al., 2014), which are both 
discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
In an affective-relationship model, companies should either attempt to increase trust through 
the processes available to their relationship stage, or to make the relationship closer and 
therefore change how the company is judged. If cognitive processing is being used, then the 
model is indistinguishable from the signalling model used above, except that the topic is 
normally restricted to ability or competence. If affective processing is being used, then the 
business should seek to create a more positive affective reaction i.e. simply to be better liked. 
But perhaps most fruitfully, this model suggests that a company can change which processes 
are used by attempting to build a closer relationship, with the aim that then all trust 
judgements will come down to a positive affective reaction. This makes relationship 
marketing a critical aspect of trust-building (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Morgan & Hunt, 
1994; Sirdeshmukh, Singh, & Sabol, 2002) and chimes with the emphasis on brands as 
relationship partners (Fournier & Alvarez, 2012). Table 1.4 suggests a series of potential 




Table 1.4 Potential consumer trust interventions within a “affective-relational” model of 
trust-building 
 
Relevant findings Research contexts Author, Year of 
Publication 
Potential interventions 
Increased liking/positivity/brand affect and homophily 
 
More liked trustees are 
also more trusted, and 
perspective taking 
increases both liking and 
trust 
Correlational studies of 
consumer and 
interorganisational trust 
and an experimental study 
of interpersonal trust 
Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 
2001, 2002; Doney & 
Canon, 1997; Erle, 
Ruessmann, & 
Topolinski, 2018; Lau & 
Lee, 1999; Nicholson, 
Compeau, & Sethi, 2001; 
Sung & Kim, 2010 
The company should 
focus its communications 
on creating a warm glow 
of positivity for 
customers, and, when 
possible, encourage them 
to see things from its point 
of view 
Trustors show greater 
trust for trustees who are 
in-group members, 
particularly when 
contrasted with a shared 
opponent, while social 
similarity and location is 
associated with increased 
trust 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust and 
correlational studies of 
interorganisational trust 
and institutional trust 
Buchan & Croson, 2004; 
Buchan, Croson, & 
Dawes, 2002; Carlsson et 
al., 2018; Chuah et al., 
2016; Deutsch, 1958; Falk 
& Zehnder, 2013; Hughes 
et al., 2016; Karlan, 2005; 
Lei, Masclet, & Vesely, 
2014; Slovic, Flynn, & 
Layman, 1991   
Showcase staff and 
leaders from a similar 
social group as the target 
customer 
Shared values or support 
for a positively regarded 
cause and can be 
associated with increased 
trust 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust and 




Carlin & Love, 2013; 
Fehrler & Kosfeld, 2013; 
Hernandez-Lagos & 
Minor, 2015; Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994; Sekhon et al., 
2014 
Support a cause that 
consumers believe in 
Eating the same food as a 
potential trustee increases 
trust 
Experimental study of 
interpersonal trust 
Woolley & Fishbach, 
2017  
In point-of-sale 
interactions, offer free 
food which is also 
enjoyed by salespeople 
Labelling a trustee as a 
‘friend’ increases trust 
Experimental study of 
interpersonal trust 
Burnham, McCabe, & 
Smith, 2000 
Describe the brand as the 
consumer’s friend in 
marketing and 
communications, 






Relationship building and reciprocity 
 
Communication and 
frequent contact are 
associated with increased 
trust 
Experimental study of 
interpersonal trust, 




Anderson & Narus, 1990; 
Ben-Ner & Putterman 
2009; Ben-Ner, 
Putterman, & Ren., 2011; 
Bicchierri, Lev-On, & 
Chavez, 2010; Burt & 
Knez, 1995; Deutsch, 
1958; Doney & Cannon, 
1997; Ellingsen et al., 
2009; Hamman, Weber & 
Woon, 2011; Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994;  
Sekhon et al., 2014 
The company should 
contact its customers on a 
regular basis  
Partnerships, especially 
more long-lasting ones, 
that allow for patterns of 
reciprocity to develop are 
associated with increased 
trust 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal and 
consumer trust and 







Bohnet & Huck, 2004; 
Bolton, Katok, & 
Ockenfels, 2004; Burt & 
Knez, 1995; Buskens & 
Weesie, 2000; Cochard et 
al., 2004; Dyer & Chu, 
2000; King-Casas et al., 
2005; McCabe, Rassenti, 
& Smith, 1996 
 
Seek to create long-term 
reciprocal relationships 
with customers, for 
example, using reward 
cards 
Higher perceptions of 
trustee loyalty are 
associated with higher 
trust 
Correlational study of 
intraorganisational trust 
Butler, 1991 Show loyalty to long-term 
customers, for example by 
offering them discounts 
Trustors show more trust 
in individual decision-
makers than group ones, 
with the inference being 
that it is easier to escape 
responsibility for 
reciprocity within a group, 
reducing the incentive to 
reciprocate 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal and 
intergroup trust 
Holm & Nystedt, 2010 Emphasise that ‘the buck 
stops’ with a particular 
individual who will be 
responsible for 
reciprocating a customers’ 
trust, for example, by 
allowing store managers 
to offer discretionary 






‘Trusting fast and slow’ model and related interventions 
 
Over recent decades, much research in psychology and behavioural science has focussed on 
how people might think in two different ways: one emphasising complex reasoning, while the 
other emphasises intuitive associations (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2002; 
Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). The evidence for this distinction starts with the idea 
that these two ways of thinking can produce a “simultaneous contradictory belief” (Sloman, 
1996, p.11). In the most famous example, participants believe that an outspoken and highly 
educated bank teller is more likely to be a bank teller and a feminist than just a bank teller – 
while, on reflection, recognising that this is logically impossible (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983). People with stronger cognitive abilities are less likely to make such errors (Stanovich 
& West, 2000). Experimental manipulations have successfully increased or decreased these 
errors (for example, Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). Models of persuasion suggest that 
different sorts of communication will have different influence on each type of thinking, with 
irrelevant information being more persuasive when processing is quick and intuitive 
(Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
 
When people are using the more intuitive way of thinking, they may fail to fully assess a 
complex question and instead use an intuitive rule-of-thumb or heuristic (e.g., Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973). Such heuristic thinking may not only be easier, it may be adaptive too 
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Rand, 2016; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012). Often these 
heuristics take the form of ‘attribute substitution’; swapping a complex question for an easy 
one (Kahneman, 2002). These easier questions are often easier because they are “natural 
assessments” that are automatically available when we examine an object: for example, size, 
distance, similarity, or fluency of processing (Kahneman & Frederick 2002, p.55). One of 
these natural assessments is affect -  whether you feel positive or negative towards an object - 
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and this then leads to the ‘affect heuristic’, where instead of answering the complex question, 
the person answers the simple question: do I feel good or bad about this object? (Finucane et 
al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2002). The ‘halo effect’ where different positive attributions all tend 
to correlate (Cooper, 1981) would be expected as the consequences of people making 
attribute substitutions using the affect heuristic. This is a concept that will be important for 
the empirical work described in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
The focus on the use of heuristics when people think quickly should not be read as implying 
that, when people are reflective, their processing is neutral, unbiased or normatively rational. 
Affective and cognitive biases have been found even when participants might be assumed to 
be using more deliberate processing (e.g., Lee & Selart, 2011; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 
2010). Instead, this slower processing is described as “thoughtful (though sometimes biased)” 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p.191). It is not necessary to take a short cut in order for someone 
to get lost, though it might make it more likely in some circumstances. 
 
The relationship between these two ways of thinking is still a matter of substantial 
controversy (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  The idea of them as two distinct and separable 
systems has been criticised as going beyond the evidence (Chater, 2003; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski et al., 2006). However, the idea of two processes 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013) or two functions (Herrmann-Pillath, 2019) is a more modest claim 
and therefore easier to evidence. At a minimum, the idea of faster and slower ways of 
thinking, even if it is simplified, can aid analysis, hypothesis generation (Kahneman, 2011) 
and practical policymaking (Chater, 2018). It is also possible to distinguish between the 
automatic processing of a something that is consciously represented and the automatic 
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processing of something that is not consciously represented, with the latter sometimes being 
called ‘Type 0’ cognition (Shea & Frith, 2016). 
 
The “default interventionist” view describes the relationship between the two processes 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), where the 
default is the intuitive, fast process – Type 1 processing in Evans and Stanovich’s (2013) 
updated terminology – while Type 2 processing, which is slower and more complex, “will 
occur only when difficulty, novelty, and motivation combine to command the resources of 
working memory” (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p.237)9. If Type 2 processes detect that an 
initial Type 1 intuition is wrong, they can correct that error or acquiesce to it, such as when 
people comply with a superstition not to ‘tempt fate’ even when they know this is impossible 
(Risen, 2015). 
 
Trust judgements are likely candidates for heuristic processes because they combine all the 
complexities of decision-making under uncertainty with additional social and strategic 
questions about how we believe others will act, what will motivate them, and how they think 
will interpret our choices (Evans & Krueger, 2011, 2014, 2016; Nooteboom, 2002; Bohl & 
van den Bos, 2012; Cox & Deck, 2006; Zak, 2019). In social interaction games, even when 
acting in an optimal fashion, participants have struggled to explain their strategy explicitly 
(Camerer & Weigelt, 1988). Together, this makes some authors sceptical that people can be 
basing their trusting behaviour on very considered judgements (Keren, 2007; Kugler, 
Connolly, & Kausel, 2009). In some situations, where there is little clear information, 
heuristics may be the only thing people can use to make trust decisions (Chaiken & 
 
9 A separate point is the suggestion that increased (reduced) trust causes more Type 1 (Type 2) processing, 
which has been evidenced in some contexts (Fein, 1996; Kleiman et al., 2015; Priester & Petty, 2003). This is 
not the focus here, but the association is referenced in the Table 1.5. 
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Maheswaran, 1994; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). However, Siegrist and colleagues (2003, 
p.707) argued that “the implications of dual-mode models of information processing for our 
understanding of trust and confidence have not been fully exploited”. 
 
In interpersonal trust research, there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that people do 
often use heuristics to form trust judgements10. These can involve the affect heuristic, where, 
when the object of trust is made more attractive or easier to deal with, trust increases (Harris 
et al., 2015; Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, 2018; Wilson & Eckel, 2006; Winkielman, 
Olszanowski, & Gola, 2015; Zurn & Topolinski, 2017). There is also evidence for a variant 
on this affect-related heuristic – where feelings unrelated to the target, such as a good mood, 
also affect trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Forgas & East, 2008; Kang et al., 2011; Lount, 
2010; Mislin, Williams, & Shaughnessy, 2015; Sellaro et al., 2015; van Knippenberg, 2017). 
Other heuristics have also been identified, such as deciding based only on one’s own 
potential payoff and ignoring partner incentives (Evans & Krueger 2011, 2014, 2016) or 
simply opting for whatever the default option is when one is low on self-control, regardless of 
whether the option is trusting or distrusting (Evans et al., 2011). Williams (2001) proposes a 
model of interpersonal trust in which people sometimes form trustworthiness perceptions 
based on a belief about a category of people – for example, taking the wine recommendation 
of a French colleague, without actually considering whether they are really knowledgeable on 
the subject – and she notes that the degree of category-based processing is influenced by the 
context people find themselves in. Murray and colleagues (2011) propose a related model of 
trust in romantic relationships where one’s expectations of one’s partner (‘reflective trust’) 
 
10 Sundar and colleagues (Kim & Sundar, 2015; Koh & Sundar, 2010) propose a somewhat similar model of 
trust judgements in media communications, but in their model, dual processes lead to either cognitive or 
affective trust in a manner redolent of McAllister’s (1995) model discussed above. 
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are overruled by one’s automatic evaluative associations with the partner (‘impulsive trust’), 





However, there is evidence that such heuristic thinking is only the default in forming trust 
judgements, and not the rule: when Type 2 processing is triggered, i.e. when there is 
difficulty, novelty, and motivation (Evans & Stanovich, 2013), then heuristics can be 
overridden, and trust judgements can be based on more credible evidence.  For novelty, there 
is some evidence that as relationships become more established, heuristics are more 
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frequently used to make trust judgements (Nicholson, Compeau, & Sethi, 2001), while 
induced suspicion has the opposite effect (Fein, 1996). The degree of risk can affect trust 
behaviour (Balliet & Van Lange, 2012; Johansson-Stenman, Martinsson, & Mahmud, 2005; 
Evans & Krueger, 2011, 2014; Keren, 2007), though not consistently (Amir, Rand, & Gal, 
2012; Johnson & Mislin, 2011). When manipulations that increase Type 1 processing are 
removed, participants can avoid using heuristics that might lead to worse outcomes (Evans et 
al., 2011; Hughes et al., 2016; Mislin, Williams, & Shaughnessy, 2015; Forgas & East, 2008; 
Lount, 2010). We see evidence of people’s capacity to ignore unhelpful heuristics in studies 
that show quiz teams able to ignore their teammate’s prestige and dominance and instead 
nominate the team member most likely to perform a task that benefits the whole group 
(Brand & Mesoudi, 2019) and participants relying more on more relevant competence-related 
information, rather than warmth-related information, to make trust judgements around 
performance risk (Harris, Wicks, & Moriarty, 2014).  
 
This approach predicts that individuals with more cognitive resources will be able to use 
Type 2 processing more – and this has been evidenced in some trust-related contexts. People 
who perform well on the Cognitive Reflection Task are better able to identify sources of 
online misinformation (Pennycook & Rand, 2019b), while those with heightened emotions 
are less able to do this (Martel, Pennycook, & Rand, 2020). People with more working 
memory (Murray et al., 2011) or self-regulation resources (Murray et al., 2013) can override 
a propensity to trust (or distrust) their romantic partners. In the opposite way, additional 
cognitive load makes people more reliant on heuristics of avoiding out groups or relying on a 
“trustworthy face” to make decisions in a trust game (Lount, 2010). There is also some 
evidence that, as children develop stronger cognitive abilities, they become more discerning 
and evidence-based in their trust decisions (Evans, Athenstaedt, & Krueger, 2013). 
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Type 1 and Type 2 processing do not map onto trust levels in a simple way. Heuristic 
processing might be more trusting – such as a heuristic to always trust doctors – or it might 
be less trusting, for example, refusing to trust anything you read in a particular newspaper. In 
terms of information processing, there is some suggestion that Type 1 processing is quicker 
to believe information that it is presented and therefore “gullible and biased to believe” 
(Kahneman, 2011, p.81). To predict the impact of different cognitive processes, we need to 
know the default which someone will tend towards when using Type 1 processes, either 
because of their individual traits (Speer, Smidts, & Boksem, 2020) or the situation they find 
themselves in (Evans et al., 2011). Rand (2016, 2014) argues that the net effects of heuristics 
are likely to be cooperative (i.e. trusting) because this is normally the adaptive thing to do in 
social life, although this depends on how benign a social environment people have grown up 
in (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012). In addition, greater reflection has been found to make 
people more cynical about the motive behind others’ generosity (Critcher & Dunning, 2011). 
However, Mercier (2017; 2020) takes a somewhat different view and argues that, in deciding 
whether to trust behaviourally-relevant information, it is more adaptive to be conservative 
and sceptical, and that this is embedded in heuristic-based judgements rather than being 
imposed by the restraining forces of Type 2 processes. There is also some evidence that 
greater self-control, normally associated with Type 2 processes, can make people more 
cooperative (Martinsson et al., 2014). 
 
Type 1 and 2 processes are also not the equivalent of our instrumental and expressive trust 
distinctions. While it might be natural to associate instrumental trust with Type 2, this need 
not necessarily be the case: if we trust the water from the tap is drinkable, our purpose is 
instrumental rather than expressive, but our processing is often not very deep. Equally, 
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expressive trust can be based on deep reflection and the decision to take a “trusting stance” 
(McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998, p.476), rather than a quick heuristic.  
 
The dual process approach might help unlock the conceptual debate about whether trust and 
distrust are distinct concepts (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Saunders, Dietz, & 
Thornhill, 2014; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Lewicki and colleagues (1998) describe two 
seemingly opposite situations: one of high trust and low distrust, where trustors cooperate 
without suspicion, and one of low trust and high distrust, where trustors are fearful and 
cynical about their potential partners. Yet could these both be examples of Type 1 processing, 
where a heuristic, rather than an assessment, is determining the level of trust? When Lewicki 
and colleagues describe a situation of both high trust and high distrust, they suggest that the 
stakes are high and that trustors carefully weigh opportunities and risks – which sounds very 
similar to a description of Type 2 processing. In the political trust literature, recent work has 
suggested some reworkings of the trust terminology that reflect this sort of distinction, 
treating trust and distrust as equally ‘blind’ compared to effortful and empirical mistrust 
(Devine et al., 2020). 
 
What could all this mean for trust in a company? Assessing the trustworthiness of a company 
is perhaps even more difficult than assessing the trustworthiness of another individual: for 
example, people have to choose which airline to fly with without truly knowing how an 
airline works. If, as Arrow (1972) argues, that almost every piece of economic activity 
involves trust, then consumers might struggle to weigh up the trustworthiness of each 
individual and organisation they transact with each day (Keren, 2007; Nooteboom, 2002). It 
seems likely that people would use heuristics, helping to explain why a meaningless logo 
could increase trust (Rafaeli, Sagy, & Derfler-Rozin, 2008) and why different types of 
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marketing and communications are more persuasive depending on which type of processing a 
customer is using (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Koh 
& Sundar, 2010; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Keren (2007) finds that sellers who demonstrate 
their honesty by drawing attention to a products’ flaws are seen as more trustworthy, but this 
only has a positive effect on sales when trust has been raised as a potential concern.  
 
On this basis, it seems reasonable to conclude that most everyday consumer trust decisions 
should be processed automatically, which, as discussed, the dual processing approach 
proposes to be the default. In many cases, trustors will have a conscious representation of the 
trustee, but perhaps in some Type 0 cases they will not (Shea & Frith, 2016): for example, if 
we pick up a sandwich at a free buffet and entirely ignore who might have made it and why. 
Whether or not the representation is conscious, trust in such circumstances is likely to be 
determined by heuristic processing. For our purposes, these Type 0 moments can therefore be 
grouped together with Type 1, as fundamentally ‘fast’ trust judgements.  
 
This approach can be summed up by advising that companies should, by default, expect the 
affect heuristic to replace the kind of trustworthiness assessments discussed in the classical 
and type signalling models described above. But when there is motivation, or there is a 
particular difficulty or novelty, then judgements will be more considered and heuristics 
should have less of an influence. In honour of Kahneman (2011), this model could be called 
‘trusting fast and slow’.11  
 
 
11 Kahneman’s (2011) title includes a comma: “Thinking, Fast and Slow”, perhaps suggesting that the subject of 
his book is thinking, which then comes in these two varieties. For my model and title, I have removed the 
comma: this makes it easier to read as a label in the body of this text and places more emphasis on the dual 
processes that are the focus of this paper. 
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In the thesis presented here, the affect heuristic becomes the specific heuristic of interest 
because positive or negative feeling towards a company is one of the ‘natural assessments’ 
discussed earlier which should be both possible in most business-to-consumer contexts, and 
can be expected to produce enough variety in that context to often be used as a signal. 
However, this is an attempt to focus the investigation here, and should not be understood as 
ruling out the relevance of other heuristics to consumer trust judgements. For example, when 
there are large differences in brand familiarity, such as when I shop in an unfamiliar country, 
I might use the ‘recognition heuristic’ to decide which brand to buy, and just opt for those I 
have seen before (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). When there are no differences in positive 
or negative feeling towards a company – for example, if we were presented with a list of 
anodyne holding companies like ‘ABC Limited’ and ‘Business Holdings PLC’ – then the 
affect heuristic would not provide a clear signal and another strategy might be needed, such 
as picking the first name on an alphabetised list. 
 
Which type of trust – fast or slow – is more valuable to a company? Kramer (2014) argues 
that Type 1-based ‘presumptive trust’ is more powerful than more considered trust, at least 
within an organisation, because it is so effortless. However, there is also a body of evidence 
that suggests that, when people are persuaded using Type 2 processing, this has longer lasting 
and more substantial effects on their behaviour (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). Inevitably, such questions will depend in part on what the company needs 
to be trusted for.  
 
This approach offers two distinct potential areas for intervention by a company, set out in 
more detail in Table 1.5. Firstly, it can accept the processing type that it faces. By default, 
this is likely to be Type 1, and so the company can aim to make people like it more, and 
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influence trust through the affect heuristic, potentially using some of the interventions 
discussed in the affect-relational model above. They could also make trustees feel more 
positive about their situation in general, and influence trust through their overall mood. 
However, if customers are in a situation of high difficulty, motivation or novelty, the business 
should adopt a more ‘rational’ or systemic approach, providing good reasons to trust, of the 
kind discussed in the classical and type-signalling models above. Finally, the company can 
also seek to change the type of processing used by a customer if it believes that will be 
advantageous. For example, if a company believes that it is being written-off by quick, 
heuristic dismissals, it could introduce a novel, attention-grabbing advert that prompts 
customers to use a Type 2 processing, so that they then to then make a more reflective and 
reasoned assessment of the company’s product claims. 
 
This approach also offers a different way of looking at some of the interventions described in 
the preceding three models. Arguments based on credible signals, or the need to maintain a 
reputation, require a trustor to draw some complex inferences about the trustee they are 
dealing with. Naïve signals or more affective relationships, by contrast, require no such 
inference. Therefore, a dual processing perspective suggests that these different approaches 
may have different levels of success, depending on the type of processing used. For example, 
a naïve signal might encourage a feeling of positivity which, if Type 1 processing dominates, 
could lead to greater trust via the affect heuristic. However, if consumers carefully considered 
the meaning of a signal, they might be much more willing to apply tests of credibility, and 
reject naïve signals as reasons to trust. 
 
The reader might easily see the word ‘affective’ in both the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model 
and in the ‘affective-relational’ model of McAllister (1995) and assume that these two 
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approaches are closely related. This would be the opposite of the intention of this thesis, 
which puts forward the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model as distinctive alternative, with a 
different psychological mechanism, and a different set of practical implications. The key 
difference is that, in the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model, people use the affect heuristic to make 
trust judgements depending on the contextual factors that allow Type 1 processing to 
dominate: specifically, the absence of sufficient difficulty, novelty, and/or motivation. But 
the type of trust judgement – performance or relational – doesn’t affect whether the affect 
heuristic is applied in the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model. By contrast, as discussed in greater 
detail above, for McAllister’s model, affective reactions happen in trust judgements when 
they are relational, and presumably regardless of the difficulty, novelty, and motivation 
involved. The implications are significant because McAllister’s model suggests that affect 
will always be the driver in questions of benevolence and integrity, while the ‘trusting fast 
and slow’ model proposes that affect can equally well drive judgements of ability, but that 
affect can also be overridden by Type 2 processes in the right set of circumstances, even 




Table 1.5 Potential consumer trust interventions within a ‘trusting fast and slow’ model 
of trust-building 
 
Relevant findings Research contexts Author, Year of 
Publication 
Potential interventions 
Irrelevant ways of increasing trust using heuristics 
 
Fluency of presentation 
and experience increases 
trust, sometimes simply 
by being repeated, but 
even through helpful 
confirmation noises in a 
busy shopping 
environment  
Experimental studies of 
communication 
credibility, consumer and 
interpersonal trust and a 
correlational study of 
investor behaviour 
Alter & Oppenheimer, 
2006; Cho, 2019; 
Dechene et al., 2010; 
Dohle, & Siegrist, 2014; 
Ertugrul et al., 2015; 
Pennycook, Cannon, & 
Rand, 2018; Reynolds-
McIlnay & Morrin, 2019; 
Silva et al., 2017; Song & 
Schwarz, 2009; Van 
Boom, Desmet, & Van 
Dam, 2016;  
Zurn & Topolonski, 2017 




choose fluent brand and 
product names 
Subliminal activation of a 
friendly name increases 
trust 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust 
Huang & Murnighan, 
2010 
Use names and phrases 
that prime customers for 
friendly associations 
Prior exposure to the word 
‘trust’ increases trust, 
while ‘mistrust’ has the 
opposite effect 
Experimental study of 
interpersonal trust 
Posten, Ockenfels, & 
Mussweiler, 2014 
Use the word ‘trust’ in 
marketing materials, 
website design, and store 
decoration 
Framing the decision to 
trust in terms of potential 
losses increases trust 
Experimental study of 
interpersonal trust 
Evans & van Beest, 2017 
 




show how failing to trust 
will leave the customer 
behind some reference 
point 
Manipulating the trustee context to change the processing style used 
Reduced sleep, ego 
depletion or additional 
cognitive load reduces 
trust*  
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust 
Ainsworth, Baumeister, 
Ariely, & Vohs, 2014; 
Anderson & Dickinson, 
2010; Samson & 
Kostszyn, 2014 
Approach consumers 




trust, while more concrete 
or convergent thinking 
reduces it* 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust 
Sellaro et al., 2014 Encourage customers to 
think differently before 
making an appeal for trust 
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Thinking suspiciously or 
about future consequences 
of your actions, especially 
the risk of making 
mistakes, reduces trust* 
 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust 
Keller et al., 2015; 
Kugler, Connolly, & 





A positive or grateful 
mood, pleasant warmth, or 
a relaxing lavender scent, 
increase trust* 
Experimental studies of 
interpersonal trust 
Dunn & Schweitzer, 
2005; Forgas & East, 
2008; Kang et al., 2011; 
Lount 2010; Mislin, 
Williams, & Shaughnessy, 
2015; Sellaro et al., 2015 
Induce a positive mood in 
consumer touchpoints and 
marketing 
* For these interventions it is critical to know whether people default towards trust or away from it in the context that they face (Evans et al., 
2011). Lount (2010) and Hughes, Ambady, & Zaki, (2016) look at the question directly, showing in their research that if the circumstances 
suggest a heuristic to distrust, then Type 1 processing would lead to distrust: for example, showing less trust towards out-group members when 
using Type 1 processing. The studies noted here did not take so direct a route, but an assumption consistent with this approach would be that, 
in these studies trusting is normally the default, and manipulations that increase Type 2 processing will therefore tend to reduce trust (as in, for 
example Sellaro et al., 2014 and Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). However, in, for example, Ainsworth and colleagues’ study (2014), it appears 






THE AIMS OF THIS WORK 
 
A core part of this thesis is developing and testing a risk-based way of measuring consumer 
trust. As is argued in detail above, the existing expressive measures miss out a substantial 
element of what makes up trust. Chapter 2 describes the design of this new measure and 
Study 1 shows how it operates in a practitioner context and compares the results with more 
standard expressive measures. Study 2, described in Chapter 3, shows how this measure 
responds to different interventions, and again compares this with more standard expressive 
measures. The aim is to show that, for the practitioner, this offers a practical and insightful 
addition to existing consumer trust measurement tools, while, for the academic, it offers a 
new methodological approach which may deliver new insights into consumer trust. 
 
However, the ambition of this work does not stop at measuring the status quo: it aims to help 
practitioners to more effectively build trust in companies. There are dozens of potential 
interventions that a business could make to improve trust, as discussed above. This work aims 
to help narrow and focus a business’s attention onto the most likely candidates. It does this in 
two ways: most obviously, in Study 2, making several interventions and testing their impact 
on consumer trust. More subtly, it offers opportunities in both Study 1 and Study 2, to test 
some of the predictions suggested by the different models of consumer trust development.  
Table 1.6 summarises these. If this work can help identify the most promising model, then 
this aids both practitioners and academics in a substantial way, by allowing them to focus on 
areas of greater potential impact, and helping to ensure that the right interventions are 




Table 1.6 Predictions based on the models of trust-building which will be explored 
and tested in Studies 1 and 2 
Hypotheses were pre-registered, and the first number reflects the study it is tested in. Where no hypothesis 
number is given then the analysis is post-hoc. 
 
Models of trust 













Inferences made about the trustworthiness of 
companies are not context dependent – they 
are effective or ineffective in all 
circumstances. 
 
The impact of a competitiveness-
related intervention on different 




Spence, 1973;  
Jensen & Mecking, 
1976;  
Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995 
Inferences made about the trustworthiness of 
companies are not context dependent – they 
are effective in all circumstances. 
 
Type signalling is only relevant to relevant 
risks – e.g., signals of ability address 
performance risk but not relational risk. 
 
Perceptions conform to three (ability, 
benevolence, integrity) or two (ability, 
benevolence/integrity) aspects. 
 
The impact of a donation, 
simplicity and trusting others-
related interventions on different 
contexts (see H2.1). 
 
The impact of a donation, 
simplicity and trusting others-
related interventions on relevant 
and irrelevant risks (see H2.2). 
 
Factor analysis of the different 
trust aspect measures (see 
exploratory factor analysis 






Morgan & Hunt, 
1994; 
Lewicki & Bunker, 
1996 
 
When risks are relational, trust judgements 
will be driven by an affective reaction. 
Decision time comparisons based 
on the type of risk (H1.4 and 
H2.6) 
 
Trusting fast and slow 
 
Chaiken, Liberman, 
& Eagly, 1989; Evans 
& Krueger, 2016; 
Kahneman, 2002; 
Murray et al., 2013; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986; 
Williams, 2001 
When motivation, novelty, and difficulty is 
low, the affect heuristic will determine trust 
levels. 
 
When motivation, novelty, and difficulty is 
high, inferences and observation, not the affect 
heuristic, will determine trust levels, and 
persuasion based on this may be longer lasting. 
 
 
The relationship between liking 
and trusting depending on the 
context under which they are 
measured (H1.3 and H2.5). 
 
When liking is controlled for, 
measures of trust that invoke Type 
2 processing will be more 
predictive of trusting behaviour 
than measures reliant on Type 1 
processing (H1.2). 
 
The dependence of different 
interventions’ impact on their 






- 2 - 
 
Applying a risk-based approach to 
measuring consumer trust (Study 1) 
 
“It frequently happens that a man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to 
be under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. The offer of a bet startles him, and makes 
him pause. Sometimes it turns out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at ten.” 






Study 1 aims to design and test a novel risk-based approach to measuring consumer trust. For 
practitioners, the fundamental test of a measurement tool is a cost-benefit analysis – is using a 
risk-based measure of trust practically justifiable? Firstly, the measurement tool must be 
relatively low-cost. This has been achieved by design in this case: the risk-based trust tool is 
used in a standard, low-cost omnibus market research platform and the cost of additional 
incentives is kept to a minimum. The bigger challenge is that the tool must provide some 
benefit, at least on enough occasions to merit its costs. In this context, that means it must 
frequently provide some additional insight when companies deploy it alongside more 
standard expressive survey questions related to trust. Two obvious kinds of insight present 
themselves, which are both examined in Study 1: 
• rank based between companies (e.g., Company A is more trusted than Company B) 
and;  






Study 1 also provides an opportunity to improve our understanding of consumer trust and 
how it can be measured. The simplest possibility is that a risk-based measure of trust should 
converge with expressive survey measures of trust, which will in turn correlate with a 
measure of planned trusting behaviour. This is stated formally as: 
 
H1.1. The risk-based measure of trust will correlate significantly with the expressive 
measure of trust and trusting behavioural intentions12. 
 
If this is not the case, then it would indicate that either the two measures are responding to 
two different underlying concepts (one or both of which might be reasonably labelled trust), 
or that contextual factors are changing between the two measurements. 
 
The ‘trusting fast and slow’ model of trust-building discussed above starts from the idea that 
people will, by default, use intuitive Type 1 processing to make trust judgements, and more 
effortful Type 2 processing “will occur only when difficulty, novelty, and motivation 
combine to command the resources of working memory” (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p.237). 
As set out in more detail below, the design of the risk-based trust measure introduces 
incentives that should increase participant motivation. It is also plainly newer and more 
complex than survey items that participants on market research panels can expect to face 
every day. Therefore, it can be hypothesised that Type 2 processing is more likely to be used 
in making trust judgements as part of the risk-based trust measure, than when responding to 
expressive trust questions. This is not just a question of theoretical interest: as described in 
 
12 Hypotheses were pre-registered with the Centre for Open Science https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/TUDK2 
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Chapter 1, practitioners need a working model of how consumers come to trust judgements if 
they are to seek to influence those judgements. 
 
As discussed above, there is an ongoing debate over whether expressive measures or 
experimental game behaviours better predict future trusting interpersonal behaviour. Study 1 
provides a new angle from which to examine this: comparing what people say in expressive 
surveys, what they do in risk-based games, and what they intend to do in their real lives.  
 
This model also has implications for the link between different measures of trust and trusting 
behaviour.  Petty and Cacioppo (1986) argue that when attitudes form from more intensive 
thought, they are likely to have a stronger and more long-lasting relationship with behaviour. 
Together, this suggests, from a ‘trusting fast and slow’ perspective, the hypothesis below: 
 
H1.2. The risk-based measure of trust will contribute more to predicting trusting 
behavioural intentions than the expressive measures of trust, once other variables are 
controlled for. 
 
We might imagine that different trustees prompt, and different trustors have the capacity for, 
different degrees of Type 2 processing. Less familiar potential trustees clearly offer some 
novelty (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Those who possess weaker cognitive abilities or engage 
those abilities less actively will be less likely to apply Type 2 processing in most 
circumstances (Stanovich & West, 2000). In this study, education is used as an imperfect 
proxy for such abilities. 
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We can combine predictions of when Type 1 and Type 2 processing are more likely to be 
used with the assumption that, of the different heuristics that might be employed under Type 
1 processing, the most relevant is the affect heuristic – where people substitute simple like or 
dislike judgements for more complex judgements, such as trust (Slovic et al., 2002). By 
definition, when the affect heuristic is being used, we should see strong correlations in how 
much people like a target and how much they trust it. 
 
Together, this leads to the prediction of a distinctive pattern. Simple like-or-dislike 
judgements should correlate more strongly with trust judgements when participants are using 
Type 1 rather than Type 2 processes. In the absence of motivation, novelty or difficulty 
connected to either the task or the target, this strong correlation should be expected – but it 
should be less expected of people with greater cognitive capacities. Kahneman and Frederick 
(2002) advocate the use of such correlation-based analysis in order to elicit and measure 
heuristics, although they suggest that this is done between-subjects (i.e. with different subject 
completing the different measures). The analysis proposed here is more similar to Finucane 
and colleagues’ (2000) within-subjects approach to eliciting the affect heuristic. This can be 
stated formally, from a ‘trusting fast and slow’ perspective, thus: 
 
H1.3. The relationship between overall positivity and trust will interact with (i) the 
measurement technique (ii) educational qualifications (iii) familiarity13 
 
 
As described above, trust is sometimes separated into two pathways: affective, when related 
to relational risk, and cognitive, when related to performance risk (McAllister, 1995). In this 
 
13 In the initial pre-registration, there was a fourth hypothesis that there would be an interaction with overall 
positivity itself. However, as discussed below the measure of positivity in Study 1 was not designed in a way 
that could test this hypothesis. This is corrected in Study 2. 
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model, following Zajonc (1980), affective trust judgements are reached through an affective 
evaluation that, in Zajonc’s argument, must arrive ahead of, and independently of, any 
cognitive assessment. Taking the idea of ‘affective trust’ literally, therefore, produces a 
specific prediction about the response times for relational risks (i.e. those dependent on 
integrity and benevolence). If McAllister’s model, as interpreted here, is correct, then we 
should observe slower decisions when judging the ability of a trustee because the processing 
is assumed to be cognitive, while, when judging the benevolence or integrity of a trustee, they 
should happen faster because the processing is expected to be through an affective reaction. 
As discussed below, this is not the primary focus of the research and so the methodology 
does not allow for strong conclusions: nevertheless, it does provide an opportunity to 
examine whether one set of tasks are obviously conducted faster than another. The following 
hypothesis states this formally, from the perspective of McAllister’s model: 
 
H1.4. Decisions on risk-based trust that relate to ability will be significantly slower 






A broadly representative sample of the UK adult population were asked about their trust in 
nine different companies, using both traditional measures and the new risk-based measure, 
with fieldwork conducted online by market research company Respondi. 2,174 participants 
responded to the questionnaire but as set out in the pre-registration, participants were 
excluded if they answered either the highest, the lowest, or the central value for every 
question across the risk-based trust measure, the behavioural intentions measure, and the 
expressive aspects measures.  This means that 2,042 participants’ responses were analysed; 
1,030 were female and, excluding those who preferred not to say, the median participant 
declared a gross household income of £30,000.  
 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of three sectors (airlines, financial services, and 
retail). They were then randomly14 allocated a target company in their sector from a range of 
three companies: so those who were allocated to Airlines were then allocated to either British 
Airways, Emirates, or Ryanair. For Financial Services and Retail the companies were JP 
Morgan, Nationwide, and Virgin Money or Amazon, Carphone Warehouse, and John Lewis 
respectively. The sectors were chosen to help demonstrate the generalisability of the results to 
a wide range of consumer-facing companies. The specific companies were chosen in 
anticipation that they would allow for enough variance in both positivity and familiarity for 
the hypotheses in H3 to be tested. However, none of the hypotheses propose that any of the 
businesses are more or less trusted than any of the others: as the risk-based measure is new, 
we start from scratch in ascertaining how trusted different companies are on this measure. 
 
14 Participants are initially allocated randomly, and then the age and gender combination of each participant is 
used to allocates them to the subgroup with the lowest allocation of that age and gender combination at that 




As shown in Figure 2.1, participants were first asked about their positivity towards the target 
company on a very simple scale of positive, neutral, or negative. This is coded as 1, 0 and -1 
respectively. Participants were asked to make this choice as quickly as possible, so as to best 
represent the idea of positive or negative affect described in the “affect heuristic” (Slovic et 
al., 2002). A deliberately different scale format from the trust questions was also used to 
reduce potential common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Participants were then asked 
about how familiar the target firm is, and whether they are a customer. 
 
The next stage of the survey measured trust in the target company in different ways, each 
described in detail below. Participants were asked six risk-based trust questions; a series of 
standard survey-style questions about the target company’s ability, benevolence, and 
integrity; and a series of expressive questions about their behavioural intentions towards the 
target company. The order of these sections was counterbalanced. Following these questions, 
participants were asked a series of expressive questions that explicitly focussed on trust, and 
which were asked about all nine companies. This was placed at the end of the survey, to 
provide the maximum distance from the overall measure of positivity, once again to minimise 
common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  Each measure is discussed in detail below. 




Trust measures – Risk-based measure (RBT) 
 
In Berg and colleagues’ (1995) trust game, risk is incorporated by endowing the participant 
with a sum of money, which will be increased if they decide to transfer this sum to their 
partner - but which can be lost if that partner acts in an untrustworthy way in the future. The 
same logic is applied here: with each risk-based choice being presented in the following way: 
 
“This choice is about British Airways. The special account pays out 50 per cent more 
on top of what you put into it. But you will lose the points you put in the special 
account if, at any time in the next year, British Airways has a major IT problem that 
causes serious disruption to its business for at least 24 hours. Please choose one of the 
following: 
 
Put nothing in the special account and keep all 4,000 points 
Put 1,000 points in the special account and keep 3,000 points  
Put 2,000 points in the special account and keep 2,000 points  
Put 3,000 points in the special account and keep 1,000 points 
Put all 4,000 points in the special account and keep nothing” 
 
The similarities with the standard trust game are obvious: an endowment can be put at risk 
and, if it is, it can increase. However, in both cases, the risk is that the other party can act in 
an untrustworthy way after the endowment has been put at risk, and anything put at risk can 
be lost. Therefore, it can be argued on the same basis as in Berg and colleagues (1995), that 
money transferred in this game is also a measure of behavioural trust. 
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There are, of course, important differences with the standard trust game. In the standard trust 
game, the other party either takes or returns money they have been sent. In this game, they act 
in an untrustworthy way, but not in a way that is linked to the amount transferred. McEvily 
and colleagues (2012) advocate a similar move in their adaptation of the standard 
interpersonal trust game, ensuring that there is no moment of ‘giving’ money to a co-partner 
as it removes the confound that comes from the participants enjoyment of the act of giving. In 
any case, a straightforward reciprocal relationship between a single consumer and a large 
company seems unlikely. As discussed above, social preferences like altruism are also 
unlikely to be relevant in this context. In some ways, therefore, consumer trust in a company 
is the ideal context for using a trust game-based technique. 
 
In this study, each participant made several ‘bets’ on the trustworthiness of one target 
company; specifically, betting against the probability that some sort of trust-undermining 
event might occur. Davies and Olmedo-Cifuentes (2016) identify six types of corporate 
misconduct, short of illegal behaviour, that might undermine trust: making mistakes, not 
telling the truth, acting unfairly, not listening to criticism, acting irresponsibly, and ‘bending’ 
the law. These can be intuitively mapped back to the ideas of ability, benevolence, and 
integrity in Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) model discussed above. The risk events used here 
are consistent with that typology, except that none of the events envisaged involve either 
bending or breaking the law. 
 
To enable comparison, it was desirable to have some risks that could conceivably happen to 
any of the nine businesses, such as an IT failure. At the same time, each sector has a rich and 
specific set of trust relationships: for example, in air travel, I care about safety and timeliness, 
while in financial services I may care more about money being stolen or fraudsters using my 
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financial data. Each participant was asked six questions about their target company: three of 
these were identical across the study, while three were specific to the sector of the target 
company. The order of these questions was randomised. 
 
To ensure that the events were not concentrated on a particular aspect of trust, the risk events 
are designed to evenly reflect Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) three aspects of trust: ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. A small pilot study (not reported, N=23) asked participants to 
allocate potential events to these aspects and where the draft events were allocated against the 
author’s expectations, revised events were created. It is assumed that all of the negative 
events used have a substantially less than 50 per cent chance of happening to a specific firm 
in the course of a year, so a 50 per cent return on trust is an attractive investment proposition 
to an economically rational, risk-neutral investor. 
 
Trust measures – Expressive measure (ET) 
 
There are a wide variety of measures designed to allow people to rate companies on how 
trustworthy they appear to be or how credible their brands are (including Chaudhuri & 
Holbrook, 2001, 2002; Erdem & Swait, 1998, 2004; Garbarino & Johnson, 1999; Ingenhoff 
& Sommer, 2010; Morgan & Hunt 1994; Morhart et al., 2015;  Schlosser, Barnett White, & 
Lloyd, 2006; Sirdeshmukh, Singh, & Sabol, 2002); as well as the “this is a company I trust” 
measure regularly used by practitioners.  All of these might be considered expressive 
measures of trust, in that they allow the rater to express a view that this company is 
trustworthy, without taking any risk. Of the available metrics, those used by Erdem and Swait 
(2004) stand out because, their measure of perceived trustworthiness asks a participant 
whether they trust the target company, not whether they believe the target company has 
certain trustworthy attributes, potentially confusing trust and ability, benevolence, and 
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integrity, which are examined below. One item from Erdem and Swait’s five-item scale refers 
to past experience with the target company: given the target companies used in this study, it 
was likely that past experience would vary widely and so this item was excluded. Another 
one of the items - “This brand doesn’t pretend to be something it isn’t” – risks straying into a 
description of integrity and so was also excluded. 
 
Trust measures – Expressive measures of ability, benevolence and integrity 
 
Measures of ability, benevolence, and integrity were adapted from Schlosser and colleagues 
(2006), which were themselves adapted for a consumer context from Mayer and Davis 
(1999). The number of measures was reduced by around two thirds for reasons of economy, 
which is especially important in light of the aim of developing a measurement approach that 
practitioners could adopt. For each aspect, participants are asked how much they agree or 
disagree with two statements on a five point scale. For example, for integrity, the two 
statements are “This company seems to try hard to be fair in dealings with others” and 
“Sound principles seem to guide this company’s behaviour.”  
 
Trust measures – Expressive measure of behavioural intentions 
 
Trusting behaviour can take many forms. Making a purchase often involves trusting a 
company, although, as discussed above, the purchaser may not reflect very much on their 
decision. However, the trustworthiness of a company may not be the only factor in a purchase 
decision: we could imagine a situation where a consumer only considers a set of reputable 
sellers, but then makes their choice within that set based on factors other than trust (Doney & 
Cannon, 1997). Businesses have other trust relationships with the public: as employers to 
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employees, as investments to investors (Pirson & Malhotra, 2011; Pirson et al., 2014, 2017) 
and as the subjects of government regulation that is ultimately accountable to voters 
(Bachmann & Hanappi-Egger, 2014; OECD, 2017a; Poppo & Schepker, 2014). Based on 
this, four new items were created to represent purchase consideration, willingness to work for 
a company, willingness to invest in a company, and support for tighter regulation of a 
company (reverse scored). Direct questions about future consideration, work, or investment 
decisions could be irrelevant for many participants in a poll of the general public: for 
example, few retirees might expect to work for a company in the future, while few on low 
incomes might expect to purchase a very expensive brand. This meant that the items were 
phrased in general terms, for example, “I would be pleased if a friend or family member 
invested in this company’s shares”. The scale used, attempting to capture the binary nature of 
behaviours, was simply agree, disagree, or don’t know (operationalised as a non-answer). As 
noted above, while all these behaviours involve some element of trust, trust is not expected to 
be the only, or even the most important, factor in determining them. Trust is imagined as one 
element of these decisions, separate from whether, for example, someone feels a product is 






Participants received a small incentive for completing the survey15 but were also told the 
following when they reached the risk-based exercises: 
 
“The next six questions are an opportunity to make some extra … points. 
In one year's time, we will randomly choose one of the [participants] and look at how 
they answered these six questions. We will then see what has happened over the year, 
because the number of points they win depends on what happens in the world over the 
next 12 months.  With each question, there’s an opportunity to earn up to 6,000 … 
points: so in total over the next few questions you could 36,000 points - worth over 
£280 - if you are the randomly chosen [participant].” 
 
A high incentive offered as part of a lottery has been found to be a compelling way of 
incentivising experiments (Bolle, 1990), even if the payoff must suffer some time discounting 
in this game. Johnson and Mislin (2011) found that this practice was used in around one third 
of trust game experiments in their meta-analysis, although they do find this systematically 
reduces the presentation of trust in an interpersonal context.  
 
There is a small element of deception in the methodology. Rather than waiting for a year to 
elapse and checking which events did occur, the randomly chosen participant is simply 
awarded the maximum value advertised (£288). The advantage to this approach is that it 
leaves no loose ends and does not put the author in the position of having to judge which 
 
15 At least 50 “mingle points”, the standard payment currency for panel members on Respondi’s panel. When a 
panel member has accumulated 2,000 mingle points they can exchange them for cash, digital shopping vouchers 
or turn them into a charitable donation. 1,000 mingle points is equivalent to £8.00 GBP 
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events occurred and which did not.  For the randomly chosen participant, this deception is to 
their financial advantage: their choices are automatically made optimal and they have no 
delay to wait for their payment. For the participants who are not chosen, there is no financial 
penalty that stems from the deception. The main disadvantage is the effect on research of this 
nature: if this measurement approach were to be repeated so regularly that many participants 
learned that their choices did not affect the payoff structure, they could cease to pay attention 
to their choices. To reduce the risk of this occurring, the winning participant was informed 
that this was the first study of its kind and that the decision to pay out the full £288 at an early 
date was due to its pilot nature, and might not be repeated if the methodology was used again 




To examine H1.4, it is necessary to measure the time that participants take to complete the 
different risk-based trust tasks. Two response time variables are calculated: the mean of the 
two risk-based trust tasks related to ability, and the mean of the four risk-based trust tasks 
related to benevolence or integrity. The data is divided by sector, as half of the risk-based 
tasks are sector specific. 
 
Response time is left uncontrolled: participants could take as long as they wish, and they 
were not given a deadline to complete each task. However, differences in response times have 
been associated with the prevalence of different biases even when response time is not 
controlled (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005).The time participants take to complete the task 
may be subject to random noise – such as computer latency – or individual differences in, for 
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example, reading speed. This limits the conclusions which can be drawn compared to, for 
example, an experimental design where the time allowed is a controlled variable. 
 
In any response time-based analysis, we need to consider the difficulty of the problem as a 
potential influence on response times (see Alós‐Ferrer, 2018, for a review and summary of 
this challenge from a dual-processing perspective). In this case, the implication from the 
argument above is that supposedly affective trust tasks, based on judgements of benevolence 
and ability, should be easier than supposedly cognitive trust tasks. Where the incentives, the 
familiarity of the target, and all other factors are equal, they should take less time. However, 
this analysis would be confounded if tasks related to ability were systematically easier or 
more difficult for some other reason. The design of the tasks has sought to make them of 
equal difficulty, but of course this cannot be precise without being measured separately. One 
reassurance, however, is that this hypothesis will be examined over all three sectors, which 
means there is some variation in the tasks. If the same pattern is found in all three sectors, it 
is less likely to be the result of random variation in the difficulty of the tasks. The text for 
each risk-task was the same 109 words plus the description of the specific risk, which varied 





Table 2.1 Summary of results by company  




Emirates Ryanair JP Morgan Nationwide Virgin Money Amazon Carphone 
Warehouse 
John Lewis 
n* 230 222 230 211 227 230 234 231 227 
Positivity  
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(Up to a 
maximum of 
£48**) 













 £16.92  
(£14.56) 
 £18.52  
(£16.84) 
 £16.67  
(£16.63) 
 £13.51  
(£14.75) 






(Up to a 
maximum of 
£48**) 
 £19.30  
(£17.71) 













 £20.41  
(£17.03) 
 £16.05  
(£16.70) 

















 £19.56  
(£16.63) 
  
 £22.84  
(£17.38) 








*Following pre-registered exclusions applied as described above. **Experimental currency of ‘mingle points’ is converted to GBP at a 
1,000 points to £8 ratio.  
NB: Note that sector-specific risks are not comparable across different sectors, as shaded above.  
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In this section, we first establish whether or not participants are using the risk-based measure 
as intended. What follows is then an examination of the practical advantages of the risk-based 
measure: does it tell us something different from the expressive measure? This is examined 
firstly in terms of the rank-order of different companies in terms of trust, and then secondly in 
terms of different aspects of trust (e.g., ability). Following this, the formal hypotheses are 
tested: looking at the correlation between the different measures of trust, the ability to predict 
behavioural intentions, and the link with positivity and reaction-time. Finally, an additional 
piece of exploratory research looks at the structure of the data and how well it fits with 
models of trust that propose two or three underlying aspects. 
 
Confirming that participants are using the risk-based measure as intended 
 
One possible concern with the risk-based measure is that participants are only sensitive to the 
risk events themselves, and not to the companies they relate to. However, as described in the 
section below on the relative standing of the different companies, we do see significant 
differences between different companies on the risk-based measure. An opposite concern 
would be that participants are only sensitive to the company, and insensitive to the type of 
risk being presented. In the section below on comparing ability, benevolence, and integrity, 
we find that there are often significant differences depending on whether or not a particular 
risk event is associated with ability, benevolence or integrity. Taken together, this strongly 
suggests that participants can be expected to be sensitive to both the company and the risk 
event presented in the risk-based measure. 
 
The risk-based measure is obviously more complicated than a standard survey, and so there 
might be some concerns that many participants are failing to understand the task that is being 
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set. The average time each participant took to complete a risk-based task was recorded 
(M=16.74 seconds, SD= 9.85 seconds). Excluding any participant whose time on any task 
was more than two standard deviations over the mean (n=276) does not make a large 
difference to the central tendency or variance (M= 16.74, seconds SD=9.79 seconds). If the 
task was proving too difficult, we might expect to see differences between the average times 
taken for participants with different levels of education. However, even after excluding 
outliers, there are no statistically significant differences in the mean times people with 
different educational backgrounds took to complete the survey, F(4, 1,761) = 1.166, p=.32416. 
 
Each participant rated all 9 companies on the expressive measure of trust (ET). As a result, 
we can compare the ratings given to companies when they were the target company and when 
they were not. As shown in Appendix 2 (Table A1), this comparison often shows a 
significant increase in expressive trust for companies which have been the target. This 
suggests that assessing a company in greater detail, with a mixture of risk-based, expressive, 
and behavioural intention questions, has, on average, a small positive effect on expressive 
trust. This could be a “mere exposure” effect (Zajonc, 1980), where people become more 
positive about a stimulus as they become exposed to it, as the participants would have been 
focussed on the target company for some extra time. Alternatively, it could be that focussing 
on questions of trust for longer leads participants, on average, to reflect more positively on 
the trustworthiness of these targets. This would be very different from the behaviour found in 
some interpersonal trust research, where greater reflection leads to reduced trust (Critcher & 
Dunning, 2011).  
 
 
16 There are also no significant differences in the variance for each educational group, Levene’s Test, F(4, 1761) 
= 0.274, p=.895. 
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As shown in Figure 2.1, the risk-based trust measures, the expressive measures of ability, 
benevolence, and integrity, and the expressive measures of behavioural intentions were 
presented in a random order, with the measure of expressive trust always coming last. If we 
measure risk-based trust as the normalised average amount transferred on the cross-sector 
risk tasks, there are no significant differences by presentation order on risk-based trust, F(4, 
2,037)= 1.342, p=.252 or the measure of trusting behavioural intentions F(4, 1700)= 1.689, 
p=0.1517. 
 
Practical advantages of a risk-based trust measure: different rank-based 
insights into consumer trust 
 
Table 2.1 summarises the relative standing found for each of the nine companies in absolute 
terms. For the subsequent analysis, the data is divided by sector and then turned into 
normalised z-scores with a mean of zero by subtracting the sector mean for each item, 
dividing by the standard deviation, and then taking a mean across the relevant items for each 
metric. The reason for this is that, in the risk-based trust exercises, no assumption is made 
that the risks are equally likely. If we believe that, for example, an IT problem is more likely 
than a reprimand over misleading advertising, then a £1 ‘bet’ against the former is not the 
equivalent degree of trust as a £1 ‘bet’ against the latter. To aid comparison, this process of 
normalisation is used for all of the measures of trust, whether risk-based or not. The result is 
that the mean of each composite metric is always zero, but the standard deviation is usually 
 
17 Excludes order effects occurring after the measure has been taken as logically impossible. Similar results, not 
reported, are found when applying the same analysis to the airline and financial services data, created in the 
same way as described in the following section. On the risk-based measure there are significant differences are 
found in the retail data, F (4, 687) = 3.18, p=.013. 
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less than one because the variance is lower across the several items than it is for a single 
item18. 
 
Two metrics are then created: a mean score for all six risk-based transfers (RBT), ɑairline=. 88, 
ɑfs=. 88, ɑretail =. 88, and a mean score for the three expressive items  (ET) such as “This 
company delivers what it promises”, ɑairline=. 94, ɑfs=. 92, ɑretail =. 91. The average scores for 
each company are then shown in Figure 2.2 and a company-by-company summary is given in 
Table 2.2. In the Appendix, Table A2 provides further detail, and Figure A1 shows the 
distribution of each trust measure: in brief, it shows that while the mean levels of trust differ, 
the distributions for each sector are similar, with the exception of one firm, Ryanair, which 
has an unusually flat and positively skewed distribution on the expressive trust measure and 
the highest rate of refusal to take up any of the risk-based gambles. 
 
In the airline data (n=682), the risk-based measure confirms the findings on the expressive 
measure. There are significant differences between the different companies on both the risk-
based, F(2, 679) = 7.72, p <.001, and the expressive measures, F(2, 679) = 72.81, p <.00119. 
As detailed in Table 2.2, pairwise comparisons on both the expressive and the risk-based trust 
measures produce the identical finding: that Ryanair is the outlier, with less trust than British 
Airways and Emirates. 
  
 
18 The need for this transformation was only identified after the pre-registration of Study 1. It is repeated in 
Study 2 and was included in the pre-registration for that experiment. 
19 There are significant differences between of the variance for different companies on the expressive measure, 
Levene’s Test, F (2, 679) = 16.033, p<.00, violating the assumption of homogenous variance. However, using a 
Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2 (2) = 106.68, p<.001, or using trimmed means as in Wilcox (2017), F(2, 263) = 43.420, 
p<.001, produces the same result. 
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Table 2.2. Pairwise comparisons between trust in the different companies*  
Two-sided t-tests were performed and resulting p values are shown, using Holm’s (1979) correction. In bold 
where p<.05. Means and standard deviations of the normalised variables are also shown**. 
 












M= -0.55,  
SD= 1.03 
M= 0.03,  
SD= 0.8 
M= 0.13,  
SD= 0.81 
M= -0.16,  
SD= 0.74 
British 
Airways  0.674 <.001  0.179 0.023 
Emirates 
0.674  <.001 0.179  <.001 
Ryanair 
<.001 <.001  0.023 <.001  
Financial services 
 
JP Morgan Nationwide Virgin JP Morgan Nationwide Virgin 
 M= -0.22,  
SD= 0.87 
M= 0.27,  
SD= 0.97 
M= -0.06,  
SD= 0.86 
M= -0.08,  
SD= 0.76 
M= 0.07,  
SD= 0.79 
M= 0,  
SD= 0.83 
JP Morgan 
 <.001 0.062  0.119 0.504 
Nationwide 
<.001  <.001 0.119  0.504 
Virgin 










 M= 0.19,  
SD= 0.85 
M= -0.4,  
SD= 0.96 
M= 0.21,  
SD= 0.82 
M= 0,  
SD= 0.75 
M= -0.11,  
SD= 0.77 
M= 0.11,  
SD= 0.83 
Amazon 
 <.001 0.835  0.23 0.23 
Carphone 
Warehouse <.001  <.001 0.23  0.009 
John Lewis 
0.835 <.001  0.23 0.009  
*Cross-sector comparisons are included in the Appendix (Table A2). 




In the financial services sector (n=668), the two types of measure paint different pictures. 
There are significant differences between the companies on the expressive measure, F(2, 665) 
= 17.3, p <.001. As detailed in Table 2.2, the pairwise comparisons show that Nationwide is 
the outlier on the expressive measure, more trusted than either of the other two firms. On that 
same expressive measure, Virgin Money can almost claim an advantage over JP Morgan but 
it does not quite meet standard threshold for significance, p=.062. However, there are no 
significant differences between the firms on the risk-based measure, F (2, 665) = 2.127, p 
=.12.  
 
In the retail data (n=692), the impression gained of the ranks between companies depends on 
the measure used. There are significant differences between the different companies on both 
the risk-based, F(2, 689) = 4.427, p=.012, and the expressive measures, F(2, 689) = 35.75, p 
<.00120. On the expressive measure, Carphone Warehouse is the outlier: significantly less 
trusted than either Amazon or John Lewis. However, looking only at the risk-based measure 
produces a different picture: there is only a significant difference between the most trusted, 
John Lewis, and the least trusted, Carphone Warehouse. These comparisons are shown in 
detail in Table 2.2. 
 
20 There are significant differences between of the variance for different companies on the expressive measure, 
Levene’s Test, F (2, 689) = 3.082, p=.046, violating the assumption of homogenous variance. However, using a 
Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2 (2) = 61.528, p<.001, or using trimmed means as in Wilcox (2017), F(2, 271.89) = 





Another way of approaching this question is to look at all nine companies together 
(N=2,042). This means using a risk-based measure based on the average transfer for the three 
cross-sectoral risks, normalised as before, ɑ =.81. The expressive trust measure is formed 
from the same three questions, ɑ =.92, but both measures are now based on normalisations 
against the entire dataset. Unsurprisingly, there are significant differences between the 
companies on the risk-based measure, F(8, 2,033)= 6.084, p <.001, and the expressive 
measure, F(8, 2,033) = 41, p <.001.With nine companies in this dataset, there are a 36 
pairwise comparisons that can be made (shown in Appendix Table A2). Even using Holm’s 
(1979) correction for multiple hypothesis testing, such a large number of pairwise 
comparisons might be expected to throw up some Type I errors. However, what we are 
interested in here is the difference between these comparisons across the two measures. 25 of 
these pairs are found to be significantly different on the expressive measure but only nine are 
found to be significantly different on the risk-based measure.  While some of these results 
might be Type 1 errors, the pattern suggests that there are more differences between firms on 
the expressive measure than on the risk-based measure. As discussed further below, it is an 
open question whether the apparent extra sensitivity of the expressive measure is a potential 




Practical advantages of a risk-based trust measure: different aspect-based 
insights into consumer trust 
 
As noted earlier, as well as knowing which is the most trusted brand in a sector, it is often 
useful for businesses to know if they perform especially well or badly on some aspect of 
trust, such as ability, benevolence or integrity. To examine this question, the survey included 
expressive measures of each of these aspects: two items for each aspect which are then 
averaged. To provide a risk-based comparison, the six risks each participant examined are 
broken down into three pairs, each pair designed to reflect one aspect, and an average taken 
across the two. As before, the data is divided by sector and then turned into normalised z-
scores with a mean of zero for each item before they are averaged together.   
 
The following analysis then looks at how companies performed on these different questions. 
Note that this analysis is within-subjects: taking all the participants who looked at one 
company and examining whether they risked more money on or rated the company 
differently, depending on whether the question focused on ability, benevolence or integrity. 
The results are summarised in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.3. Table 2.4 summarises all these 




Table 2.3. Pairwise comparisons between different aspects of trust using two different 
measurement approaches 
Two-sided t-tests were performed and resulting p values are shown, using Holm’s (1979) correction. In bold 
where p<.05. Means and standard deviations of the normalised variables are also shown.* 
 Expressive measures Risk-based measures 
British 
Airways 
Ability Benevolence Integrity Ability Benevolence Integrity 
 M= 0.27  
SD= 0.78 
M= 0.18  
SD= 0.8 
M= 0.25  
SD= 0.83 
M= 0.03  
SD= 0.9 
M= -0.01  
SD= 0.84 
M= 0.07  
SD= 0.91 
Ability  0.03 0.49  0.53 0.53 
Benevolence 0.03  0.07 0.53  0.21 
Integrity 0.49 0.07  0.53 0.21  
 
Emirates Ability Benevolence Integrity Ability Benevolence Integrity 
 M= 0.25  
SD= 0.79 
M= 0.25  
SD= 0.79 
M= 0.28  
SD= 0.77 
M= 0.12  
SD= 0.88 
M= 0.17  
SD= 0.9 
M= 0.1  
SD= 0.92 
Ability  0.97 0.82  0.51 0.59 
Benevolence 0.97  0.82 0.51  0.34 
Integrity 0.82 0.82  0.59 0.34  
 
Ryanair Ability Benevolence Integrity Ability Benevolence Integrity 
 M= -0.51  
SD= 0.99 
M= -0.42  
SD= 0.98 
M= -0.52  
SD= 0.97 
M= -0.14  
SD= 0.87 
M= -0.16  
SD= 0.83 
M= -0.16  
SD= 0.83 
Ability  0.11 0.83  1 1 
Benevolence 0.11  0.03 1  1 
Integrity 0.83 0.03  1 1  
 
JP Morgan Ability Benevolence Integrity Ability Benevolence Integrity 
 M= -0.13  
SD= 0.87 
M= -0.2  
SD= 0.83 
M= -0.22  
SD= 0.82 
M= -0.02  
SD= 0.92 
M= -0.14  
SD= 0.81 
M= -0.09  
SD= 0.79 
Ability  0.49 0.26  0.02 0.24 
Benevolence 0.49  0.6 0.02  0.29 
Integrity 0.26 0.6  0.24 0.29  
 
Nationwide Ability Benevolence Integrity Ability Benevolence Integrity 
 M= 0.15  
SD= 0.97 
M= 0.23  
SD= 0.97 
M= 0.26  
SD= 1 
M= 0  
SD= 0.85 
M= 0.12  
SD= 0.93 
M= 0.1  
SD= 0.89 
Ability  0.05 0.01  0.06 0.06 
Benevolence 0.05  0.4 0.06  0.68 




Ability Benevolence Integrity Ability Benevolence Integrity 
 M= -0.03  
SD= 0.91 
M= -0.05  
SD= 0.88 
M= -0.06  
SD= 0.95 
M= 0.02  
SD= 0.95 
M= 0.01  
SD= 0.89 
M= -0.02  
SD= 0.87 
Ability  1 1  1 1 
Benevolence 1  1 1  1 
Integrity 1 1  1 1  
 
Amazon Ability Benevolence Integrity Ability Benevolence Integrity 
 M= 0.33  
SD= 0.78 
M= 0.05  
SD= 0.92 
M= -0.09  
SD= 0.98 
M= 0.03  
SD= 0.87 
M= 0.03  
SD= 0.85 
M= -0.07  
SD= 0.83 
Ability  <.001 <.001  1 0.08 
Benevolence <.001  <.001 1  0.08 





Ability Benevolence Integrity Ability Benevolence Integrity 
 M= -0.36  
SD= 0.91 
M= -0.21  
SD= 0.88 
M= -0.17  
SD= 0.86 
M= -0.11  
SD= 0.84 
M= -0.15  
SD= 0.85 
M= -0.07  
SD= 0.89 
Ability  <.001 <.001  0.69 0.69 
Benevolence <.001  0.3 0.69  0.21 
Integrity <.001 0.3  0.69 0.21  
 
John Lewis Ability Benevolence Integrity Ability Benevolence Integrity 
 M= 0.03  
SD= 0.97 
M= 0.16  
SD= 0.88 
M= 0.27  
SD= 0.9 
M= 0.08  
SD= 0.89 
M= 0.12  
SD= 0.94 
M= 0.14  
SD= 0.93 
Ability  <.001 <.001  0.79 0.58 
Benevolence <.001  <.001 0.79  0.79 
Integrity <.001 <.001  0.58 0.79  
* Normalised so M=0, SD=1 for each sector on each item, then averaged. 
 
For two companies, there are no significant differences between how they perform on ability, 
benevolence and integrity, regardless of which metrics are used.  The first is Emirates: neither 
risk-based aspects, F(2,442)=1.431, p=.241, nor expressive aspects are significantly different, 
F(2,442)=0.769, p=.464. The second is Virgin Money: neither the risk-based measure, Huyn-
Feldt corrected21 F(1.894, 433.726) = 0.372, p=.678, nor the expressive measure, Huyn-Feldt 
corrected F(1.934, 442.886) = 0.309, p=.727, show significant differences between the 
different aspects.  
 
For two other companies, by contrast, performance varies across ability, benevolence and 
integrity, whichever measure is used. For Nationwide the differences are significant on both 
on the risk-based measure, Huyn-Feldt corrected F(1.94, 438.44) = 3.783, p=.025, and the 
expressive measure, F(2, 452) = 5.095, p=.006. For Amazon there are also significant 
differences on both the risk-based, F(2,466)=3.171, p=.043, and the expressive measure, 
F(1.890, 440.312)=38.116, p<.001. As can be seen in detail in Table 2.3, the pairwise 
comparisons between the different aspects are similar for Nationwide, whichever metric is 
used, although some of the pairs very slightly exceed the standard threshold for statistical 
 
21 Whenever Mauchly’s test shows that the assumption of sphericity has been violated, the Huyn-Feldt adjusted 
p values and degrees of freedom are used instead.  
105 
significance. The pairwise comparisons are somewhat similar for Amazon, except that on the 
risk-based measure it does not see greater transfers when the risk-based task relates to ability 
than when it relates to benevolence. 
 
There are then a series of companies which apparently perform differently across ability, 
benevolence, and integrity when using the expressive measures, but where there are no 
differences on the risk-based measures. For British Airways, the expressive measure shows 
some significant differences between the aspects, F(2,458)=3.801, p=.023, while the risk-
based measure does not, F(2,458)=1.705, p=.183. Ryanair too has significant differences 
between the aspects on the expressive measures, Huyn-Feldt corrected F(1.918, 439.222) = 
4.211, p=.044, but not on the risk-based measure, F(2, 458)= 0.145, p=.865. For Carphone 
Warehouse, we see significant differences between the trust aspects on the expressive 
measure, F(2,460) = 19.082, p<.001, but not on the risk-based measure, F(2, 460) = 1.655, 
p=.192. For John Lewis, there are significant differences between the trust aspects measured 
using the expressive metric, Huyn-Feldt corrected F(1.892, 427.592) = 21.409, p<.001, but 
not using the risk-based metric, Huyn-Feldt corrected F(1.942, 438.892) = 0.949, p =.386. 
The company-specific differences in performance on these different aspects are shown in 
Table 2.3. 
 
Finally, JP Morgan is the opposite case, where there are significant differences between the 
transfers that participants make on the risk-based measure of different aspects, F(2, 420) = 
3.651, p=.003, but there are no significant differences between the ratings given on the 
expressive aspect measures, Huyn-Feldt corrected F(1.752, 367.92) = 1.680, p=.191. As 
shown in Table 2.3, the risk-based trust measure suggests that JP Morgan is more trusted for 






Table 2.4 Practical insights for each company from the new risk-based measure 
 
Company Summary of findings from the 
expressive survey measures 
Summary of findings from the 
risk-based measures 
Additional insight from the 
new risk-based measure 
British Airways More trusted than Ryanair 
and as trusted as Emirates.  
 
More trusted for its ability 
than its benevolence. 
More trusted than Ryanair 
and as trusted as Emirates.  
 
Equally trusted for ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. 
The expressive measure 
suggests British Airways 
performs better on ability 
than benevolence, but the 
risk-based measure questions 
this. 
Emirates More trusted than Ryanair 
and as trusted as British 
Airways.  
 
Equally trusted for ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. 
More trusted than Ryanair 
and as trusted as British 
Airways.  
 
Equally trusted for ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. 
Both measures produce the 
same results. 
Ryanair Less trusted than British 
Airways and Emirates.  
 
More trusted for benevolence 
than integrity. 
Less trusted than British 
Airways and Emirates.  
 
Equally trusted for ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. 
The expressive measure 
suggests Ryanair performs 
better on benevolence than 
integrity, but the risk-based 
measure questions this. 
JP Morgan Less trusted than Nationwide 
and close to being less trusted 
than Virgin Money.  
 
Equally trusted for ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. 
As trusted as Virgin Money 
and Nationwide.  
 
 
More trusted for its ability 
than its benevolence. 
The expressive measure 
suggests JP Morgan is less 
trusted than the competition 
but the risk-based measure 
questions this. 
 
The risk-based measure 
suggests JP Morgan performs 
better on ability than 
benevolence, but the 
expressive measure questions 
this. 
Nationwide More trusted than JP Morgan 
and Virgin Money.  
 
 
More trusted for its integrity 
than its ability.  
As trusted as Virgin Money 
and JP Morgan.  
 
 
Close to being more trusted 
for its integrity than its 
ability.  
The expressive measure 
suggests Nationwide is more 
trusted than the competition 
but the risk-based measure 
questions this. 
 
Virgin Money Less trusted than Nationwide 
but close to being more 
trusted than JP Morgan.  
 
Equally trusted for ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. 
As trusted as Nationwide and 
JP Morgan.  
 
 
Equally trusted for ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. 
The expressive measure 
suggests Virgin Money is less 
trusted than Nationwide but 





Amazon More trusted than Carphone 
Warehouse and as trusted as 
John Lewis.  
 
More trusted for ability than 
benevolence, and more 
trusted for benevolence than 
for integrity. 
As trusted as Carphone 
Warehouse and John Lewis.  
 
 
Close to being more trusted 
for ability than for integrity. 
The expressive measure 
suggests Amazon is more 
trusted than Carphone 
Warehouse but the risk-based 




Less trusted than Amazon 
and John Lewis. 
 
More trusted for benevolence 
and integrity than for ability. 
As trusted as Amazon but 
less trusted than John Lewis.  
 
Equally trusted for ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. 
The expressive measure 
suggests Carphone 
Warehouse is less trusted 
than Amazon but the risk-
based measure questions this. 
 
The expressive measure 
suggests Carphone 
Warehouse performs better 
on benevolence and integrity 
than ability but the risk-based 
measure questions this. 
John Lewis More trusted than Carphone 
Warehouse and as trusted as 
Amazon. 
 
More trusted for integrity 
than ability or benevolence. 
More trusted than Carphone 
Warehouse and as trusted as 
Amazon.  
 
Equally trusted for ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. 
The expressive measure 
suggests John Lewis 
performs better on integrity, 
than ability and benevolence 






Hypothesis testing: H1.1. The risk-based measure of trust will correlate 
significantly with the expressive measure of trust and trusting behavioural 
intentions 
 
H1.1 looks at the correlation between the risk-based measure of trust and the more standard 
expressive measure of trust. Because some of the risk-based questions are sector-specific, 
these correlations are examined on a sector-by-sector basis. As can be seen in Figure 2.4, the 
correlations between risk-based trust and expressive-trust are significant but rather weak, 
whether we examine airlines, r (680)= .286, p<.001, financial services, r(666)=. 309, p<.001, 
or retail, r(690)= .248, p<.001. While this might be surprising if the two measures are 
addressing the same concept in the same context, these correlation coefficients are consistent 
with those found between trust surveys and games in the interpersonal trust literature22.  The 
interpretation put on this difference, expanded in greater depth below, is that the risk-based 
trust task itself changes the context, by introducing novelty, difficulty and extra motivation, 
thus making it less likely that participants will use the affect heuristic to form their trust 
judgements. 
 
H1.1 also relates to the correlation between the risk-based measure of trust and the measure 
of trusting behavioural intentions. The original plan was that this measure would be an 
average of four items, relating to a participants’ likelihood to purchase goods or services, to 
 
22 Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010) found similarly weak correlations (r=.20-27) between transfers in a classic 
trust game and survey measures of generalised trust. In Erle and colleagues’ (2018) Experiment Two we see a 
similar correlation between trust game transfers and self-reported trust (r=.24) although this rises somewhat in 
Experiment Three (r=.43). Similarly, Carlsson and colleagues (2018) find the correlation between stated trust in 
an institution and trust game transfers to an employee of that institution can be similarly weak (r=.21-27) 
although in the case of one institution, the electricity provider, they were somewhat stronger (r=.37). By 
contrast, Glaeser and colleagues (2000) found that correlations between surveys and trust games were weaker 
than those found in this study (r=-.01-.19). 
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work for the company, to invest in the company, or to support efforts to impose stricter 
regulations on the company. However, participants were offered a “don’t know” option and a 
larger number took it than had been envisioned: 1,045 (48%23) participants said “don’t know” 
to the investment question, while 1,021 (47%) said “don’t know” to the regulation question. 
The questions on employment and consumption were answered by a substantially larger 
proportion of the participants: only 436 (20%) gave “don’t know” answers to both of these 
questions. Therefore, the measure of trusting behavioural intentions is restricted to those 
spheres: taking an average of the two binary measures where both are provided, using only 
one of the two if only one answer is available. This means that, unless otherwise noted, 
participants who did not answer these questions are excluded from any analysis involving 
trusting behavioural intentions. Having done this, the correlations between trusting 
behavioural intentions and risk-based trust are again significant but not particularly strong for 
airlines, r(579) = .219, p<.001, financial services, r(502)= .232, p<.001, or retail, r(618)= 
.209, p<.001.  
 






Hypothesis testing: H1.2. The risk-based measure of trust will contribute 
more to predicting trusting behavioural intentions than the expressive 
measures of trust, once other variables are controlled for. 
 
Table 2.5. Summary of OLS regressions testing H1.2 
Significant (p<.05) predictors in bold 
 







































































































R2 0.472 0.361 0.472 0.281 0.182 0.292 0.344 0.287 0.347 
AIC 210.606 309.416 212.374 177.245 237.701 172.294 90.699 136.250 89.831 
Table A4 in Appendix 2 provides the full specification of each model, including estimates of the intercept and correlates such as gender, which 
are included in each regression model, and the results of various diagnostic tests. 
 
To test H1.2, Ordinary Least Squares regression models24 are created as reported in summary 
in Table 2.5, and then in more detail in the Appendix 2 Table A4. The data is once again 
divided by sector. In each model, the measure of trusting behavioural intentions forms the 
dependent variable. For each sector, three models are created: one using expressive trust as 
the explanatory variable (Model 1), one using risk-based trust (Model 2), and one using both 
 
24 The exercise was repeated as a logistic regression on a binary variable which took the value of one if a 
participant said they would purchase or work for the target company, and zero if they said they would neither 
work for or purchase from the company. This produced identical insights and so is not reported here. 
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measures (Model 3). Control variables on familiarity, customer status, propensity to trust 
businesses, gender and income are used in all three models as described in more detail in 
Appendix 2 Table A4. 
 
In none of the sectors under examination does Model 2 exceed the explanatory power of 
Model 1, which prompts a rejection of H1.2: trusting behavioural intentions are not better 
predicted by the risk-based measure than the expressive measure. However, the rejection of 
H1.2 does lead to the conclusion that the expressive measure is a better predictor of 
behaviour. There is a greater similarity between an expressive measure of trust and 
expressive measure of behavioural intentions, in that both are unincentivised survey questions 
of the standard type. This could potentially mean that anything that causes participants to 
answer similar questions in similar ways would artificially strengthen the relationship 
between the expressive measure of trust and the measure of behavioural intentions, creating a 
common methods bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003)25. 
 
Using both measures produces a better model for the financial services and retail data, but the 
differences both in R2 and in Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC), another measure of fit 
that compensates for the number of variables used, are quite small. One noteworthy point is 
that the beta weight attached to positivity in the regression models, across all three sectors, is 
greater when expressive trust is left out of the model. There is no similar effect when risk-
based trust is not included in the model. This could be interpreted to mean that positivity and 
expressive trust are explaining a similar variance in the data - a point that will be explored 
further in testing H1.3. 
 
 
25 This caveat was foreseen and mentioned in the pre-registration of hypothesis H1.2. 
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Hypothesis testing: H1.3. The relationship between overall positivity and trust 
will interact with (i) the measurement technique (ii) educational 
qualifications (iii) familiarity 
 
The contention of the ‘trusting fast and slow’ argument is that trust judgements will be 
substituted with like/dislike judgements when people rely heavily on intuitive Type 1 
processes. To examine this more directly, we look at the new, more complex and more 
incentivised risk-based measure, and the standard expressive measure of trust, and see how 
they correlate with the simple measure of positivity that participants completed at the start of 
the survey. This is a particularly interesting result for the theoretical framework outlined here: 
as described in detail above, the correlation between liking and trusting is expected to be 
stronger when people use Type 1 processing.  
 
As shown in Figure 2.5, the correlation between positivity and trust tends to be substantially 
stronger on the expressive measure than on the risk-based measure. Correlations between 
expressive trust and positivity are strong for airlines, r(680)=.674, financial services, 
r(666)=.557, and retail, r(690)=.599, all p<.001. This is in line or slightly below the 
correlations reported in three other studies mentioned in Chapter 1 which show correlations 
between an expressive measure of trust and a measure of overall positivity, sometimes called 
‘brand affect’ or ‘brand liking’: they reported r=.59 (Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2002); r=.66 
(Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001); r=.75-.80 (Nicholson, Compeau, & Sethi, 2001), r=.79 
(Sung & Kim, 2010) and r=.89 (Lau & Lee, 1999). The correlation between risk-based trust 
and positivity is weak for airlines, r(680)=.234, p<.001, financial services, r(666)=.119, 
p=.002, and retail, r(690)=.207, p<.001. A t-statistic can compare the relative strength of 
these dependent correlations (Field et al., 2011): the correlation with positivity is significantly 
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stronger on the expressive measure than on the risk-based measure for airlines, t(679)= -
1.752, p=.040 (one-tailed), financial services, t(665)= -5.491, p<.001 (one tailed), but this 
only approaches significance for retail, t(689) = -1.244, p=.107 (one tailed).  
 
Taken together with the regressions described above, this provides some quite compelling 
evidence that differences in positivity overlap much more strongly with differences in trust 
when a participant is using a traditional expressive survey technique than when they are using 
the new risk-based measure. It echoes Erle and colleagues’ (2018) finding in an interpersonal 
trust context, where liking was strongly correlated (r=.86-87) with self-reported trust but 
more weakly correlated with transfers in a trust game (r=.18-41). The correlations here are 
also comparable to those found between risks and benefits of different activities and 
technologies in Finucane and colleagues’ (2000) study of the affect heuristic: without time 
pressure, these varied from r=-.44 and r=.21. 
 
People are expected to engage Type 2 processing more when dealing with something novel 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Early in the survey participants were asked how familiar they 
were with the target company on a four-point scale, from very unfamiliar to very familiar. In 
the airline data, there was no main effect of familiarity on expressive trust, F(1, 678)= 1.004, 
p=.317, but there was a significant interaction effect between familiarity and positivity on 
expressive trust, F(1, 678)= 4.190, p=.041. The reverse is true in the financial services data, 
with a significant main effect of familiarity, F(1, 664)= 19.093, p<.001, but no interaction, 
F(1, 664)= 0.413, p=.521, and in the retail data, again with a significant main effect of 
familiarity,  F(1, 688)= 9.502, p=.002, but no interaction, F(1, 688)= 0.325, p=.569.  
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To take this analysis further, the data is divided in two, with one group including all those 
who said they were familiar or very familiar with the target (67% of the participants in the 
airline group, 50% in financial services, and 84% in retail). As shown in Figure 2.7, in the 
airline data, the correlation between positivity and expressive trust for those who were 
familiar with their target company, r(452)=.699, p<.001, is significantly stronger than for 
those who were unfamiliar, r(226)=.564, p<.001, z=2.770, p=.003 (one tailed). We see the 
same pattern in the financial services data: there is a significantly stronger correlation when 
the target is familiar, r(335)=.567, p<.001, than when the target is unfamiliar, r(329)=.372, 
p<.001, z=3.246, p<.001. For the retail data, the story is similar: stronger correlations when 
the target is familiar, r(582)=.575, p<.001, than unfamiliar, r(106)=.477, p<.001, but the 
difference only approaches significance, z=1.279, p=.100 (one tailed). While these are not 
large differences in absolute terms, this is at least suggestive of a stronger overlap between 
positivity and expressive trust when people are dealing with a familiar target.  
 
The relationship between positivity and trust appears to be unconnected to familiarity in the 
risk-based trust data. There are no significant interactions between familiarity and positivity 
in predicting risk-based trust for airlines, F(1, 678)=0.067, p=.795, financial services, F(1, 
664)=0.600, p=.434, or retail, F(1, 688)=0.241, p=624. For familiar targets, correlations 
between positivity and risk-based trust are similar, rairline(452)=.216, rfinancial services(335)=.082, 
rretail(582)=.217, to those found with unfamiliar targets, rairline(226)=.266, rfinancial services(329)=.085, 
rretail(106)=.105, and the differences are not significant in the airline data, z=-0.656, p=.256, 
financial services data, z=-0.0414, p=.483, or retail data, z=1.085, p=.139, (all one-tailed). 
 
 
Continuing to assess the evidence for H1.3, there is the potential that participants with weaker 
abilities to deploy Type 2 processing would tend to rely on the “affect heuristic” more than 
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those with stronger cognitive abilities. Education is used as a proxy for cognitive ability to 
test this hypothesis. A self-reported measure of education with five levels is used, from i) No 
formal education or qualifications; ii) GCSEs or GNVQs or respective equivalents; iii) A 
levels or equivalents; iv) Undergraduate degree or professional qualification; v) Postgraduate 
degree or equivalent. There is an interaction between education and positivity towards 
retailers in predicting expressive trust, F(1, 688)=5.446, p=.019. In all the other cases there is 
no interaction: whether trust is measured using the traditional expressive metric or the new 
risk-based metric respectively, there are no education-positivity interactions in the airline, 
F(1,678)=0.412, p=.521, F(1,678)=0.406, p=.524, financial services, F(1,664)=0.356, p=551, 
F(1,664)=0.017, p=.896, or retail data using the risk-based measure, F(1,688)=0.053, p=.818.  
 
To build on this analysis, the data is now divided in two, based on graduating higher 
education or an equivalent professional qualification (43% in the airline data, 45% in the 
financial services data, and 43% in the retail data). As shown in Figure 2.8, in the airline data, 
there are no significant difference between the correlations for graduates and non-graduates 
on the expressive measure, r(289)=.691 and r(389)=.659, both p<.001, z=0.765, p=.222, or 
on the risk-based measure, r(289)=.234 and r(389)=.229, both p<.001, z=0.078, p=.469. 
Similarly, in the financial services data there are no significant difference between the 
correlations for graduates and non-graduates on the expressive measure, r(298)=.584, 
r(366)=.532, both p<.001, z=0.968, p=.166, or on the risk-based measure, r(298)=.142, 
p=.014, r(366)=.097, p=.066, z=0.594, p=.276. The story is the same in the retail data: no 
significant difference between the correlations for graduates and non-graduates on the 
expressive measure, r(293)=.633 and r(395)=.577, both p<.001, z=1.156, p=.124, or on the 
risk-based measure, r(293)=.182, p=.002 and r(395)=.225, p<.001, z=-.590, p=.277. Thus, 
there is very little evidence to suggest that education is affecting the degree of overlap 
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between trust and positivity. This is perhaps unsurprising when looked at alongside the 
finding mentioned earlier: that even participants with no qualifications completed the risk-
based trust task in similar average times to those with postgraduate qualifications. 
 
Finally, as discussed above, it might be expected that participants engage in Type 2 
processing when they dislike a target. The study was not designed to test this hypothesis, as 
positivity only has a three point scale, making it difficult to observe a polynomial 
relationship. However, as shown in Figure 2.6, the variance in the expressive trust data 
appears to grow when a target is disliked. Levene’s Test assesses the null hypothesis that 
variances in different groups are equal by conducting a one-way analysis of variance on the 
differences from the mean for each group (Field et al., 2011). Variance in expressive trust is 
significantly different at different levels of positivity for airlines, Levene’s Test F(2, 679)= 
3.910, p=.020, financial services, F(2,665)=4.155, p=.016, and retail, Levene’s Test 
F(2,689)= 7.623, p<.001. On the risk-based measure, there are significant differences in the 
variance at different levels of positivity in the airline data, Levene’s Test F(2, 679)=6.077, 
p=.002, but the variance is greater for the better liked companies. There are no differences in 
the variance in risk-based trust at different levels of positivity for either the financial services 
data, Levene’s Test F(2, 665)=0.195, p=.823, or the retail data, Levene’s Test F(2, 
689)=1.582, p=.206. While not definitive, this might suggest that, when a participant is asked 
to look at a well-loved company and rate it on an expressive measure, they tend to form a 
homogeneous positive judgement, but that when they deal with a disliked company or a more 
complicated, risk-based measure, their judgements of trust and liking will vary. This is 









Hypothesis testing: H1.4. Decisions on risk-based trust that relate to ability 
will be significantly slower than other risk-based trust decisions. 
 
As described above, trust formation is sometimes separated into two routes: affective, when 
risks are relational, and cognitive, when risks are performance related (McAllister, 1995). If 
affective responses are more accessible than cognitive judgements (Zajonc, 1980), then it 
seems plausible that they should happen more quickly. To test this hypothesis, as shown in 
Figure 2.9, the time each participant took to complete each risk-based judgement was 
recorded, again using data that had been sub-setted by sector. Two average times were 
calculated for each participant: one for the two ability based tasks, Mairline= 16.517, SDairline= 
13.250, Mfinancial services= 16.941, SDfinancial services=15.304, Mretail=15.841 , SDretail=11.633, and 
one for the four non-ability based tasks, Mairline=16.581, SDairline=9.682, Mfinancial 
services=17.371, SDfinancial services=12.236, Mretail=16.766 , SDretail=10.982. The supposedly 
affective judgements are not significantly faster in the airline, t(681) =-0.130, p=.552 one-
tailed, financial services, t(667)=-0.680, p=.752 one-tailed, or retail data, t(691)=-1.873, 
p=.969 one-tailed.  
 
These results provides some evidence against the idea that different kinds of trust are 
assessed by either affective or cognitive mental processes. It is not conclusive because 
reaction time is not a controlled variable and there may have been some differences in the 
difficulty of the different trust decisions which is not related to whether they are focussed on 
supposedly affective or cognitive trust. However, the consistency of the finding across all 






Additional analysis - different aspects and common methods 
 
Closing this section, the relationships between the different variables are examined using an 
exploratory factor analysis. The first step is to examine whether a single common factor can 
explain a large proportion of the variance – although, as noted by Podsakoff and colleagues 
(2003), this is not a sufficient test for the extent of common method bias. Again, this means 
splitting the data by sector to ensure comparability, but now looking at each risk-based 
exercise, each item in the expressive scales, and the measures of positivity, familiarity and 
customer status. A single common factor, using the maximum likelihood with varimax 
rotation, can explain 40% for the variance in the airline data, 38% in the financial services 
data, and 36% in the retail data. The questions on trusting behavioural intentions are excluded 
because of the issue with ‘don’t know’ answers discussed above.   
 
This suggests that a multi-factor solution is more appropriate. How many factors? The survey 
has been designed around Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) model where trust has three aspects: 
ability, benevolence, and integrity. Each aspect was measured on both the expressive and the 
risk-based measure, while there was also a three-item general measure of expressive trust, 
unconnected to a specific aspect. Together, this would suggest four factors. In addition, we 
might expect familiarity to emerge as a single factor, based both on the explicit familiarity 
ratings and the customer status variable, if we assume that anyone will be highly familiar 
with the companies that they buy from. Finally, overall positivity or brand affect is defined as 
distinct from trust (Nicholson, Compeau, & Sethi, 2001; van der Merwe & Puth, 2014), 




Together, this would suggest that there should be six factors in the data: trust, ability, 
benevolence, integrity, positivity, and familiarity26.  Tables 2.6-2.8 show an exploratory 
factor analysis performed with a six-factor solution on the airline, financial services, and 
retail data respectively. As can be seen in those tables, in all three analyses, trust on the risk-
based measure appears to be a single factor, distinct from both positivity and the other 
measures of trust. Positivity tends to load onto the same factor as the expressive trust 
measures and/or familiarity. There are some differences between the overall measure of 
expressive trust and the expressive measures of ability, benevolence, and integrity, but there 
is no suggestion that the three different aspects stand as two, let alone three, distinct factors, 
measured in either an expressive or risk-based way. This is explored further in Table A5 in 
the Appendix, which shows that there is little to indicate that the correlations are stronger 
between, for example, the risk-based measure of ability and the expressive measure of ability, 
than, for example, and the expressive measure of benevolence. 
  
 




Table 2.6. Exploratory factor analysis of the airline data 
n=682. Maximum likelihood using varimax rotation, shown in bold where the loading is >.3. 
  
  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 
Positivity 0.67 0.12 0.22 0.19 0.06 -0.12 
Expressive trust:             
This company delivers what it 
promises 
0.76 0.15 0.07 0.47 0.02 0.00 
This company’s product claims 
are believable 
0.76 0.13 0.07 0.51 0.02 0.00 
This company has a name you 
can trust 
0.78 0.14 0.05 0.42 -0.01 0.01 
Expressive measure of ability:             
This company appears to be 
successful at the things it tries 
to do 
0.76 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.04 0.37 
I feel very confident about this 
company’s skills and abilities 
0.84 0.17 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.15 
Expressive measure of 
benevolence 
            
It doesn’t seem this company 
would knowingly do anything 
to hurt me 
0.77 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 0.10 0.09 
This company seems to really 
look out for what is important 
to people like me 
0.86 0.11 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 
Expressive measure of 
integrity: 
            
This company seems to try hard 
to be fair in dealings with others 
0.85 0.09 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
Sound principles seem to guide 
this company’s behaviour 
0.88 0.15 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 
              
Risk-based exercise on ability  
(cross-sector) 
0.09 0.74 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.13 
Risk-based exercise on ability  
(sector-specific) 
0.08 0.79 0.02 0.02 -0.13 0.00 
              
Risk-based exercise on 
benevolence (cross-sector) 
0.18 0.70 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.02 
Risk-based exercise on 
benevolence (sector-specific) 
0.05 0.69 0.12 0.03 -0.06 -0.08 
              
Risk-based exercise on integrity  
(cross-sector) 
0.17 0.77 0.01 0.02 0.58 0.02 
Risk-based exercise on integrity 
(sector-specific) 
0.17 0.71 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 
              
Familiarity 0.08 0.04 0.54 -0.03 0.01 0.04 






Table 2.7. Exploratory factor analysis of the financial services data 
n=668. Maximum likelihood using varimax rotation, shown in bold where the loading is >.3. 
  
  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 
Positivity 0.39 0.03 0.34 0.50 0.01 0.07 
Expressive trust:             
This company delivers what it 
promises 
0.37 0.17 0.76 0.20 0.12 0.00 
This company’s product claims 
are believable 
0.41 0.18 0.72 0.23 0.09 0.09 
This company has a name you 
can trust 
0.41 0.16 0.74 0.18 0.06 -0.09 
Expressive measure of ability:             
This company appears to be 
successful at the things it tries 
to do 
0.56 0.09 0.24 0.13 0.78 0.00 
I feel very confident about this 
company’s skills and abilities 
0.72 0.15 0.27 0.19 0.27 0.01 
Expressive measure of 
benevolence 
            
It doesn’t seem this company 
would knowingly do anything 
to hurt me 
0.73 0.18 0.24 0.11 0.09 0.07 
This company seems to really 
look out for what is important to 
people like me 
0.76 0.13 0.26 0.22 -0.01 0.19 
Expressive measure of integrity:             
This company seems to try hard 
to be fair in dealings with others 
0.82 0.10 0.18 0.20 0.13 -0.07 
Sound principles seem to guide 
this company’s behaviour 
0.85 0.11 0.25 0.17 0.05 -0.16 
              
Risk-based exercise on ability  
(cross-sector) 
0.08 0.76 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.10 
Risk-based exercise on ability  
(sector-specific) 
0.10 0.79 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.01 
              
Risk-based exercise on 
benevolence (cross-sector) 
0.04 0.75 0.13 -0.01 0.06 -0.09 
Risk-based exercise on 
benevolence (sector-specific) 
0.11 0.73 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.02 
              
Risk-based exercise on integrity  
(cross-sector) 
0.07 0.80 0.08 -0.01 0.08 -0.03 
Risk-based exercise on integrity 
(sector-specific) 
0.11 0.60 0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 
              
Familiarity 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.64 0.11 -0.10 





Table 2.8. Exploratory factor analysis of the retail data  
n=692. Maximum likelihood using varimax rotation, shown in bold where the loading is >.3.  
  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 
Positivity 0.32 0.13 0.38 0.50 0.03 -0.12 
Expressive trust:             
This company delivers what it 
promises 
0.46 0.13 0.71 0.25 0.07 0.09 
This company’s product claims 
are believable 
0.43 0.12 0.73 0.25 0.05 0.00 
This company has a name you 
can trust 
0.47 0.12 0.66 0.23 0.00 -0.01 
Expressive measure of ability:             
This company appears to be 
successful at the things it tries 
to do 
0.61 0.08 0.19 0.35 0.21 0.32 
I feel very confident about this 
company’s skills and abilities 
0.74 0.14 0.22 0.27 0.55 0.05 
Expressive measure of 
benevolence 
            
It doesn’t seem this company 
would knowingly do anything 
to hurt me 
0.74 0.12 0.23 0.07 0.02 0.09 
This company seems to really 
look out for what is important 
to people like me 
0.76 0.14 0.23 0.21 0.08 -0.06 
Expressive measure of 
integrity: 
            
This company seems to try 
hard to be fair in dealings with 
others 
0.84 0.11 0.21 0.06 -0.07 0.00 
Sound principles seem to guide 
this company’s behaviour 
0.81 0.11 0.21 0.04 -0.02 -0.10 
              
Risk-based exercise on ability  
(cross-sector) 
0.02 0.70 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.07 
Risk-based exercise on ability  
(sector-specific) 
0.11 0.71 0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.17 
              
Risk-based exercise on 
benevolence (cross-sector) 
0.10 0.76 0.09 0.15 -0.01 -0.09 
Risk-based exercise on 
benevolence (sector-specific) 
0.09 0.72 0.08 0.04 0.02 -0.07 
              
Risk-based exercise on 
integrity  
(cross-sector) 
0.11 0.74 0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.08 
Risk-based exercise on 
integrity (sector-specific) 
0.10 0.76 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
              
Familiarity 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.69 0.03 0.01 






Table 2.9. Overview of findings from Study 1  
 
Aim Goal / Hypotheses Finding Discussion 
Practical 
contribution 
Without adding undue cost, 
the new measure regularly 
provides a different rank-
based insight into consumer 
trust (e.g., Company A is 
more trusted than Company 
B) that is different from the 
standard alternatives. 
In 2 of 3 sectors, the 
hierarchy of trust looks 
different on the two 
measures, questioning 
apparent advantages of 
certain firms. 
For a small cost, firms can 
reasonably expect that this 
additional tool will provide 
an extra test of which firms 




Without adding undue cost, 
the new measure regularly 
provides a different aspect- 
based insight into consumer 
trust (e.g., Company A is 
seen to have more integrity 
than ability) that are different 
from the standard 
alternatives. 
In 4 of 9 companies, 
differential performance on 
specific aspects is questioned 
by the risk-based measure. In 
1 of 9 companies, the risk-
based measure finds a 
difference in performance 
that is questioned by the 
expressive measure. 
For a small cost, firms can 
reasonably expect that this 
additional tool will provide 
an extra test on aspects of 




H1.1. The risk-based measure 
of trust will correlate 
significantly with the 
expressive measure of trust 
and trusting behavioural 
intentions. 
While significant, the 
correlations are very weak. 
This suggests that either the 
risk-based measure is 
measuring something 
different, or the fact of 
completing a risk-based 
exercise is changing the 




H1.2. The risk-based measure 
of trust will contribute more 
to predicting trusting 
behavioural intentions than 
the expressive measures of 
trust, once other variables are 
controlled for. 
Adding the risk-based 
measure does not contribute 
more to predicting trusting 
behavioural intentions. 
There is no evidence that the 
risk-based measure better 
predicts behavioural 
intentions. However, this 
might be explained by the 
fact that intentions are being 







H1.3. The relationship 
between overall positivity 
and trust will interact with (i) 
the measurement technique 
(ii) educational qualifications 
(iii) familiarity 
The relationship between 
positivity and trust is strong 
for the expressive measure, 
but not for the risk-based 
measure. Greater familiarity 
strengthens the relationship 
between the expressive 
measure and positivity, but 
education has no effect. 
The strong evidence of an 
overlap between positivity 
and trust on the expressive 
measure is consistent with the 
suggestion that responses on 
the expressive measure of 
trust tend to rely on the affect 
heuristic. 
 
The absence of such a 
relationship on the risk-based 
trust measure is consistent 
with no attribute substitution 
taking place when this 
measure is used. 
 
This difference, as well as the 
interaction with familiarity, is 
consistent with the 
predictions made by the 





H1.4. Decisions on risk-
based trust that relate to 
ability will be significantly 
slower than other risk-based 
trust decisions. 
Supposedly affective 
judgements are no quicker 
than supposedly cognitive 
ones. 
This raises some questions 
for the idea of ‘affective 
trust’ being developed 
through a distinct route, as 





The first finding from Study 1 is that the risk-based approach to consumer trust measurement 
does seem initially promising. Participants can handle the task; it produces different results 
for different companies and between different types of risk; and it has minimal cost. One 
concern might be that too high a percentage of participants refused to participate in any of the 
gambles they were allocated: from 10 per cent for JP Morgan and Virgin Money to 21 per 
cent for Ryanair. We have no information on the elasticity of trust in this context (Bohnet, 
Hermann, & Zeckhauser, 2010) but if participants are responsive to increased potential gains, 
it might be possible to produce a dataset with greater variation by increasing the potential 




But, more importantly, does the measure offer genuine practical advantages? Table 2.9 
summarises the reasons to believe that it does. Firstly, we are looking for the risk-based 
measure to provide enough new insight to justify its small additional cost to the companies 
that might commission a piece of research on consumer trust. In some instances, the risk-
based measure only confirms what was found using the more standard expressive techniques. 
In many ways this is to be expected – indeed, from a theoretical perspective, the neat result 
implied by H1.1 would be that companies should perform similarly on the two measures. 
This would be tidy and perhaps reassuring, but of little value to practitioners, who would 
have limited use for a measure that only confirmed what they already knew. 
 
As can also be seen in Table 2.4, however, the risk-based measure does provide new insight 
for many of the companies examined here. In two of the three sectors examined, apparent 
rank advantages that one firm has over another appear to melt into insignificance when 
measured with this new tool. Looking at ability, benevolence, and integrity, the risk-based 
measure calls into question the idea that four of the nine companies are performing 
particularly well or poorly on one or two of these aspects. Only one company of the nine, 
Emirates, would learn nothing new from applying the risk-based measure. 
 
However, the learning is generally negative in character: rejecting apparent differences rather 
than confirming them. In general, there are greater differences between the different 
companies on the expressive measure than on the risk-based measure. On the one hand, this 
might suggest that the risk-based measure is something of a blunt instrument that misses 
some of the underlying heterogeneity in perceptions of these companies. On the other hand, it 
might be that when it comes to assessing the risk of trusting these companies, the companies 
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are more similar than they might first appear (for example, they all operate in the same 
regulatory environment).  
 
From a practitioner perspective, the new measure can at least provide a useful challenge: is 
our company’s (dis)advantage on trust really as dramatic as the traditional measures suggest? 
This could prompt a significant shift in strategy: for example, a business might believe they 
have a competitive advantage on trust, launch a new product on that basis, only for a rival to 
quickly follow with an imitation. Or it might prompt a change in resource allocation: if a 
company initially thought it was poorly placed on questions of ability, but then discovered 
this was not true, it might then pay equal attention to building reputations for ability, 
benevolence and integrity. 
 
The findings for JP Morgan are different from those just discussed. It would appear to be 
weak on ability using the traditional expressive measure, but the risk-based measure finds no 
such weakness. This is the second most disliked company in our sample (after Ryanair) but is 
intuitively also a large, successful and respected firm. Without pre-empting the hypothesis 
testing below, it seems plausible that JP Morgan would score poorly on ability if people used 
the affect heuristic, rather than reflecting in greater depth on the ability of the global 
investment bank.  
 
Turning to the hypothesis testing, as is already implied in the practical conclusions, the 
expressive and risk-based measures of trust only correlate weakly. There are a number of 
potential implications from this result: firstly, it could be that one measure reflects trust, 
while the other measure reflects some other concept. Alternatively, we could push Dunning 
and colleagues’ (2012) distinction to the fullest extent, and argue for two concepts of trust: 
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instrumental and expressive. A third possibility, which is explored in H1.3 below, and in 
Study 2, is that there is a single concept of trust, but that trust judgements are arrived at by 
dual processes. 
 
If our two measures of trust are showing different things, we could potentially choose 
between them by seeing which one more closely matches ‘real world’ consumer behaviour. If 
the risk-based measure had been able to better predict trusting behavioural intentions, then 
this might have given it a right to claim to ‘truly’ reflect consumer trust. However, H1.2, is 
rejected: if we just look at what people say they will do in the future, the risk-based measure 
adds little to traditional expressive measures. Because of the methodological similarity 
between the expressive measure of trust and the expressive measure of behavioural 
intentions, we cannot make the opposite claim, that the traditional expressive survey is better 
at predicting consumer behaviour.  
 
By largely supporting H1.3, Study 1 provides some evidence for dual processes of judgement 
in consumer trust decisions. Trust correlates more strongly with overall positivity when 
measured using a survey measure than when using a risk-based measure. This fits the 
expected pattern, with the affect heuristic dictating results when the task is familiar, easy and 
simple, but Type 2 processing taking over “when difficulty, novelty, and motivation combine 
to command the resources of working memory” (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p.15), as was 
expected when responding to the risk-based trust measure. 
 
Assessment of a familiar company also seems to be more reliant on the affect heuristic, to a 
degree that an unfamiliar company is not. There is some evidence that participants were less 
likely to use the affect heuristic when they dealt with an unfamiliar brand. From a dual 
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processing perspective, the extra novelty would be expected to increase Type 2 processing. 
There are also some indications that this pattern repeats for liked and disliked companies, a 
point that is explored further in Study 2. The fact that education, as a proxy for cognitive 
ability, does not seem to influence reliance on the affect heuristic should probably not be 
regarded as a conclusive strike against the ‘trusting fast and slow’ approach, given that 
participants of all levels of education seem able to handle the design of the risk-based 
gambles without difficulty. 
 
Study 1 provides some evidence that does not fit easily with the affective model of trust 
building as proposed by McAllister (1995). Across three different sectors, it takes participants 
as long to decide about the risk of trusting a company whether they are considering the 
company’s character or its practical abilities. This would seem inconsistent with the idea, set 
out in H1.4, that some of these decisions are affective while others are cognitive. None of the 
other models of trust building discussed above make the link between the type of risk (i.e. 
relational or performance risk) and the process used to arrive at a trust judgement. In the 
classical liberal model and type signalling models both types of judgement require the same 
inferences and observations. In the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model, it is the contextual factors 
that determine the speed of processing, not the difference between questions of character and 
questions of ability: consistent with the finding that people can make extremely quick 
assessments of whether a person’s face suggests either goodwill or competence (Todorov et 
al., 2005). This does not prove the need to necessarily collapse McAllister’s categories of 
‘cognitive and affective’ trust, but does suggest that his labels may be misleading if taken 




Study 1 also provides little evidence that a tripartite model based around ability, benevolence, 
and integrity works consistently across all types of trust tasks. Within the different measures, 
we do not see two or three distinct factors emerging that might reflect these three aspects, 
despite both the expressive and risk-based measures being designed to reflect this typology. 
There are also no stronger correlations across the measures when they deal with the same 
aspect. This at least calls into question the utility of this extra level of analysis. 
 
Study 1 is correlational in design and based on a single survey. As noted throughout the 
above discussion, this creates risks connected to common methods bias. In addition, the 
correlational approach leaves a question mark on the claims about identifying the cognitive 
processes that lead to consumer trust judgements. Study 2, described in the next chapter, 
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Increasing consumer trust through 
different cognitive processes (Study 2) 
 
"Truth is ever to be found in simplicity, and not in the multiplicity and confusion of things." 
Isaac Newton, Fragments from a Treatise on Revelation quoted in Manuel (1974) 
 
“Whenever commerce is introduced into any country probity and punctuality always accompany it…. It is far 
more reducible to self-interest, that general principle which regulates the actions of every man, and which leads 
men to act in a certain manner from views of advantage, and is as deeply implanted in an Englishman as a 
Dutchman. A dealer is afraid of losing his character, and is scrupulous in performing every engagement. When a 
person makes perhaps 20 contracts in a day, he cannot gain so much by endeavouring to impose on his 
neighbours, as the very appearance of a cheat would make him lose.” 




Practical and theoretical need for evidence on the effectiveness of specific 
interventions in a consumer trust context 
 
Practitioners look for interventions which can increase trust in their businesses. Although 
they have not been collected into a clear taxonomy, a small number of papers have tested a 
specific intervention on consumers and observed the effect on trust (Morhart et al., 2015; 
Pirson et al., 2014; 2017; Schlosser, Barnett White, & Lloyd, 2006; Waytz, Heafner, & 
Epley, 2014) and there is a substantial literature on the related problem of unobservable 
product quality (reviewed in Kirmani & Rao, 2000). There is also a large and growing 
behavioural science and experimental economics literature that touches on interventions 
which increase interpersonal trust (for example, Keck & Karelaia, 2012). Authors writing 
about interpersonal trust often note the implications of these studies for the business world, 
but few replicate their studies in this context (for example, Arce, 2006; Kim et al., 2013; Zurn 
& Topolonski, 2017). This could be a rich source of novel potential interventions to help 
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companies that wish to build trust with their consumers. 27 However, there are reasons why 
we might not assume a simple read across from interpersonal to consumer trust, because the 
trustee is now a powerful group, rather than just another individual (Holm & Nystedt, 2010; 
Kim et al., 2017.) 
 
Study 2 offers the opportunity to test whether some of these findings can be generalised from 
the interpersonal to the consumer trust context, and therefore have some potential 
applicability for practitioners seeking to increase trust in a business. From a theoretical 
perspective, the generalisability, or not, of these findings from the interpersonal to the 
consumer trust context is, in itself, of interest. 
 
Each of the interventions examined here is rooted in the interpersonal trust literature but aims 
to affect consumer trust in a company. Firstly, it is possible that a company’s greater 
Simplicity could increase consumer trust. Steve Jobs at Apple was apparently obsessive about 
simplicity and wielded a metaphorical “simple stick” to veto ideas that lacked this crucial 
quality (Segall, 2013, p.8). Consultants have long advocated increased simplicity as a 
potential driver of increased trust (Ashkenas, 2009), and this has been given fresh impetus 
from a research agenda into the impact of fluent meta-cognitive experiences on behaviour 
(Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). When something has a simpler or more fluent name, it is more 
trusted, whether it is a partner (Zurn & Topolinski, 2017), seller (Silva et al., 2017), a brand 
(Cho, 2019; Dohle, & Siegrist, 2014), a food additive (Song & Schwarz, 2009) or even a 
 
27 However, not all of this literature will produce novel or actionable interventions for businesses. Some studies 
make interventions that were originally inspired by business, such as testing the effect of charitable giving 
(Elfenbein et al., 2012; Fehrler & Prezpiorka, 2016; Milinski et al., 2002), corporate logos (Rafaeli et al., 2008) 
or offering guarantees (Andreoni, 2005). Many other studies focus on differences between trustors (for example, 
Croson & Buchan, 1999), or differences between trustees that have no obvious organisational equivalent (for 
example, Gervais, Shariff, & Norenyzayen, 2011; Rezlescu et al., 2012). That leaves a subsection of the 
literature that focuses on trustees increasing trust - and where there are potential analogies in the business-to-




stock (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2006). In addition, consumers expect that it will be easier to 
make an insurance claim when the contract is simpler (Van Boom, Desmet, & Van Dam, 
2016), while businesses with more complex annual reports tend to face higher costs of credit 
(Ertugrul et al., 2015). These accounts tend to emphasise the experience of something being 
simple as being the driver, rather than a preference for things which are explicitly simpler, 
although such a preference would be consistent with the idea of simplicity as a common goal 
in all forms of cognition (Chater, 1999; Chater & Vitányi, 2003). 
 
The second intervention tested is to show the trustor Trusting others. Charness and colleagues 
(2011) found that providing information on how much someone trusted in a past trust game 
(as Player 1) could influence how much they themselves were trusted by others (as Player 2). 
They suggest that trust-ing behaviour is used as a proxy for trust-worthy character, in the 
absence of other cues. A company that trusts its employees might experience a similar uplift 
in perceived trustworthiness. Note that this is different from ideas of ‘tit for tat’ reciprocity 
because the trusting move is made towards one party (employees), but trust is enhanced with 
an entirely different group (potential customers). 
 
In addition to these, we can consider an intervention which describes the target’s history of 
making charitable Donations. Not only has this been found, in the interpersonal trust 
literature, to increase trust (Elfenbein, Fisman, & McManus, 2012), it provides a helpful 
benchmark: do any of the other interventions used here have a greater impact than large 
charitable donations? While not directly translating into ‘cash terms’, it provides a sense of 





Finally, a number of studies have found greater trust when trustees are in fierce Competition 
to build a good reputation (Abraho et al., 2017; Barclay, 2004; Bohnet & Huck, 2004; Bolton, 
Katok, & Ockenfels, 2004; Huck, Ruschala, & Tyran, 2006; Keser, 2003; Resnick et al., 
2006; Slonim & Garbarino, 2008).  Unlike the other concepts described here, this is a 
question about the market situation, not the individual company. However, we can design an 
intervention that benefits the specific company, by informing consumers that the market is 
highly competitive immediately before they make a trust judgement about a specific 
company. 
 
Practical and theoretical need for evidence on different models of consumer 
trust-building 
 
As set out in Chapter 1, different literatures from classical economic theory, signalling 
theory, marketing and management, and behavioural science point towards different models 
of how trust is built in a consumer context. Perhaps because these models come from such a 
range of theoretical roots, they are rarely pitted against one another. The main exception is 
the literature that tests the conclusions of the classical economic model: for example, Berg 
and colleagues’ (1995) seminal work showing how interpersonal trust persists despite the 
prediction that ‘rational’ self-interested players of their trust game should never make an 
investment. As will be set out below, this is not the only situation where the different models 
make different predictions from one another. 
 
From a practitioner perspective, knowing which model works best in a consumer context 
would be very useful. It is unlikely that an effective intervention could be designed to 
increase consumer trust in one company without reference to the specific circumstances of 
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the relevant company. The practitioner needs, instead, a menu of prima facie valid 
prescriptions, that can then be tested in the specific context of the specific company28. 
However, such a prima facie longlist could be effectively cut down if we can identify which 
of the different models of trust-building is most credible in a consumer context. Study 2 aims 
to begin the creation of such a guide for practitioners by demonstrating that some 
interventions do generalise from the interpersonal trust literature. 
 
The underlying model of trust-building affects what tactics practitioners should adopt in 
making their interventions, particularly when looking at the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model 
described in Chapter 1 and evidenced, at least in part, in Chapter 2 (Study 1). If this approach 
is accurate, then consumers will process questions of trustworthiness in different ways, 
depending on how much attention they are paying to the question. The degree of attention 
that a consumer pays will vary dramatically across different sectors and situations. As a 
result, businesses in one situation may face a very different sort of challenge from another. 
For example, imagine a construction company builds an apartment complex. When it sells its 
apartments to owner-occupiers, the consumer is likely to put a huge amount of attention in 
the decision. If it sells them to a property magnate, this is an everyday transaction for more 
moderate stakes. If these two kinds of consumer think about trust in the same way, then the 
construction company only has a single problem to solve. But if the two groups are thinking 
in different ways, then the marketing strategies may need to be very different. 
 
 
28 A well developed menu exists in the trust repair literature: following an accusation, a company can deny 
responsibility, apologise, justify their actions, promise to make amends or change personnel (Ferrin et al., 2007; 
Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Kim et al., 2009; Nakayachi & Watabe, 2005; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). However, 
as noted in Chapter 1, these models are designed to respond to a specific trust-breaking incident. If the target 
company wants to increase trust but does not face a single specific allegation against it, then these models are 
silent on what interventions might work.  
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The dual processing approach offers a basis for predictions on how these situations might 
differ. If Type 2 processing is relied on more when the stakes are higher, then we should see 
more involved trust judgements when people are buying a house than a coffee. Similarly, if 
Type 2 processing is more likely when consumers face an unfamiliar question, new entrants, 
new products and new technologies should be purchased with greater reflection than familiar, 
habitual purchases. And if Type 2 processing is also more likely when we face a negative 
piece of information, a company that has just had to confess to some scandal is more likely to 
be judged in depth, rather than in a fleeting fashion.  So, for practitioners, if it can be shown 
that consumers use different processes to make trustworthiness judgements, this adds an 
important new contextual variable to their decision-making: picking a Type 1 processing-






Predictions based on different models of trust 
 
The different models of trust-building are characterised in detail in Chapter 1, based on 
grouping different authors and research approaches into categories that share some similar 
ideas of what causes trust to increase. Taking each model in turn, it is possible to draw out 
some of the different predictions that the different approaches might make regarding the 
different interventions described above. This is summarised in Table 3.1. 
 
The classical liberal model would predict that few of the interventions under consideration 
will be successful. Donations, Trusting others, and Simplicity do not change the incentive of 
a trustee and so, if trust is largely a matter of mutual interest, they should not make any 
difference to a rational trustor. However, the Competitiveness of the market environment is a 
crucial reason to trust in this model. Strictly speaking, if we assume information is perfect, 
then telling people that the market is competitive should have no effect, as this is information 
they should already know (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944). However, if we relax that 
assumption slightly and allow people to be persuaded by or have their attention drawn to the 
question of competition, the classical liberal approach might predict that the tougher the 




Table 3.1 Predictions regarding the impact of different interventions based on different 






Trusting fast and slow 
 
Donation  Predicts no 
effect 
Predicts higher 
trust if the risk is 
relational (and the 
signal is credible). 
 
Predicts no effect 
if the risk is 
performance (or 
the signal is not 
credible.) 
Predicts higher 
affective trust if 
the risk is 
relational. 
If the trustor is using Type 2 
processing, predicts higher trust if the 
risk is relational (and the signal is 
credible). 
 
If the trustor is using Type 1 
processing, predicts higher trust for 
both relational and performance risks 
due to increased liking, regardless of 







trust if the risk is 
relational (and the 
signal is credible). 
 
Predicts no effect 
if the risk is 
performance (or 
the signal is not 
credible.) 
Predicts higher 
affective trust if 
the risk is 
relational. 
If the trustor is using Type 2 
processing, predicts higher trust if the 
risk is relational (and the signal is 
credible). 
 
If the trustor is using Type 1 
processing, predicts higher trust for 
both relational and performance risks 
due to increased liking, regardless of 
whether it is credible. 
 
Simplicity Predicts no 
effect 
Predicts no effect Predicts no effect Predicts higher trust on both relational 
and performance risks if the trustor is 












Predicts no effect Predicts no effect Predicts higher trust on both relational 
and performance risks if the trustor is 
using Type 2 processing. 
 
 
In the type-signalling model, the nature of the risk is crucial: broadly speaking, signals of 
ability increase trust in situations of performance risk, while signals of benevolence and 
integrity increase trust in situations of relational risk (Das & Teng, 2004; Colquitt et al., 
2011; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). The Donations and Trusting others might be 
signals of benevolence and integrity, and therefore might increase trust in those situations of 
relational risk, but should be unrelated to trust over performance risk. However, it is an open 
question whether the evidence presented in the stimulus constitutes a credible signal of 
benevolence and integrity in the context that participants are facing (Boulding & Kirmani, 
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1993; Erdem & Swait, 1998; Nakayachi & Watabe, 2005). It might be, for example, that 
participants do find charitable activity to be a potential signal of benevolence and integrity, 
but that the amount proposed here is not sufficiently generous for the signal to be credible. 
However, the Competitiveness of the marketplace says nothing about the type that the trustee 
belongs to, meaning that this model predicts no effect for this intervention. Similarly, the 
Simplicity of a business is not a signal of trustworthiness in the way it has been set out here 
and therefore the type-signalling model predicts it will have no effect. 
 
In this study, the trustee is a relatively new entrant to the market and isn’t identified (see 
below for a longer discussion of this design), which means that participants cannot have a 
close or reciprocal relationship with the trustee. Therefore, in this study, we can simply aim 
to reflect the ‘headlines’ of McAllister’s (1995) cognitive and affective trust model. As in the 
type-signalling model, news about the Competitiveness of the marketplace should have little 
role. Also like the type-signalling model, the Donation and Trusting Others interventions are 
relevant to relational trust, and so might increase affective trust, but should have no effect on 
cognitive trust. An organisation’s Simplicity does not provide a basis for either affective or 
cognitive trust in any of the approaches where this model has been applied in a consumer 
context (e.g., Calefato, Lanubile, & Novielli, 2015; Johnson & Grayson, 2005; Sekhon et al., 
2014). 
 
Finally, the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model is based on dual process models of persuasion 
which suggest that different types of messaging will be more effective in changing attitudes 
depending on the degree of attention being paid by the audience (Chaiken, Liberman, & 
Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In this model, interventions which increase positive 
affect towards the target should lead to an increase in trust when trustors are relying on 
146 
 
heuristics – specifically, the affect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2002). This might create a ‘halo 
effect’ from situations where the liking might be relevant, i.e. for relational risks, to questions 
where it is not, i.e. for performance risk. The Donation, Trusting Others, and Simplicity, 
interventions should all make a business more likeable, and are all therefore expected to 
increase trust, and this effect is potentially expected to go beyond just questions of relational 
risk, provided participants are using Type 1 processing. But when trustors are less reliant on 
heuristics, these interventions should be less effective i.e. these interventions should increase 
trust on the standard expressive survey measure but not on the risk-based measure.  
 
By contrast, we could consider an intervention that provides no additional reason to like a 
trustee, but does, after some reflection, provide a good reason to trust them. The 
Competitiveness intervention is designed to fill this gap. This cannot be based on the affect 
heuristic: knowing that all potential trustees are in competition provides no reason for me to 
feel warmer towards any one of them. Instead, it requires the trustor to reflect and put 
themselves in the role of the trustee: asking themselves, ‘would I be more trustworthy if I had 
to fight to hold on to every customer’?  Evans and Krueger (2011, 2014) show that when the 
potential losses from interpersonal trust are higher, this can make trustors ignore changes in 
the degree to which their partners are tempted to defect. Thinking about the trustee’s 
incentives requires mental effort (Evans and Krueger, 2011; Bohl & van den Bos, 2012). It is 
possible in principle, however, that this relationship between competition and trust is learned 
by some non-effortful associative process, rather than through reasoning, and hence might not 
be develop through Type 2 processing. However, such an association does not seem 
intuitively likely: in other contexts, trusting those who are intensely competitive – at work, 




It might be argued that the Trusting others and Donation interventions are not heuristic based 
because they provide evidence of trustworthiness, in that they provide evidence of the 
trustors’ character, and that allows trustees to make predictions about the future. There is a 
credible response that such a judgement is still rooted in the affect heuristic: categorising the 
trustor as a ‘good guy’ based on one virtuous act in the past, and then using that to decide 
how they will act in the future. Nevertheless, this objection can be put aside when we focus 
on trust for performance risk: if someone trusts my ability to complete a difficult task because 
I have been morally virtuous in the past, they must be using some kind of heuristic reasoning, 
whereby the overall positivity created by my virtuous actions is producing a ‘halo effect’ 
(Cooper, 1981) that is affecting the assessment of my competence. 
 
These predictions become especially useful if we associate the two different trust metrics, 
expressive and risk based, with Type 1 and Type 2 processing respectively. As set out in 
Chapter 1, in the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model, Type 1 processes are assumed to be the 
default, but Type 2 processes are more involved when novelty, difficulty, or motivation are 
increased. As discussed around H1.3.i in the previous chapter, the risk-based measure 
introduces novelty, difficulty, and additional motivation for the participants. The evidence in 
Study 1 was consistent with the claim that the affect heuristic was used more when 
participants used standard expressive survey measures than when they completed risk-based 
tasks.   If this is conclusion is correct, then the two metrics should move differently in 
response to different interventions, with the risk-based measure responding to the more 
involved arguments, and the expressive measure responding to the more superficial ones, as 





Hypothesis testing around the interventions 
 
Based on the discussion above, the following hypotheses29 were generated from the 
perspective of the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model. Firstly, H2.1.i-iii describes the expected 
effect of three interventions on expressive trust – i.e. on a measure that is expected to reflect 
Type 1 processing in trust judgements: 
 
H2.1.i-iii The three treatments (i-Donation; ii-Trusting others; iii-Simplicity) aimed at 
achieving increased trust through attribute substitution will significantly increase trust 
on the expressive measure (ET) compared to the control group. 
 
Secondly, hypothesis H2.2.i-vi focusses on the potential ‘halo effect’ discussed above. If 
there is such a halo effect when participants use Type 1 processing, then there should be little 
difference between the impacts on expressive measures of ability and expressive measures of 
benevolence or integrity. If the ‘halo’ is less present when participants use Type 2 processing, 
then a stronger distinction should be drawn, with the risk-based measure of ability unmoved 
by information that is unconnected to a trustee’s performance risk. This is a similar design to 
Finucane and colleagues’ (2000) Experiment 2, where they provide information about a 
technology’s risks (benefits) and see if it reduces the technology’s perceived benefit (risk). 
They used this to show the affect heuristic at work: as irrelevant positive information did tend 
to increase the positive assessment of the technology. It is also similar to the idea of ‘strong 
and weak arguments’ in the literature on persuasive communications (Chaiken, Liberman, & 
Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986): information about a company’s benevolence is a 
 
29 Hypotheses were pre-registered with the Centre for Open Science https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/U9GKS 
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strong argument for it being trustworthy in relational risks, but a weak argument for it being 
trustworthy in performance risks. 
 
H2.2.i-vi The three treatments (i-Donation; ii-Trusting others; iii-Simplicity) aimed at 
achieving increased trust through attribute substitution will significantly increase 
expressive measures of both ability (ETA) and benevolence / integrity (ETB). They 
will not (iv-vi) cause any significant increase in trust on the risk-based measure when 
it is limited to ability risks (RBA) 30. 
 
Thirdly, hypothesis H2.3 focusses just on the Competitiveness intervention. This provides no 
reason to like the trustor, and so should have no effect on trust via the affect heuristic. 
However, if participants are using Type 2 processing, as expected when completing the risk-
based trust exercise, they may be able to infer that this business is more likely to act in a 
trustworthy way because of its incentive to maintain its reputation. 
 
H2.3 The treatment on Competitiveness will significantly increase trust on the risk-
based measure (RBT) compared to the control group.  There will be no significant 
increase in trust on the expressive measure (ET) compared to the control group.  
 
Further hypothesis testing 
 
In addition, the design of Study 2 allows for some of the findings from Study 1 to be further 
explored. Firstly, Study 1 found that there was a stronger correlation between positivity and 
trust as measured using the expressive measure than using the risk-based measure. It was 
 
30 For clarity, the final set of null hypotheses (H2.2.iv-vi) are listed as separate hypotheses in this document, 
while in the pre-registration they were collectively listed under a single designation, H2.iv. 
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argued that this was because participants had a greater tendency to use the affect heuristic 
when faced with an unincentivised survey question than when completing a risk-based trust 
exercise. This tendency is expected to be repeated when the same two tasks are performed in 
Study 2. However, as discussed below, the target company in Study 2 is unnamed, rather than 
being a familiar brand. This is expected to prompt participants to rely less on the affect 
heuristic, just as they appeared to in Study 1 when dealing with an unfamiliar brand. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses is formulated: 
 
H2.4 The correlation between positivity and expressive trust (ET) will be weaker than 
in Study 1, but still stronger than the correlation between positivity and risk-based 
trust (RBT). 
 
Study 2’s design also enables the testing of two additional hypotheses that look at the 
correlation between positivity and trust, and how this may vary based on whether the 
participant is more or less heavily relying on Type 1 or Type 2 processing. Firstly, if it is 
assumed that Type 2 processing is quite literally ‘thinking slower’ than Type 1, as is central 
to Kahneman’s (2011) analysis, then it can be predicted that the people who complete the 
survey more quickly will tend to be more reliant on the affect heuristic. Secondly, Study 1 
found some suggestions that the affect heuristic was used less when participants faced a 
target they disliked. However, the results were far from conclusive, and so the question is 
explored further here31. Both of these hypotheses are restricted to the expressive measure of 
trust, given the finding in Study 1 that positivity did not correlate strongly with the risk-based 
measure of trust. 
 
31 In Study 1, participants were only asked to record whether they were positive, neutral or negative towards the 
target company. In Study 2, a longer scale is used, making it possible to look at correlations even within the 




H2.5 There will be a stronger correlation between positivity and expressive trust (ET) 
when i) the survey is completed more quickly or, ii) only those with a positive or 
neutral attitude towards the target company are included32. 
 
Finally, as in Study 1, this research allows us to look at another dualist model of trust: 
McAllister’s (1995) affective and cognitive trust model. This model is widely used in the 
management literature (for example, Calefato, Lanubile, & Novielli, 2015; Johnson & 
Grayson, 2005; Sekhon et al., 2014) and discussed in detail in Chapter 1 as part of the 
relational/affective approach. In contrast to the ‘fast and slow’ dual-processing model 
discussed above, this approach sees content rather than context as the factor which 
determines which process dominates: when the content relates to competence it is arrived at 
through a cognitive process, when it relates to character it is arrived at through an affective 
process. If these labels of ‘cognitive’ and ‘affective’ processes are to be taken at face value, 
then they should lead us to different expectations in terms of the speed of decision-making. 
This is based on the well-recognised finding that affective responses can happen more 
quickly than ones involving judgement and reflection (Zajonc, 1980). Therefore, all else 
being equal, in McAllister’s model, a judgement of benevolence or integrity through should 
happen more quickly, as it is driven by an affective response, than a judgement of ability, 
which is supposed to be reached through cognitive trust. This is a different prediction from 
the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model, which suggests that fast, affective reactions will happen 
for questions of both ability and benevolence/integrity if the participant is using Type 1 
 
32 The phrasing of this hypothesis has been very slightly changed from the pre-registered version to make clear 




processes, while slower, more considered judgements will happen for both questions of 
ability and benevolence/integrity when Type 2 processes are mobilised. 
 
In Study 1, there was no evidence that supposedly affective trust decisions do happen faster 
than cognitive ones. However, Study 1 only looked at the differences in decision-times for 
the risk-based trust exercise. Study 2 seeks to replicate the finding in that exercise and also in 
the standard expressive measures of trust. In doing this, it should be noted that, once again, 
decision-time is not a controlled variable: participants are not instructed or incentivised to 
make their decisions as quickly as possible, except that, in doing so, they will complete the 
survey and receive their incentive more quickly. In any analysis based on decision-time, it is 
vital that the decisions being compared are of equal difficulty (Alos-Ferrer, 2018; Krajbich et 
al., 2015). Specifically in this case, any differences in difficulty must be due to the difference 
in the content of the decision (supposedly ‘affective’ content related to character or 
supposedly ‘cognitive’ content related to ability), rather than other factors that might make it 
more or less difficult to make the decision. This difficulty is not measured in the experimental 
design: instead, such conclusions that can be drawn are based on looking at a pattern across 
multiple settings. Just as in Study 1, it would be surprising that across three sets of questions, 
the same bias in terms of difficulty was created, Study 2 looks across two very different 
measures: expressive survey questions and risk-based decision tasks. Thus, the two studies 
provide multiple opportunities for the two distinct systems proposed by McAllister (1995) to 
reveal themselves, and if they consistently fail to do so then we are within our rights to 
question whether they are really there. Following on from Study 1’s null finding, Study 2 
puts the hypothesis more strongly and in the negative, arguing against the affective and 




H2.6 Ability judgements will not be significantly slower than judgements of 
benevolence / integrity, whether on the expressive or risk-based measures. 
 
The setting for Study 2 is the UK consumer banking sector. For similar reasons as for Study 
1, financial services represent a compelling example of a sector that is reliant on trust. At the 
time of conducting the research, the UK consumer finance sector was also undergoing a 
period of potential disruption, with new, digital-only banks like Monzo, Starling, Revolut and 
others seeking to challenge the dominant retail banks (“The digital upstarts taking on 
Britain’s dominant few banks”, 2018; Coulter, 2019, June 5). For a new bank to win over 
consumers will obviously require them to win consumer trust. One contemporary media 









Study 2 mirrors Study 1 in using the online panel provided by market research company 
Respondi, recruited to be representative of UK adults.  2,005 participants completed the 
survey, but 243 were excluded before any further analysis was undertaken based on pre-
registered exclusion criteria. Of the remaining 1,762, 916 were female. The criteria for 
exclusion were different to Study 1 because, as well as excluding overly consistent responses, 
the experiment required participants to pay attention to the stimulus.  The pre-registered 
exclusion criteria were: 
- completed the survey in less than 15% of the median time; 
- completed the survey in over 300% of the median time; 
- gave overly consistent responses (all of the same value) for all of the question sections 
(the manipulation checks, the risk-based trust exercises, and the expressive trust 
questions); 
- gave overly consistent responses (all of the same value) for two of the question 
sections (the manipulation checks, the risk-based trust exercises, and the expressive 
trust questions) while also completing the survey in under 50% of the median. 
 
As summarised in Figure 3.1, participants were randomly33  allocated to the control group or 
one of four treatments (labelled Donation, Trusting others, Simplicity, and Competitiveness 
and summarised in Table 3.2). All participants were given initial instructions that explained 
that the survey concerned a real company, but the company would not be named except for a 
brief description. For the control group, this description was: 
 
33 Participants are initially allocated randomly, and then the age and gender combination of each participant is 




This company is often called a “challenger bank” because they aim to work 
differently from the big banks in the UK today. They were founded in 2016 and they 
focus on using technology to improve the experience for customers. They have a 
highly rated app and no high street branches. They now have over 400 employees in 
their UK headquarters and around a million customers. 
 
The treatment groups saw the same description but with a few additional sentences, shown in 
Table 3.2 and discussed below. Participants were then asked a series of questions about their 
view of the bank and how much trust they had in it, as shown in the full text of the 
questionnaire provided in Appendix 3. 
 
The survey does not name the bank being described but does assert that it is a real bank. The 
description is based on how one of the most popular challenger banks, Monzo, describes 
itself on its website (Monzo 2019a). But the publicly available facts are amended in several 
ways to create the manipulations in the experimental design: 
- Changing the year in which the bank was founded and changing the number of 
employees to prevent easy identification. 
- Asserting in one treatment that the bank gives 1 per cent of its profits to charity to 
create the Donation treatment described below. 
- Slightly exaggerating the extent of the bank’s flexible working policy (Monzo, 2019b) 
in order to make it clearer to the reader in the Trusting others treatment described 
below. 
- Asserting that the business’s organisational structure is unusually simple in order to 




The amendments are very minor, especially given that no specific bank is identified during 
the survey. It is, however, necessary to ensure that participants believe that they refer to a real 
company, otherwise the incentivisation of the risk-based tasks becomes moot. As the 
randomly chosen participant receives the full payout (as described below), there is no 




After participants had seen the description, they were then asked how positive or negative 
they felt towards the bank. The scale used for positivity was increased to seven points rather 
than three as in Study 1. Participants were then asked a series of manipulation check 
questions to confirm that the different interventions had achieved their intended goal, using 
the items shown in Table 3.2.  
 
Then, as shown in Figure 3.1, participants completed two banks of questions: one set of risk-
based trust exercises, and a set of expressive trust measures in the standard survey format. 
Participants were randomly allocated to complete one block before the other. Finally, 
participants were given a second manipulation check question to confirm whether they 








An initial Pilot Study (not reported, N=269) helped identify which interventions successfully 
led to different answers on the manipulation check questions. Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1 both 
show the final form that the interventions took: 1-4 additional sentences, totalling 23-65 
words, added on to the general description of the bank that is given above. The Donation 
intervention uses an arbitrary scale of charitable giving that did not intuitively stretch 
credibility. The Trusting others intervention is operationalised as referring to trusting 
employees, both to make decisions and to manage their own time – reflecting, though in a 
simpler way, the kind of language used on Monzo’s website (Monzo, 2019b), and being 
careful not to suggest any link to trusting customers so as to avoid invoking ideas of 
reciprocity. The Competition intervention makes statements about how easy it is for customer 
to transfer their current account, without specifically referring to the target bank. 
 
The Simplicity intervention cannot flow directly from much of the relevant the literature as 
the experimental design does not allow for either the name of the bank or the description 
provided to be a much more fluent experience than reading the control. Therefore, rather than 
instilling the metacognitive experience of fluency, this intervention uses an explicit 
description of simplicity to suggest that this bank would generate that experience when you 
engaged with it. It covers both internal structures and ways of communicating (reflecting 
Monzo, 2018; 2019a), but is careful not to give users reasons to believe that the bank is more 
competent – indeed, it might be argued that the simple kind of bank described is less 




Table 3.2 Summary of interventions used in Study 2 
Intervention label and stimulus used  Basis in the literature Manipulation 
check 
Donation 
“One thing that makes this company unusual 
is that they have pledged to donate one per 
cent of all their profits to charity.”  
Supporting a charity can make an 
individual more trusted (Elfenbein, Fisman, 





“More than other banks, this company 
encourages its staff to use their own 
judgement to make the right decisions for 
customers. It also offers its employees an 
unusual amount of flexibility.  Employees 
can arrive when suits them, work from home 
whenever they like, and take holiday at short 
notice.”  
Charness and colleagues (2011) found that 
providing information on how much 
someone trusted in a past trust game (as 
Player 1) could influence how much they 
themselves were trusted by others (as 





“This company aims to be simpler than 
other banks. Instead of a huge set of 
different offers, they just have one personal 
account and one business account. Instead of 
a complex bureaucracy, they have just two 
teams: the money management team and the 
technology team. They have also won the 
Clear & Simple Mark by Fairer Finance for 
having easy to understand terms and 
conditions.” 
Numerous studies have found that 
participants are more willing to trust when 
they are presented with a simple, fluent 
stimulus (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2006; 
Cho, 2019; Dechene et al., 2010; Dohle, & 
Siegrist, 2014; Ertugrul et al., 2015; 
Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, 2018; 
Reynolds-McIlnay & Morrin, 2019; Silva 
et al., 2017; Song & Schwarz, 2009; Van 
Boom, Desmet, & Van Dam, 2016;  







“Today, banks have to compete for current 
account customers. If customers are not 
happy with their bank, it is now very easy 
for people to switch to a different bank using 
the Current Account Switch Service. That 
means banks can only succeed by keeping 
their customers happy.” 
 
 
Several studies have found greater trust 
when trustees have to compete to build a 
good reputation (Abraho et al., 2017; 
Barclay, 2004; Bohnet & Huck, 2004; 
Bolton, Katok, & Ockenfels, 2004; Huck, 
Ruschala, & Tyran, 2006; 
Keser, 2003; Resnick et al., 2006; Slonim 
& Garbarino, 2008). 
“This company 
must work hard 










As far as possible, the measures used in Study 2 are repeated from Study 1. The risk-based 
trust measure (RBT) for financial services is repeated from Study 1, with two amendments. 
Rather than being increased by 50 per cent, anything that is put at risk is now quadrupled. 
This is to compensate for the fact that the target is not named and so participants may be 
more wary about trusting. Secondly, to avoid any possible confusion with the word “account” 
used in Study 1, the less financially-relevant term of “pot” is used instead. 
 
The expressive measure of trust (ET) is repeated from Study 1, except for one item which 
referred to the company’s name and is therefore inappropriate for a study where the company 
is not named. This is replaced with the intuitively straightforward item “This company is 
trustworthy”. Given that the split of ability, benevolence, and integrity did not seem 
especially fruitful in Study 1, Study 2 asks about two sets of antecedents: ability-based ones, 
and those related to either benevolence or integrity. The items are repeated from Study 1, but 
two new items are added to the expressive measure of ability, adapted from Schlosser and 
colleagues (2006), so as to have the same number of ability and non-ability related items, 
which enables some of the decision-time comparisons made below.  The time taken by each 








All participants were awarded points that can be exchanged for cash as payment for 
completing the survey in exactly the same way as in Study 1. As in Study 1, one participant 
was randomly chosen and they are given the full amount that it is possible to win, without 
waiting to see what happens to Monzo over the coming year. Because of the increased gains 
to trust, this participant received £384 GBP in Study 2. As discussed in Study 1, this small 
deception had some practical benefits in the short term, but is not necessary to the design of 
the risk-based measure, and the winning participant was warned that their immediate payout 







The following section first examines the success of the manipulations in the experimental 
treatments and identifies some order effects that appear in the data. After this, the main focus 
of Study 2 is to look at the impact of the interventions on both expressive and risk-based 
measures of trust. Finally, it looks again at the correlation between positivity and different 
measures of trust, as well as the time taken to complete trust questions on more ‘affective’ or 
‘cognitive’ questions. A summary of the results for different experimental treatments is 




Each group answered all of the manipulation checks, and the relevant comparisons between 
treatment group and control group are shown below. Each of the treatment groups have a 
higher mean score for positivity than the control group (M=4.429, SD=1.029). This is 
expected for the Donation treatment (M=4.746, SD=1.184), t(686.91)=-3.778, p<.001, two-
sided, the Trusting others treatment (M=4.925, SD=1.405), t(654.39)=-5.348, p<.001, two-
sided, and the Simplicity treatment, (M=4.766, SD=1.293), t(678.04)=-3.835, p<.001, two-
sided. What is more of a surprise is that Competition treatment is receives significantly higher 
positivity scores than the control, (M=4.64, SD=1.09), t(687.62)=-2.702, p=.007, two-sided. 
While the effect is small, r=.102, this is still surprising because the Competition stimulus did 
not provide any additional information about the specific target company. Either this could be 
caused by the mere expose to a slightly longer stimulus about the target (Zajonc, 1980) or, 
perhaps more likely, the additional information about the sector in the Competition stimulus 





As shown in Table 3.2, each intervention was paired with a manipulation check statement to 
establish whether the intervention had improved perceptions in the way intended. Participants 
in the Donation condition were more likely to agree with the statement “This company 
supports charities” (M=4.068, SD=1.013) than the control group (M=2.962, SD= 0.896), 
t(689.29)= -15.275, p <.001, one-sided. Participants in the Trusting others condition were 
more likely to agree with the statement “This company trusts its employees”, (M=4.042, 
SD=0.886), than the control group (M=3.557, SD= 0.825), t(698.41)= -7.505, p <.001, one-
sided. Participants in the Simplicity condition were more likely to agree with the statement 
“This company keeps things simple” (M=3.986, SD=0.905) than the control group (M=3.618, 
SD= 0.839), t(699.41)= -5.5902, p <.001, one-sided. Participants in the Competition condition 
were more likely to agree with the statement “This company must work hard to win and keep 
its customers” (M=4.055, SD=0.842) than the control group (M=3.977, SD= 0.816), but this 
did not meet the test of statistical significance, t(688.81)= -1.235, p=.109, one-sided. 
 
At the end of the survey, participants were asked how confident they were that the bank 
referred to in the questions was real using a 1 to 5 scale. 330 Around 19 per cent (n=330) 
gave answers of 1 (i.e. not at all confident) or 2. The figures reported throughout include 
these participants. As planned in the pre-registration, the same analysis was also conducted 








Because the design was counter-balanced, roughly half the participants completed the 
measure of expressive trust after the measure of risk-based trust. The two groups were 
equally positive towards the company before their question order was allocated, with no 
significant difference in the positivity of the group who saw the risk-based exercises first 
(M=4.714, SD=1.238) and those who saw the expressive questions first (M=4.697, 
SD=1.203), t(1749.1)= 0.293, p=.770, two-sided. However, the order of the tasks did affect 
how long participants spent on each one, as shown in Figure 3.2. When participants 
completed the risk-based trust exercise first they spent significantly longer on the six 
exercises (M=78.217 seconds, SD=44.087 seconds) than the participants who completed the 
risk-based trust exercises after already completing the expressive trust questions (M=70.265 
seconds, SD=35.685 seconds), t(1650.8)=4.149, p<.001, two-sided. This effect is even more 
pronounced for the expressive trust exercises: when they were presented first, participants 
spent, on average, more than twice the total time on these three exercises (M=113.663 
seconds, SD=57.565 seconds) than when they were presented after the risk-based trust 
exercises (M=43.487 seconds, SD=23.603 seconds), t(1209.3)=-33.77, p<.001, two-sided. 
 
These order effects were not envisaged before the data was analysed. It might be imagined 
that fatigue from the first exercise could cause participants to speed up on the second exercise 
they face. Alternatively, the introduction of an incentivised task could reduce the intrinsic 
motivation for accuracy on subsequent, non-incentivised tasks (Gneezy & Rustichini, 1998; 
Kreps, 1997). Finally, there might be some more idiosyncratic reason for these order effects, 
either specific to trust or to the experiment design. For example, it might be that in coming to 
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a trust judgement in the risk-based task, participants have a salient and considered view that 
they can quickly and easily consult to answer subsequent expressive questions. 
 
The balanced design provides a route past this potential confound in the order of questions: 
when looking at one of the two trust measures, we can look only at the ‘unpolluted’ data of 
those who answered that question first. Obviously this reduces the overall sample size 
dramatically, but as the sample is chosen to match the commercial market research norm of 
N=2,000, there is still much analysis that can be conducted with this reduced subset of the 
data: following the exclusions discussed above, n=859 saw the risk-based exercises (RBT) 
first, and n=903 saw the expressive trust exercises (ET) first. Unless otherwise stated in the 
analysis below, only these subsamples are used to analyse risk-based or expressive trust 








Intervention impacts (H2.1-H2.3) 
Table 3.3 Summary of results by intervention 
Means (and standard deviations) except where stated. 
 
 Interventions 
 Control Donation Trust others Simplicity Competition 
Sub-sample asked the expressive trust questions before the risk-based trust questions 
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Average transfer in 
the risk-based trust 
exercises** 
(Across six gambles, up to 












Sub-sample asked the risk-based trust questions before the expressive trust questions 
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Average transfer in 
the risk-based trust 
exercises 
(Across six gambles, up to 












*Following pre-registered exclusions applied as described above 
** Shown for completeness only 
***Experimental currency of ‘mingle points’ is converted to GBP at a 1,000 points to £8 ratio.  
 
 
Table 3.3 summarises the results for the different treatments.  For completeness, it shows the 
mean values on the different trust measures both for those who saw the risk-based trust 
questions first and those who saw the expressive measures first. The table gives the responses 




As described in the planned pre-registration, the data is normalised by subtracting the control 
group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation before taking an average of 
the amount put at risk across the six tasks in the case of risk-based trust (RBT, =.89 ), or the 
average scores given on the three expressive trust questions (ET, =.87). This is repeated 
from Study 2 and, as discussed above, ensures that ‘bets’ on risk events with different 
probabilities can be compared. It means that the control treatment always has a mean of zero, 
but a standard deviation is less than one because the variance is usually reduced across the 
several items. The distribution of the trust for each of the different treatments is similar, as 
shown in Appendix Figure A2. The normalisation means that the control group means are 
always zero, and the control group standard deviations are expected to be around one, 
although this can vary as the normalisation is conducted at the item level, before being 
averaged. 
 
In addition, metrics are created along the same design to look at the different aspects of trust: 
both for the four expressive questions on ability  (ETA, =.89 ), and the four expressive 
questions on benevolence and integrity (ETB, =.89). In addition, a measure of risk-based 
trust using only the two risks related to ability is also created (RBA, r(857)=.570, p<.001), 
and, for completeness but not referenced in any of the hypotheses, one that covers the 
remaining four risks related to benevolence and integrity (RBB, =.85). 
 
The first hypothesis to examine is whether the interventions expected to increase trust on the 




H2.1.i-iii The three treatments (i-Donation; ii-Trusting others; iii-Simplicity) aimed at 
achieving increased trust through attribute substitution will significantly increase trust 
on the expressive measure (ET) compared to the control group.  
 
As shown in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.3, the three treatments designed to increase trust through 
attribute substitution had different effects on the expressive measure of trust. Contrary to 
H2.1.i and H2.1.ii, the Donation and Trusting others interventions had no effect on the 
expressive measure of trust. However, and as predicted in H2.1, for the Simplicity group, 
there is a small but significant difference, t(363.25) =-1.885, p=.030, one-sided34. From this, 
it can be concluded that one of these approaches, emphasising simplicity, can drive increased 




34 This conclusion is slightly different if we perform the analysis on all the participants i.e. in this case, 
including participants who completed the measures of expressive trust after the risk-based trust exercise. The 
difference in expressive trust now slightly exceeds the standard threshold for statistical significance (M=0.111, 
SD= 0.930), t (699.97) =-1.615, p=.053, one-sided. 
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Table 3.4 Testing whether the interventions cause a significant difference in trust 
Bold used where p<.05. 
 
 Interventions 
 Control Donation Trust others Simplicity Competition 
























































t(327) = -2.91,  
p= 0.002 
NB - Only showing data for those who saw the relevant metric first 
 
 
A second set of hypotheses proposed that interventions designed to create a warmer 
impression of the target would increase trust on both relevant (i.e. benevolence-related) and 
irrelevant (i.e. ability-related) measures of expressive trust. By contrast, there would be no 
impact on irrelevant measures of trust when using a risk-based measure. Note that because of 
the order effects discussed above, this means examining the two different subgroups that have 
an ‘unpolluted’ read on each measure. In the pre-registration, this hypothesis was set out as: 
 
H2.2.i-vi The three treatments (i-Donation; ii-Trusting others; iii-Simplicity) aimed at 
achieving increased trust through attribute substitution will significantly increase 
expressive measures of both ability (ETA) and benevolence / integrity (ETB). They 
will not (iv-vi) cause any significant increase in trust on the risk-based measure when 











Table 3.5 Testing whether the interventions cause a significant difference in different 
aspects of trust  
Bold used where p<.05. 
 
 Interventions 
 Control Donation Trust others Simplicity Competition 














One sided t-test 
comparing control 
























One sided t-test 
comparing control 
























One sided t-test 
comparing control 
























One sided t-test 
comparing control 











NB - Only showing data for those who saw the relevant metric first 
 
Table 3.5 shows the different results for the different aspects of trust, measured in the two 
different ways. Once again, the Donation and Trusting Others35 interventions do not cause a 
significant increase in either the expressive measure of ability or of benevolence, although 
 
35 As noted above, participants were included even if they said at the end of the exercise that they doubted 
whether the company was real. Excluding those doubting participants produces a slightly different conclusion 
here: the Trusting Others interventions causes a significant increase in ETA (M=2.23, SD=0.906) compared to 
the mean (M=0, SD=0.858), t(270.55)=-2.095, p=.02. It also causes an increase in ETB (M=2.43, SD=0.868) 
compared to the mean (M=0, SD=0.867), t(273)=-2.328, p=.01.  
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some of the differences approach the standard threshold for statistical significance. The 
Simplicity intervention does cause an increase in both the expressive measure of ability and of 
benevolence but it only passes the test for significance on the benevolence measure, t(362.43) 
=-1.734, p=.042, one-sided36. This suggests a rejection of the H2.2.i-iii: where the 
interventions have a significant impact, it is on the measure that is more relevant to their 
content i.e. on the question of benevolence/integrity. From this, we might reject the idea that 
these interventions affect any expressive measure in the same way, whether or not it is 
relevant. However, as can be seen in Figure 3.4, the irrelevant expressive measure of ability 
(ETA) does increase, albeit not to a degree that meets the threshold for statistical 
significance, t(363)= -1.05, p=.15 one-sided.  H2.2.iv-vi are fully supported: none of these 
interventions affect the risk-based measure of trust in ability, as shown in Figure 3.6. 
 
Finally in this section, we examine the treatment on competitiveness that was expected to 
increase trust on reflection, but not through the attribute substitution as discussed above. This 
led to the prediction that the treatment would move one metric, but not the other: 
 
H2.3 The treatment on Competitiveness will significantly increase trust on the risk-
based measure (RBT) compared to the control group.  There will be no significant 
increase in trust on the expressive measure (ET) compared to the control group. 
 
This prediction was fulfilled exactly as expected, as is shown in Table 3.4. There was a small 
but significant increase in trust on the risk-based measure compared to the control group, t 
(326.99) =-2.906, p=.002, one-sided. There was no similar increase in trust on the expressive 
 
36 This conclusion is slightly different if we perform the analysis on all the participants i.e. in this case, 
including participants who completed the measures of expressive trust after the risk-based trust exercise. The 
difference in the expressive measure of benevolence (ETB) does not meet the test of statistical significance 
(M=0.079, SD= 0.894), t (699.53) =-1.1866, p=.12, one-sided. 
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measure. It is worth noting that this is despite the fact that, as discussed in the manipulation 
check above, positivity towards the target company increased following the Competitiveness 













Other hypotheses (H2.4-H2.6) 
 
H2.4 The correlation between positivity and expressive trust (ET) will be weaker than 
in Study 1, but still stronger than the correlation between positivity and risk-based 
trust (RBT). 
 
Study 2 repeats the finding from Study 1 that there is a much stronger correlation between 
expressive trust and positivity, r(901)=.591, p<.001, than between risk-based trust and 
positivity, r(857)=.132, p<.001, as shown in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. This difference is 
significant, z=-11.442, p<.001. H2.4 added the additional proposal that this effect would be 
weaker because an unnamed bank might prompt greater Type 2 processing, as in Study 1 
there is a weaker correlation between expressive trust and positivity when the target is 
unfamiliar. This did not occur in the Study 2 data: while the correlation is a little weaker for 







H2.5 There will be a stronger correlation between positivity and expressive trust (ET) 
when i) the survey is completed more quickly or ii) only those with a positive or 
neutral attitude towards the target company are included. 
 
The model advocated in this thesis is entitled ‘trusting fast and slow’ and so it is natural to 
look at whether or not participants behave differently when they work quickly through the 
survey, and might therefore be more reliant on faster cognitive processes. As well as a main 
effect of positivity on expressive trust, F(889, 1)=485.932, p<.001, there is an interaction 
between positivity and completion time, F(889, 1)= -5.875, p=.016. Exploring this further, 
the participants are divided into four quartiles based on their total completion time. The 
slowest two quartiles have similar correlation coefficients, r(225)=.508, r(225)=.505, 
respectively, both p<.001. The fastest and second fast quartiles have higher correlation 
coefficients: r(224)=.690, r(221)=.650, respectively, both p<.001. Table 3.6 shows that the 
differences between these correlations are often significant. This is consistent with the idea 
that participants who work quickly are more likely to use attribute substitution than those 
who work slowly. However, completion time was not a controlled variable in the study so 
exogeneous factors might confound this correlational analysis: for example, if participants 
who felt particularly confident using their computer were more likely to give an extremely 




Table 3.6 Comparing the correlations between expressive trust (ET) and positivity for 
faster and slower participants 
z-test results shown, in bold where the one tailed p value is <.05. 
 
  q1 (fastest) q2 q3 q4 (slowest) 
q1 (fastest) 
 
z= 0.75,  
p= 0.23 
z= 3.09,  
p= 0.001 
z= 3.04,  
p= 0.001 
q2 z= 0.75,  
p= 0.23  
z= 2.33,  
p= 0.019 
z= 2.28,  
p= 0.01 
q3 z= 3.09,  
p= 0.001 
z= 2.33,  
p= 0.0137  
z= -0.05,  
p= 0.48 




z= -0.05,  
p= 0.48  
NB - Only showing data for those who saw the expressive trust metric first 
 
In Study 1, the scale on the positivity metric only included positive, neutral, and negative. In 
Study 2, this scale is expanded to 7 points. This means that the data can be split to isolate 
those who felt negative about the target company (n=96), and those who felt neutral or 
positive (n=807). For these two groups, the correlations between positivity and the expressive 
measure of trust are near-identical: r(805)=.510, p<.001 for the neutral or positive group and 
r(94)=.518, p<.001, for the negative group r(805)=.510, p<.001, z=-0.105, p<.459. Unlike in 
Study 1, these results provide no evidence that participants are engaging in less attribute 
substitution when they are dealing with a target that they dislike38.  
 
H2.6 Ability judgements will not be significantly slower than judgements of 
benevolence / integrity, whether on the expressive or risk-based measures 
 
 
37 This test does not quite meet the test of statistical significance when the whole dataset is analysed, z=1.53, 
p=.006. 
38 This analysis looks different when we look at the whole dataset. The correlation for those who are positive or 
neutral towards the target is similar to that given above: r(1583)=.464, p<.001. However, the correlation for 
those who disliked the target is quite a bit weaker: r(175)=.335, p<.001. The differences between the two 
correlations are significant as predicted in H2.5.ii : z=1.923, p=.037, one-tailed. 
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As discussed above, the labels of ‘affective’ and ‘cognitive’ have implications for the time it 
will take participants to come to an assessment of a target on different issues related to trust. 
Study 2 recorded completion times for both the risk-based exercises and the expressive 
exercises, as shown in Figure 3.8. As in all of the analysis above, only the times for those 
who completed the relevant exercise first are reported. Within these two sets of exercises, 
some were expected to reflect the ‘cognitive’ label, i.e. those related to ability and 
competence, while others were expected to reflect the ‘affective’ label i.e. those related to 
benevolence and integrity. Replicating the finding from Study 1, the mean time taken to 
complete supposedly ‘affective’ risk-based trust exercises (M=12.976 seconds, SD=7.452 
seconds) is not significantly faster than the mean time taken to complete supposedly 
‘cognitive’ risk-based trust exercises (M=13.156 seconds, SD=11.239 seconds), 
t(858)=0.496, p=.310, one-sided. Extending that finding to the expressive measures, the mean 
time taken to complete supposedly ‘affective’ expressive questions (M=9.127 seconds, 
SD=9.680 seconds) was not significantly faster than for supposedly ‘cognitive’ ones 
(M=8.900 seconds, SD=10.642 seconds), t(902)=-0.436, p=.669. 
 
As discussed above, this conclusion cannot be taken too far: participants’ decision time was 
not controlled and might fluctuate for a range of reasons. These could be prosaic, as 
participants took the survey at home on a range of different devices, or they could be highly 
relevant to the research question, if, for example, those with higher cognitive abilities worked 
through all the tasks more quickly. This might then inflate the variance in decision times and 
make it very difficult to meet a standard tests for significance. In addition, some of the 
choices in either the expressive or risk-based questions might be more difficult than others, 
and this could misleadingly increase the average decision times. Nevertheless, it seems 
unlikely that this could happen so consistently across three different sectors (in Study 1) and 
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two different task-types (in Study 2), that it brought the two sets of decision times so closely 
into line on each occasion. The alternative explanation – of no underlying difference – has the 








Table 3.7 Overview of findings from Study 2 
Aim Goal / Hypotheses Finding Discussion 
Practical 
contribution 
Start to create a list of potentially 
viable interventions that 
businesses could make to 
increase trust by extending 
findings from the interpersonal 
trust literature. 
Two of the four interventions 
examined successfully 
increased trust on one of the 
measures used: highlighting the 
organisation’s simplicity or its 
competitive context. 
The interpersonal trust 
literature can be a source of 
business-related trust 
interventions. More 
specifically, these two 
interventions have prima 
facie viability in a business 
context – without always 




Examine whether the 
effectiveness of a particular trust-
building intervention is 
dependent on the degree of 
motivation, novelty, or difficulty 
experienced by the trustor. 
The successful interventions 
were only successful in one 
context each: the simplicity 
intervention succeeded in 
increasing trust on an 
expressive survey measure, 
while the competitiveness 
intervention succeeded in 
increasing trust on an 
incentivised, risk-based 
measure. 
This suggests that it is 
possible for interventions to 
only be successful when 
consumers are processing 
in a particular way, 
implying that businesses 
should pay attention to this 




H2.1.i-iii The three treatments (i-
Donation; ii-Trusting others; iii-
Simplicity) aimed at achieving 
increased trust through attribute 
substitution will significantly 
increase trust on the expressive 
measure (ET) compared to the 
control group. 
(i) Donation and (ii) Trusting 
others did not increase trust on 
this measure (or any other 
measure). (iii) Simplicity did 
increase trust on the expressive 
measure as predicted. 
A brief intervention on a 
business’s simplicity can 





H2.2.i-vi The three treatments (i-
Donation; ii-Trusting others; iii-
Simplicity) aimed at achieving 
increased trust through attribute 
substitution will significantly 
increase expressive measures of 
both ability (ETA) and 
benevolence / integrity (ETB). 
They will not (iv-vi) cause any 
significant increase in trust on the 
risk-based measure when it is 
limited to ability risks (RBA). 
(i) Donation and (ii) Trusting 
others did not increase trust on 
any of the measures discussed, 
although they sometimes 
approached significance. (iii) 
As predicted, the Simplicity 
intervention increased the 
expressive measure of ability 
(ETB) without increasing the 
risk-based measure (RBB). 
However, it did not increase 
the ETA measure to the extent 
predicted. 
It appears that interventions 
are linked to a particular 
domain (performance-risk 
for ability or relational risk 
for benevolence/integrity). 
On the expressive measure, 
there is some ‘spillover’ 
between different domains 




H2.3 The treatment on 
Competitiveness will 
significantly increase trust on the 
risk-based measure (RBT) 
As predicted, the 
Competitiveness intervention 
increased trust on the risk-
based measure but not on the 
A brief intervention on a 
business’s competitive 
environment can increase 
trusting behaviour in risk-
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compared to the control group.  
There will be no significant 
increase in trust on the expressive 
measure (ET) compared to the 
control group. 




H2.4 The correlation between 
positivity and expressive trust 
(ET) will be weaker than in 
Study 1, but still stronger than 
the correlation between positivity 
and risk-based trust (RBT). 
Replicating the finding from 
Study 1, and as predicted here, 
positivity was more strongly 
correlated with trust on the 
expressive measure than on the 
risk-based measure. Contrary 
to the prediction, there were no 
differences between Studies 1 
and 2. 
This should offer greater 
confidence that consumers 
are using the affect 
heuristic when completing 
expressive trust measures to 
a much greater extent than 
when completing risk-
based trust measures. 
Theoretical 
contribution 
H2.5 There will be a stronger 
correlation between positivity 
and expressive trust (ET) when i) 
the survey is completed more 
quickly or ii) only those with a 
positive or neutral attitude 
towards the target company are 
included. 
As predicted in (i) the 
correlation between expressive 
trust and positivity was 
stronger for those completing 
the survey faster but, against 
the prediction in (ii) there was 
no similar difference between 
positive and negative 
respondents  
This offers some further 
evidence that consumers 
are using the affect 
heuristic more when they 
work quickly, but are not 
necessarily using it less 




H2.6 Ability judgements will not 
be significantly slower than 
judgements of benevolence / 
integrity, whether on the 
expressive or risk-based 
measures 
Replicating and extending the 
finding from Study 1, and as 
predicted, there were no 
differences in task completion 
times depending on whether 
the task was supposedly related 
to cognitive or affective 
judgements. 
 
This confirms and extends 
the conclusion that the 
affective/cognitive 
distinction in McAllister’s 
(1995) model should, at 
best, not be taken as a 
literal reference to different 
psychological processes. 
 
Practitioners want to understand what will increase trust in their business. The evidence of 
Study 2, summarised in Table 3.7, does not directly answer that question for any specific 
practitioner. Even Monzo, the brand that the stimulus was loosely based on, would be unable 
to use these findings directly to conclude that any specific intervention was a sure-fire trust 
winner, because the stimulus never mentioned Monzo by name.  
 
But what Study 2 does tell practitioners clearly is that it is possible to design interventions, 
based on the behavioural science and experimental economics literature on interpersonal 
trust, to successfully increase consumer trust. These interventions were not large: just a few 
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extra sentences at the end of a vignette description. In the case of the Competition 
intervention, the extra sentences did not even refer to the target company. Yet they lead to 
small but significant increases in trust for a newly introduced company, which might in 
practice have a meaningful commercial relevance. The fact that they have been successful 
here means they must at least be worth considering by any company aiming to increase trust. 
They were successful when a more conventional approach, of announcing a large charitable 
donation, was not. 
 
The Simplicity intervention appears to succeed because of the same heuristic thinking that 
makes simpler stimulus more trusted in other contexts. As discussed in the opening to this 
chapter, the Simplicity of a trustee says nothing about its interests, does not signal that it is a 
trustworthy type, and provides little basis for affective or cognitive trust. The meta-cognitive 
experience of simplicity can induce greater trust (e.g., Zurn & Topolinski, 2017) but, from a 
purely metacognitive view, the Simplicity treatment should be slightly more complex than the 
control group, as they had to read a slightly longer piece of text.  While research in a 
consumer context has established that creating a fluent meta-cognitive experience can 
increase trust (e.g., Van Boom, Desmet, & Van Dam, 2016), this research suggests that the 
promise of simplicity, even without the experience of it, is enough to slightly increase trust. 
This shows the potential advantages of scouring the interpersonal trust literature in the 
behavioural sciences to identify trust-building strategies that might prove effective at building 
consumer trust. Of the models of trust-building discussed in Chapter 1, only the behavioural 
science approach, labelled with the heading ‘trusting fast and slow’ has a detailed explanation 
as to why this Simplicity intervention should be successful in increasing trust, and why that 
effect should be limited to the expressive measure and not the risk-based measure. However, 
the effect may be easily disrupted: it loses its significance when we look at participants who 
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completed the risk-based task first. This could indicate that such interventions can only have 
a fleeting effect, meaning that practitioners can only make use of them if they can time the 
intervention to immediately precede a crucial trust judgement. 
 
The Competitiveness intervention is perhaps more surprising still. It did not work exactly as 
expected: the description of the competitive environment made participants feel a little more 
positive towards the company itself, and did not quite pass the manipulation check on 
increasing perceptions of a competitive environment. But, crucially, it did increase trust on 
one of the metrics. This is consistent with the classical liberal model of trust, but the type-
signalling and relational/affective models do not predict this effect. However, the classical 
liberal model would predict that any increased trust was independent of the trust metric. Only 
the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model predicts that this intervention will only be effective when 
participants are required to reflect more, in answering the more complex and incentivised 
questions. In Chapter 2, Study 1 showed how much rarer significant differences between 
companies were on the risk-based measure, making this difference particularly impressive. At 
least since Adam Smith wrote the quote that opened this chapter, there has been an idea that 
self-interest can lead to trustworthiness in a competitive environment – and yet it remains a 
somewhat counter-intuitive point.  When businesses look for trust-increasing strategies, 
communicating about the competitive situation in their sector might not be as obvious as, for 
example, talking about a positive record of charitable giving. Nevertheless, this research 
suggests that businesses should consider asking consumers to put themselves in the 
business’s shoes, and to infer from that whether the business will be reliable. 
 
A central contention throughout the design and analysis of Study 2 has been the potential 
context-dependence of interventions. It is natural to note, therefore, that these effects have 
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only been demonstrated in one part of one sector in one country: ‘challenger’ banks in the 
UK. In other countries or other sectors, these interventions could fail or even backfire. In 
particular, the context of the specific brand is omitted, and this could be extremely important 
for practitioners to consider. It may be that highly-disliked brands do not benefit from being 
seen as having to compete: rather than expecting a malevolent company to work harder in a 
competitive context, I might instead assume that it would break the rules. If I am a customer 
of a brand with a difficult user experience, then talking about simplicity might clash with my 
experience and irritate me. Practitioners would be wise to conduct experiments along a 
similar design to test if a message about competition or simplicity actually increases trust in 
their specific circumstances. 
 
None of the interventions tested in Study 2 increased trust on both the expressive and the 
risk-based measure. At the very least, this suggests that practitioners who are only using 
standard survey tools might misdiagnose failure, abandoning attempts to increase trust which 
failed to move one measure, without knowing whether it is in fact increasing trust in a 
different, and perhaps more important, way. 
 
More dramatically, if it is accepted that these two measures reflect two different cognitive 
processes, it implies that intervention success is dependent on the cognitive processes being 
relied on by the recipient.  As discussed further in Chapter Four, practitioners might consider 
‘pairing’ specific interventions with situations that are dominated by specific cognitive 
processes: for example, choosing a heuristic-based intervention for moments when 
consumers are not paying close attention. Perhaps the most compelling element of the pre-
registered hypothesis testing was the success of this ‘pairing’: that, as predicted, the 
Competition intervention only increased trust when it was measured in a highly involved 
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way, while the Simplicity intervention only increased trust when it was measured in an 
simple, unincentivised way. 
 
Study 2 provided some further evidence in favour of the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model that 
underlies this thinking.  It replicated the finding from Study 1 that the standard expressive 
measures of trust correlate with overall positivity in a way that the risk-based measures do 
not. It did not suggest that this correlation depended on how liked or how familiar a target 
was, but it did suggest it depended on the time taken to make judgements, with faster 
judgements being more strongly correlated with overall positivity.  
 
Crucially, none of the interventions that were expected to work through attribute substitution 
had any effect on trust when the participants were expected to be paying close attention and 
the intervention based on inference had no effect when the participants were expected to be 
paying little attention. This is the exact pattern that was predicted in the pre-registration, and 
it is hard to explain it without accepting some distinction between the different types of 
interventions and the different types of measures. This takes the correlational evidence of 
Study 1, which was largely replicated in Study 2, and gives it the much greater weight of an 
experimental design. 
 
However, Study 2 did not provide evidence that attribute substitution is complete in trust 
judgements. The Simplicity intervention did make consumers more trusting in general on the 
expressive measure and this carried through into the expressive measure of benevolence. It 
did not carry through to the same extent to the expressive measure of competence, although 




What does the evidence in Study 2 say about potential interventions around charitable giving 
or trusting others? The pre-registered hypotheses were rejected for these interventions. The 
fact that these two interventions were unsuccessful would be predicted by the ‘classical 
liberal’ approach discussed above. However, there are other explanations that are consistent 
with the type-signalling model of trust-building: we do not know if the signals given here 
were credible in the sense used within the type-signalling model and perhaps stronger signals 
or different markets would have produced a different response. The ‘trusting fast and slow’ 
approach might offer a similar explanation: that model would only need to be rejected if they 
had succeeded in increasing trust on the risk-based measure but failed to do so on the 
expressive measure. However, their failure here does not allow us to include them in a list of 
prima facie valid interventions that a practitioner should consider as potential strategies to 
increase trust. All else being equal, the Study 2 data would suggest that practitioners should 
explore strategies around simplicity or competition before they start to consider strategies that 
brandish their charitable or trusting credentials. 
 
Study 2 repeats and extends the finding from Study 1, which questions one of the commonly 
used models of trust-building: the cognitive and affective model of trust (McAllister, 1995).  
It might be easy to confuse McAllister’s model for the kind of dual process model of 
cognition that underpins the ‘trusting fast and slow’ approach - after all, they are both 
‘dualist’ in some way. However, the distinctions are practically and theoretically important. 
The labels of McAllister’s model suggests that some topics for trust-judgements will lead to a 
quick, emotional reaction, while the ‘trusting fast and slow’ approach suggests some 
situations will lead to that type of reaction. The labels in McAllister’s model mean that there 
is no room for heuristic cues like a doctor’s white coat leading to a stronger perception of 
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competence, or for cold-eyed evaluations of the company’s incentives making someone more 
willing to believe they will act with integrity.  
 
Study 2 provided another opportunity, on top of the three provided in Study 1, for these 
different content-based processes to reveal themselves in participant decision-times. Once 
again, there are no significant differences in the time taken to make what McAllister (1995) 
labels as ‘affective’ trust judgements, compared to what McAllister (1995) labels as questions 
of ‘cognitive’ trust. Decision time is not a controlled variable, so a final judgement on this 
question must await future research. But at the level of correlation, and consistently across 
both Study 1 and Study 2, this repeated failure to show any difference in decision times at 
least raises questions for a model that is defined by its two distinct pathways to trust. While 
the point might seem technical, if practitioners cease to use these labels then their scope for 
action widens dramatically: allowing them to use emotions to win trust in their company’s 
abilities, or to provide dry evidence of their company’s integrity. 
 
The evidence of Study 2 is more consistent with making the distinction between relational 
risk and performance risk (Das & Teng, 2004), a distinction that is included in McAllister’s 
(1995) model as well as others. In Study 2, it seems that at least on the expressive measures, 
different interventions have different size effects on these two areas (see H2.2 above). 
Whether these two topics exhaust the key areas for trust, or whether integrity forms a separate 
area for intervention that is separate from benevolence, as in Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) 
model, is beyond the scope of Study 2. 
 
Finally, the order effects discussed above are worth dwelling on. Firstly, when practitioners 
are using both risk-based and expressive measures of consumer trust in the future, it would be 
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advisable to divide the sample in two and only ask one type of question with each half. If 
both types of questions are to be completed by every participant, the analysis here suggests 
that the expressive trust questions will receive a greater focus if they are asked first, while the 
impact of going second is less pronounced on the risk-based trust questions.  
 
In the analysis here, the first strategy has been pursued post hoc and after the data was 
examined. For the most part, the results reported here would not be different if the original 
strategy had been stuck to. The key difference is in the impact of the Simplicity treatment on 
expressive trust, which does not quite meet the level for statistical significance (p=.053) when 
the whole dataset is included. Readers may wish to rely less on that finding because of this. 
However, the dramatic differences in the times participants took to complete the expressive 
exercise makes the analysis presented here more useful overall.  
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Discussion and development of a consulting model 
 
“Thus people on a steamer at sea talk and laugh light-heartedly, for all the world as if they were on dry land; but 
let the smallest hitch occur, at the faintest hint of something unusual, and their faces instantly express a peculiar 
anxiety, betraying their unceasing awareness of unceasing danger.” 






A new model of consumer trust-building: ‘Trusting fast and slow’ 
 
As set out in Chapter 1, by combining a long tradition of dual processing approaches to 
psychology and communications (including Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973) with more recent work on bounded rationality in interpersonal trust judgements 
(including Evans & Krueger, 2011; 2014, 2016), it is possible to sketch out a model of 
consumer trust-building built around different cognitive processes. This model proposes that, 
by default (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), fast Type 1 processes 
determine trust judgements, meaning that they are often based on attribute substitution in 
general (Kahneman, 2002) and, in particular, swapping the complex question of whether a 
trustee is trustworthy for the simple one of whether or not you feel good about them (i.e. 
using the affect heuristic, Slovic et al., 2002). However, the model also suggests that “when 
difficulty, novelty, and motivation combine to command the resources of working memory” 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p.237), Type 2 processes allow people to come to trust 





Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence that different cognitive processes should be 
part of any model of consumer trust building. The first part of this evidence focusses on the 
correlation between liking and trusting. If the two are strongly correlated, this is consistent 
with someone using the affect heuristic, with such correlations used as a common method of 
demonstrating this heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The 
‘trusting fast and slow model’ predicts that the correlation will be strong by default, but 
weaken as people use more Type 2 processing, as predicted in H1.3.i and H2.4. In Study 1 
and 2, the correlations are indeed strong when using a simple expressive measure: with r 
from around .58 to .67 in Study 1, and .59 in Study 2. However, introducing a new, more 
difficult, incentivised, risk-based measure of trust – i.e. one that should be associated with 
greater Type 2 processing – produced much weaker correlations between trusting and liking, 
with r between .12 and .23 across both studies. 
 
Looking beyond the two measurement approaches, Type 2 processing is predicted to be more 
dominant when dealing with an unfamiliar or disliked target, or if the trustor has greater 
cognitive abilities, and it is assumed to correlate with working at tasks more slowly and 
carefully (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). Study 1 and 2 provide some evidence 
to support these claims: in particular, the correlation between liking and trusting weakens as 
participants take longer to make decisions, as predicted in H2.5.i. Unfamiliarity with a named 
brand also attenuated the correlation between liking and trusting in Study 1, as predicted in 
H1.3, but the introduction of an unnamed brand did not appear to have this affect in Study 2, 
contradicting elements of H2.4. Neither greater liking nor greater education, as a proxy for 





A second strand of evidence comes from the impact of the different interventions in Study 2. 
The ‘trusting fast and slow’ model predicts that interventions based on heuristics will 
increase trust on expressive measure but not on the risk-based measure. One of the heuristic-
based interventions, the simplicity intervention, did increase trust on that expressive measure, 
and none of them increased trust on the risk-based measure, partly supporting H2.1. It also 
predicts that an intervention that requires consumers to make inferences about a business’s 
future incentives will increase trust on the risk-based measure, but not on the expressive 
measure, because the expressive measure will not tend to prompt the Type 2 processing 
needed to move beyond heuristics into making complex inferences. This is what was found in 
Study 2’s examination of the competitiveness intervention (H2.3). 
 
From this, it is possible to conclude that the types of cognitive processes that are engaged in 
forming trust judgements are critical to any model of consumer trust-building. Trust appears 
to be built through the affect heuristic when Type 1 processing is at work, while it can be 
built on a more complex evidence base when Type 2 processing dominates. While not 
offering complete certainty on when the two processing types are most likely to be invoked, 
incentives, novelty, difficulty and speed all appear to be relevant factors that determine the 
type of processing used in trust judgements. 
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Implications for other models of trust-building 
 
The research presented here was never designed to fully test the other models of trust-
building described in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, it can help, pro tem, to provide insight into 
what, if any, elements from those models should be incorporated into a model of trust-
building that is largely built around the fast and slow distinction. In Study 1, there was little 
evidence to suggest that the three distinct factors of ability, benevolence, and integrity were 
structuring consumer trust judgements as suggested in the Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) 
‘antecedents’ model. However, the division between performance risks and relational risks 
(Das & Teng, 2004) that is a key part of such type-signalling models does seem to be born 
out, at least in part, in the impact of the different interventions in Study 2. Therefore, 
maintaining some distinction between being trusted over questions of ability, and questions 
of benevolence and integrity, appears worthwhile. 
 
At the same time, Studies 1 and 2 provide some evidence against the idea that we use 
different processes for different kinds of trust questions – affective processes for relational 
questions and cognitive processes for performance questions, as proposed by McAllister 
(1995). These judgements appear to be happening through similar processes, as examined in 
H1.4 and H2.6. This is important because the affective and cognitive trust model would 
suggest that affective interventions should only drive trust around relational risks, while 
cognitive interventions should only drive performance risks. If cognitive and affective 
processes are both used by consumers across relational and performance risks, as proposed in 
the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model, then this increases the range of potential interventions that 
might be worth considering. There is no reason not to address performance risks with a 
highly emotive advertising campaign, or to reassure customers of that the company will act 
ethically using cold and logical arguments. 
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The successful interventions: Simplicity and competitiveness 
 
As shown in Chapter 1, there are a wealth of potential interventions that a business might 
hope will increase trust. Study 2 shows that at least two of the findings from the interpersonal 
trust literature can generalise to a consumer trust context: an emphasis on simplicity and a 
reminder that the trustee operates in a highly competitive market and therefore needs to 
maintain a good reputation. These two interventions have only been shown to work in one 
market, in one country – nevertheless, they present interesting candidates for practitioner 
action. Two other interventions, grounded in the type-signalling model of trust-building, were 
unsuccessful: not necessarily ruling them out, but at least putting them towards the ‘back of 
the queue’ for practitioners until they can be shown to be more successful in a consumer 
context. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, many practitioners have suspected that simplicity was a route to 
business success (for example, Ashkenas, 2009). The findings from Study 2 suggest that 
greater simplicity can increase consumer trust, that the mechanism is a heuristic one, but it 
does not necessarily rely on immediately experiencing cognitive fluency (as in, for example, 
Van Boom, Desmet, & Van Dam, 2016). Ironically, many ‘legalistic’ things that companies 
do to meet standards of trustworthiness (Sitkin & Roth, 1993), such as, in a consumer 
context, providing the ‘small print’ on advertisements, might actually make the consumer 
experience less fluent, and therefore make the company less trusted. Practitioners should be 
sensitive to the impact to the impact on consumer trust of any decision to complicate 




The success of a competitiveness-based intervention raises some new questions for 
practitioners, who might typically be expected to focus on the strengths of their company, 
rather than the nature of the market they operate in. Because an intervention based around a 
competitive marketplace doesn’t require the firm itself to have particular characteristics or a 
track record, it might be particularly appealing to a new entrant. They could say ‘you may not 
have heard of us, but in this market the only way to succeed is by treating people right’. At 
the same time, in sectors that have been accused of untrustworthy behaviour, such as 
banking, the arrival of new entrants or regulatory changes that encourage competition may 
have the effect of driving up trust as a whole. It may even be in a dominant incumbent’s 
interest to at least generate the impression of greater competition. 
 
Instrumental or expressive trust: a contextual rather than a conceptual issue? 
 
This research developed a risk-based approach to measuring consumer trust alongside more 
standard, risk-free survey question approaches, analogous to the development of risk-based 
games to measure interpersonal trust (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). Studies 1 and 2 
combine to show that the two measurement approaches produce somewhat different answers 
in the realm of consumer trust, just as they have done in the realm of interpersonal trust (see, 
for example, Wilson, 2018). Given the importance of risk or vulnerability to most definitions 
of trust (see, for example, Rousseau et al., 1998), it can be argued that the risk-based 
measurement approach is more faithful to the concept of trust, particularly when linked to 
trusting behaviour, which must always be risk-taking in some way. 
 
As discussed at greater length in Chapter 1, definitions of trusting beliefs or intentions can 
either emphasise strategic thinking – instrumental trust – or see trust as uncalculating and 
199 
 
‘expressive’ (Dunning, Fetchenhauer, & Schlosser, 2012). Making this conceptual split helps 
to navigate the vast literature on trust, avoiding the unappealing cul-de-sac that beckons if we 
say that half of the literature that discusses trust in different disciplines doesn’t really discuss 
trust in terms of our preferred definition. However, this is a conceptual distinction, not an 
explanation. It might make us more comfortable with the fact that the different measurement 
approaches produce different results, but it doesn’t tell us why they should. It offers no 
predictions for when the instrumental trust definition will be most relevant, and when the 
expressive trust concept is more appropriate. 
 
The ‘trusting fast and slow’ model offers more of an explanation, starting from the trustors’ 
context. It suggests that, by default, trust judgements are expressive: they are 
indistinguishable from liking or disliking, because people make trust judgements using the 
affect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2002) as described above. But as people start to use Type 2 
processing, trust judgements become less influenced by this heuristic. This is particularly true 
for the risk-based measurement approach because it introduces difficulty, novelty and 
motivation in its very design, but the pattern can also be seen in, for example, the finding that 
the correlation between liking and trusting weakens when participants complete the standard 
survey measures more slowly (H2.5.i). Only the risk-based trust measure allows for trust to 
be truly instrumental, in that participants can win or lose from their trust judgements. But 
whichever approach is used, when Type 2 processes are invoked, judgements appear to 
conform less to the expressive trust definition.   
 
Seeing the distinction between expressive and instrumental trust as being driven by different 
cognitive processes helps to integrate the existing literature and also offers some interesting 
guidance for future research. In many traditional surveys about trust, it may be hard to get 
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participants to engage Type 2 processes, as they are only compensated after completing the 
survey and have no incentive to focus exclusively on their task. By contrast, the strange 
surroundings in lab studies of trust, especially those that are conducted using equipment like 
fMRI scanners (e.g. Fett et al., 2014), may inevitably lead participants away from their 
default Type 1 processes. Researchers examining trust, both amongst consumers and beyond, 
must be highly sensitive to these contextual factors if they fundamentally change the way that 






A CONSULTING MODEL TO INCREASE CONSUMER 
TRUST 
 
The challenge of an effective consulting model 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, greater consumer trust can be valuable for businesses in different 
ways. In one sector, success might go to the company which can first win consumer trust in a 
new innovation, while in another sector, greater trust might enable a company to charge a 
higher price without reducing demand (Harris & Wicks, 2014). The kind of trust that is 
valuable to Google might be very different from the kind of trust that is valuable to 
McDonald’s. While Kramer (2014) argues that trust is most valuable when it is presumptive 
– in my terminology ‘fast trust’ – Petty and Cacioppo (1986) instead argue that when 
judgements are arrived at through considered processes – in my terminology ‘slow trust’ – 
then they are more likely to persist and affect behaviour. To be actionable for practitioners, a 
consulting model must be sufficiently flexible that it can be applied in these very different 
business environments, and still have something to say. Inevitably, this leads more to a set of 
questions, perhaps asked in a specific order, rather than an ‘off-the-shelf” solution for all 
circumstances. 
 
In the field of consumer and wider corporate trust, Gillespie and Dietz (2009) set out a 
consulting model that provides the initial inspiration for the one described here. Their focus is 
on rebuilding trust after some kind of major crisis or organisational failure. Their model has 
four stages: an immediate response after the crisis, such as an apology, a diagnosis as to what 
caused the failure, a set of interventions designed to fix these problems, and an evaluation. 
The process is designed around the trust-breaking incident, and builds on a well-developed 
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literature on how trust is rebuilt after it has been broken at an interpersonal and 
intraorganizational level (for example, Kim, Dirks & Cooper, 2006; 2009).  
 
The model set out in the remainder of this chapter takes a similar, four-stage structure as used 
in Gillespie and Dietz (2009), moving from diagnosis to intervention to evaluation. However, 
there is no trust-breaking incident: instead, the business is assumed to be interested in 
increasing trust in general, rather than after a crisis. In contrast to the literature on rebuilding 
trust, the consulting model uses the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model of how trust is built, 
described above, with a central role for different cognitive processes in determining the 
optimal intervention and measurement approach. Firstly, the model is set out using a similar 
series of propositions as used by Gillespie and Dietz and extended by Poppo and Schepker 
(2014).  These might be tested in future research but are not tested empirically in this paper, 
following the same approach as both Gillespie and Dietz and Poppo and Schepker. Following 
this, two illustrations describe how the model might be deployed in two different 
hypothetical, but realistic, business contexts. 
 
Also following Gillespie and Dietz (2009), the consulting model proposed here focuses on 
identifying what might move trust, and then measuring whether it has moved. It does not then 
go on to measure the cost of the intervention and the increased revenue that comes from the 
increased trust, which would be needed in order to calculate the returns to the investment. 
The question addressed here is not the primary question, ‘would increasing trust increase my 
profits’, but the secondary question ‘if I wanted to increase trust, how could I go about it?’ To 
answer that primary question with evidence might be possible in some contexts if there is a 
well-evidenced link between trust perceptions and a specific consumer behaviour for the 
company concerned (e.g., Resnick, et al., 2006). However, it is also a difficult undertaking in 
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many circumstances: as discussed above, very few consumer behaviours are solely driven by 
trust, but might instead be produced in combination with other factors, such as product 
attractiveness. In this model, the manager is assumed to have already arrived at the judgement 








A consulting model based on ‘trusting fast and slow’: Stage one 
 
 
The consulting model is divided into four stages as shown in Figure 4.2. The initial task, in 
stage one, is to consider what different consumer trust judgements are important to the target 
business. The importance of a particular judgement must be related to the business’s strategy: 
for example, a Chinese firm with no plans to move into Europe might decide that the trust 
judgements of European consumers are not important to their business. By definition, as 
discussed in detail in Chapter 1, trust judgements must in some way relate to risk or 
vulnerability (Rousseau et al., 1998), reducing the scope from all important consumer 
perceptions, to just those that might determine whether a consumer takes a risk on the 
company or not. 
 
These risks can be further sub-divided based on whether the vulnerability is connected to the 
choices of the company – ‘relational risks’ – or the abilities of the company – ‘performance 
risk’ (Das & Teng, 2004). In practice, this may not always be an easy distinction to draw 
(Poppo & Schepker, 2014): if a restaurant serves me the wrong order, is it because the staff 
were too busy to ensure the order was accurate (performance risk), or is it because they didn’t 
care and so chose not to check (relational risk)? Given this analysis is based on the 
consumer’s judgement rather than the company’s, it seems sensible to resolve such questions 
in line with the consumer’s interpretation, which might simply be gleaned from discussions 
with frontline staff or, if important enough, might itself be the subject of qualitative or 
quantitative consumer research. 
 
With this list of trust judgements in hand, the next stage is to ask what cognitive process the 
consumer is likely to be using when they form each judgement? Based on the ‘trusting fast 
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and slow’ model, the default assumption has to be that they will use fast Type 1 processing 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). However, they 
are likely to use slow Type 2 processing when they have sufficient motivation – for example, 
because of high stakes – or when they face a novel or difficult situation (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013).  Using this rule, it should be possible to classify the situations where people make 
different trust judgements into situations where Type 1 or Type 2 processes are likely to 
dominate, without any additional fieldwork. However, qualitative and quantitative 
observation of consumer behaviour in the relevant situation may provide additional insight to 
help with this process. 
 
It may be helpful at this stage to break up the different judgements based on different 
products in the business’s portfolio, customer segments, stages in the customer journey, or in 
different risk scenarios, because these different subgroups are expected to use different 
cognitive processes. New customers presumably often experience novelty, prompting Type 2 
processing, while existing customers might not. Certain products might especially involve 
high stakes or be difficult to engage with, particularly for certain groups, which might again 
prompt more Type 2 processing. At different stages of a customer journey, different 
processes might be engaged because the different stages include a different mix of 
motivation, novelty, and difficulty. We might also imagine risk scenarios that affect the 
degree of motivation, novelty, and difficulty: for example, at the time of writing, many 
consumers are starting to return to different businesses as Covid-19 lockdown restrictions are 
eased. We might suspect that in such circumstances, there will be extra novelty and difficulty 
from new processes, and a greater motivation to avoid infection, and that this will increase 
Type 2 processing, at least initially. If one business has to shut down again because it 
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becomes a Covid-19 hotspot, this same pattern might repeat, as customers warily return and 
then slowly get used to the situation and revert back to their default eventually. 
 
The approach is shown in Figure 4.2 and described in the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1 – The consumer trust judgements that are important to a business can be 
mapped along two dimensions: (i) the typical cognitive process used to form the 
judgement and (ii) whether the judgement is a relational or a performance risk.  
 
Proposition 2 – All consumer trust judgements, by default, will tend to be reliant on 
Type 1 processing, unless the customer’s faces difficulty or novelty or their 







A consulting model based on ‘trusting fast and slow’: Stage two 
 
With the trust judgements mapped in stage one, stage two seeks to complete the diagnosis by 
looking at the standing of the target company on the different judgements. This standing 
could be thought of in absolute terms: for example, a binary question about whether the 
trustor is willing to make a purchase. More commonly, however, it might be thought of in 
relative terms, with the target company benchmarked against other companies, often its direct 
competitors. Either way, the aim is to focus attention where improvement will be most 
valuable. This is partly a function of how the judgement plays back into the firm’s own 
business model – particular trust judgements might be linked to particularly profitable 
activities. But it is also a question of whether the business is a laggard, indicating room for 
improvement, or if the business is a high performer, indicating a potentially differentiated 
strength that might be protected but has little room for growth. 
 
The key innovation at stage two is that the measurement tool used to assess this situation 
depends on the cognitive processes that consumers are using to form trust judgements, as 
identified in stage one. As described above, the risk-based measure of trust developed in this 
research is taken to be associated with Type 2 processing, while the more traditional 
expressive measure of trust is taken to be associated with Type 1 processing. If we have an 
idea of which cognitive processes consumers will use in the field, then our measurement tool 
can match that process.  
 
 
In an ideal world, using both types of measure would provide the greatest insight, but if the 
business can only devote resources to one approach, then it is vital that they choose the 
appropriate one. If the measurement tool is not matched to the relevant cognitive process 
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used by consumers, then we should expect a mismatch between the measurements and 
consumer judgements ‘in the wild’. This approach is described in the following two 
propositions, using the categories shown in Figure 4.2: 
 
Proposition 3 – To benchmark and compare trust judgements in categories A and B, 
an expressive measure is most appropriate, as a risk-based measure will limit the 
impact of the affect heuristic which is likely to operate in these situations. 
Proposition 4 – To benchmark and compare trust judgements in categories C and D, a 
risk-based measure is most appropriate, as an expressive based measure will be overly 
influenced by the affect heuristic which is unlikely to operate in these situations. 
 
A consulting model based on ‘trusting fast and slow’: Stage three 
 
As a target company moves into stage three, they should have selected the trust judgements 
that they most urgently need to address and have a good idea of the cognitive processes used 
to make those judgements. Then the task is to select and design an intervention to increase 
trust. The idiosyncrasies of the specific market, the specific business, and the specific trust 
judgement are all likely to play a role in determining which approaches are most plausible. 
Nevertheless, as described in detail in Chapter 1, there are many studies that might inspire an 
intervention even if we only look at interventions that have been discussed in a business 
context. When we expand the list to consider interventions inspired by the interpersonal trust 
literature, it grows substantially. It is necessary to isolate a smaller list of candidate 
interventions – and the consulting model does this by considering both the nature of the trust 




The contention from the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model is that the cognitive processes used by 
consumers will have a critical role to play in determining the effectiveness of any 
intervention. Firstly, we can look at this from the default situation, when consumers are 
relying on Type 1 processing. In such a situation, the affect heuristic is expected to play a 
large role in determining trust judgements. Therefore, the target company should consider 
interventions that seek to build trust through that heuristic. At the ‘front of the queue’ for 
such consideration is an intervention around simplicity, having been shown to be potentially 
effective in Study 2. But this does not exhaust the affect heuristic: many different 
interventions might make a company more liked, or simply make a consumer feel more 
positive in the moment that they are making the judgement. 
 
In relying on heuristics, we should expect some overlap between the effects of interventions 
connected to ability and those connected to benevolence or integrity, rather than a strict 
separation that implies ability is only relevant to performance risk and benevolence or 
integrity are only relevant to relational risk. In Study 2, the simplicity-based intervention 
increased both the ability-related and the benevolence-related expressive measures, but the 
former move was smaller and did not meet the threshold for statistical significance. There 
may be some heuristic interventions that similarly ‘lean’ towards performance risk or 
relational risk, but the suggestion from this approach is that they can all be considered as 
potential interventions if participants are expected to be using Type 1 processing. Using the 
categories shown in Figure 4.2, the following proposition sets this out: 
 
Proposition 5 – To increase trust judgements in category A and B, the most effective 




We can also look at the situation from the perspective of a company that decides it needs to 
increase trust when consumers are paying attention and thinking carefully, i.e. in category C 
or D in Figure 4.2. As shown in Study 2, when consumers are using Type 2 processes, their 
trust judgements can be based on complex inferences about the likely behaviour of the 
trustee. This was achieved by reminding consumers about the competitive environment that 
the company faces and allowing them to infer that the company will need to behave in a 
trustworthy way in future. But other interventions would also fit into this category: 
particularly some of the interventions under the classical liberal model and credible signalling 
approaches discussed in Chapter 1, including pointing out that strict regulations mean the 
firm has no incentive to defect or using large investments in advertising to signal a 
commitment to preserving the reputation of a particular product.  
 
Some of these interventions might specifically address either performance or relational risks: 
for example, the threat of being imprisoned for fraud might be a good reason not to expect 
outright lies, but it might not be a convincing reassurance when it comes to shoddy 
workmanship. However, some might act as a deterrent to both: the competitive environment 
might incentivise a company to act with benevolence and integrity and ensure that its 
products are always high quality. The following proposition sets out the approach using the 
categories from Figure 4.2. 
 
Proposition 6 – To increase trust judgements in category C and D, the most effective 
interventions will be to present credible evidence, which may require some reasoning 





Companies do not simply have to accept the cognitive process that consumers are using: if 
they think it is to their advantage, they could try to engage another cognitive process. In Petty 
and Cacioppo’s (1986) elaboration likelihood model, variables can act as persuasive 
arguments, peripheral cues, or affect the degree of elaboration. Similarly, a business can 
make an intervention aimed at each of these different potential levers. For example, if a 
business has a strong intervention to make that requires complex inferences, they could seek 
to introduce novelty, extra motivation, or extra difficulty to encourage consumers to use Type 
2 processing. This is what was done in Study 2: the risk-based trust measure lead to increased 
Type 2 processing, meaning that the more complex evidence around competition was taken 
into account in forming trust judgements. In general, when the business possesses strong 
arguments, it will be advantageous to increase Type 2 processing, and it will often necessary 
to do so when seeking to achieve a long-term shift in behaviour (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
 
It seems more likely that the shift would happen in this direction, from Type 1 to Type 2, 
especially given Type 1 processing’s default status (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002). A reverse process is not out of the question: it would be one way of 
interpreting the finding from Lount (2010) that an intervention to increase positive mood 
increases reliance on simple schema in interpersonal trust judgements. However, as it is not 
the assumed default and, as discussed further in Chapter 5, it raises additional ethical 
questions, this model focuses on the potential to shift consumer processing from Type 1 to 
Type 2. Proposition 7 summarises the approach: 
 
Proposition 7 – For an evidence and reasoning-based intervention to be effective in a 
category A or B situation, other factors must create the difficulty, motivation, or 
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novelty that engages Type 2 processing, effectively changing the context to move the 
judgement into category C or D. 
 
Dual process models of attitude formation have suggested that persuasion is more fleeting 
when it operates through the Type 1 route (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). Consistent with this, the intervention in Study 2 which aimed to work 
through these heuristic processes was only significant when looking at participants who went 
straight from the Simplicity claim to the expressive measure, without the distraction of the 
risk-based measure. This could mean that practitioners decide to try and engage Type 2 
processing in order to make their impact more robust and long-lasting. While the evidence 
presented in Studies 1 and 2 do not provide enough evidence to make this claim strongly, 
such a strategy would be consistent with this wider literature. 
 
A consulting model based on ‘trusting fast and slow’: Stage four 
 
Finally, at stage four, once the interventions have been made, the target company will 
presumably want to know how effective they have been. For all the reasons presented above, 
it is critical that trust is measured in a way that reflects the cognitive processes consumers 
will be using. For the most part, this means that the same measurement approach should be 
used to judge interventions as was used for the benchmarking in stage two, which might also 
provide a pre-intervention baseline. However, there is a need to take a slightly different 
approach if the business has sought to change the consumers’ cognitive processes in stage 
three. If this has been the goal, then trust needs to be measured using both measurement 
approaches and a manipulation check, such as checking time to complete different elements 
of the customer journey, also needs to be introduced. This will mean that, if the intervention 
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is unsuccessful, it is clear whether it was the trust-building or the process-shifting actions that 
were unsuccessful. 
 
Proposition 8 – To establish the effectiveness of most interventions, the appropriate 
measurement approach advised in Propositions 3 and 4 should be used, except that if 
an attempt has been made to change the type of processing that the consumer uses, as 
in Proposition 7, then this attempted manipulation should also be measured, as well as 
a more comprehensive baseline. 
 
If a company takes each of the steps outlined, it gives itself a strong chance of identifying an 
effective trust-building intervention. By focussing on specific trust judgements and the 
cognitive processes associated with them, it shifts from general appeals to increase trust to a 
highly granular and business-led process to develop a trust-building intervention. From this 
position, it can judge where it stands today relative to the competition, select interventions 
that go with the grain of the customer’s cognitive processes, or seek to increase customer 
attention in order to make a complex trust-building message have a greater effect. Ideally, a 
company might make many interventions, perhaps using regular trials and experimentation to 
find which intervention had the greatest impact on the appropriate trust metric. Such an 
approach is easier in fields with lots of A/B testing, such as website design, than in fields 
where each intervention is very costly and time consuming (see Bojinov, Saint-Jacques, & 
Tingley, 2020 and King, 2020, for a practitioner perspective on implementing these 
techniques).  However, in those latter fields it is even more important to select an intervention 




To help show how the process responds to different business circumstances, two fictional 
companies are used to illustrate each stage of the consulting process. While the scenarios are 
hypothetical, they are designed to capture realistic business challenges.  
 
Illustrating the consulting model with a fictional example: An online 
cosmetics company 
 
ThousandShips.com sells cosmetics online, offering them at lower costs than many 
competitors who work through bricks-and-mortar sales channels. It has a dedicated 
following, but a relatively small market share compared to both the long-established giants of 
the industry and more recent entrants that particularly emphasise their ethical credentials. 
ThousandShips.com believes its product quality matches the bigger players and that its 
ethical policies are just as stringent as the more recent entrants, and its main strategic priority 





In stage one, the ThousandShips.com executives identify five trust judgements that are 
critical to their business. In terms of performance risk, the critical one is product efficacy: can 
ThousandShips.com’s promises about results, colours etc., be trusted? There are also some 
performance risks that are common to any online product sales: will the credit card 
transaction be secure and will the order arrive on time and intact? There are also risks that are 
relational, in that they focus on the benevolence and integrity of the trustee: firstly, given 
these are products that will be applied on the face, could it cause some unsightly or unhealthy 
problem? Secondly, its products carry a label saying that they are not tested on animals, but 
consumers who are concerned about this must trust that this claim is true. 
 
Based on the rule that Type 1 processes are the default, the starting point for the team is to 
assume that all these trust judgements are currently formed through Type 1 processing. 
However, as a company focussed on growing market share, it is natural for the business to 
divide consumers into dedicated customers and potential customers who have not yet tried its 
products. This latter group is used to buying other goods online, but have not bought from 
ThousandShips.com, meaning that there is an extra layer of novelty and potential difficulty in 
their first encounter with the ThousandShips.com website. From this, the company assumes 
that trust judgements around product efficacy, safety and ethics will be handled by Type 2 
processes when a customer is new. 
 
At stage 2, ThousandShips.com commissions two small pieces of research. The first is a 
satisfaction survey of existing customers, using standard expressive questions, and asking 
them to benchmark ThousandShips.com against competitors on all of the different risks 
discussed so far, from delivery times to ethics. The second is a risk-based trust survey, aimed 
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at the much larger group of potential customers, and asking them to make bets on probability 
of different risk events happening for different competitors, focussing on product efficacy, 
safety, and ethics. 
 
From the expressive survey, the business learns that existing customers have no worries about 
transaction security or delivery performance for any of the competitor set, including 
ThousandShips.com. With these existing customers ThousandShips.com outperforms on 
questions around product safety and efficacy but underperforms on ethics compared to the 
recent entrants who have focussed on ethics more explicitly. This last finding is a worry for 
the executive team until they see the results of the risk-based trust survey, which shows that 
potential customers trust ThousandShips.com just as much as the ethics-focussed competitors 
in their risk-based trust exercises. They interpret this finding to mean that, while other brands 
might have a strong association with ethics, when people stop and think about it, they don’t 
believe any brand could afford to lie about whether it tested on animals. However, the risk-
based trust survey identified a different problem: that ThousandShips.com underperforms 
with potential customers when they make gambles around product efficacy. 
 
In phase three, the firm decides that the focus of its trust strategy should be on this issue of 
product efficacy.  Because it is aimed at new customers, who are assumed to use Type 2 
processing in their interactions with ThousandShips.com, the team tasked with developing a 
trust-building intervention consider those interventions that involve some complexity or 
inference-drawing on the part of the trustor. They decide to create a special landing page for 
new arrivals on the website that says ThousandShips.com will only succeed if it builds a loyal 
following in a market where customers can easily switch if they are dissatisfied – a form of 
the competitiveness argument used in Study 2. This is A/B tested, i.e. using tracking cookies 
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to show the new landing page to fifty per cent of new customers, with a follow up survey 
using risk-based trust measures to establish whether or not trust has increased. 
 
If we assume that the intervention is as successful as the similar intervention described in 
Study 2, then ThousandShips.com will have achieved a significant increase in trust amongst 
its priority audience, without expending substantial sums of money. Not only that, but they 
will have avoided taking the path that might have been recommended based on a traditional 
survey approach but which this model suggests would have been ineffective i.e. seeking to 
compete with the more ethics focussed brands by investing the marketing budget into 
promoting to potential customers the fact that the company does not test on animals.  
 
Nevertheless, the executive team might still be concerned that existing customers have less 
faith in ThousandShips.com’s promises on animal testing. This isn’t stopping them spending 
money on the site; but perhaps they would spend more if these concerns were addressed. 
When questions around animal testing are on existing customers’ minds – for example, after 
an NGO campaign launch – ThousandShips.com may need to reiterate its commitment to not 
testing on animals. The implication from the stage two findings is that when people use Type 
2 processing, they infer that the company would not take the risk of lying in its material. In 
designing its marketing responses to an NGO campaign launch, the company could choose to 
introduce greater novelty through a particularly unusual piece of advertising, which might 






Illustrating the consulting model with a fictional example: A medium-sized 
mortgage broker 
 
Cooper & Phillips LLP are a mortgage brokerage working in a regional city outside the 
country’s main financial centre. Their business model is to advise first-time homebuyers on 
mortgage products, charging a fee for their expertise and for making the arrangements, and 
then providing financial advice on mortgage and other financial products as the relationship 
continues. There are many other similar firms, although most are based in the country’s main 
financial centre, and consumers can also access mortgages directly through banks and 
building societies, rather than using a mortgage broker. Over the medium term, 
homeownership is expected to grow substantially in Cooper & Phillips’ area, and the business 
is poised for success if it can win a share of this growth. 
 
The two partners, between them, have no problem completing phase one, and creating the 
map of trust judgements shown in Figure 4.4. They think about the judgements in terms of a 
customer journey. At the consideration stage, potential clients need to trust that they have a 
good range of mortgage products, something that many first-time buyers are ill-equipped to 
assess. Potential buyers may also be nervous of engaging with a system they don’t 
understand, being asked intrusive questions about their incomes and lifestyles, or being 
pressured or harassed by relentless marketing efforts if they start a conversation with a 
mortgage broker. These factors come into play at the consideration stage of the customer 





At the point of making a decision about a mortgage, however, it seems reasonable to assume 
that participants would be highly motivated to get the decision right, as well as finding the 
experience novel and somewhat difficult. Therefore, Cooper & Phillips can assume that 
participants making trust judgements at this stage in the customer journey will be using Type 
2 processes. Perhaps the most important of those trust judgements is trust in the specific 
recommendations that the company is making: is their expertise good enough to recommend 
a product that effectively minimises mortgage costs for the customer? At the same time, the 
customer might also worry about the benevolence and integrity of the mortgage broker: at 
one extreme, they are trusting the broker with all their financial information and perhaps with 
some powers to make the financial arrangements, so there must be some risk they could 
become the victim of fraud. At a less extreme level, the customer must trust that the mortgage 
broker has tried their best to reflect their clients’ interests – listening to the client’s own 
expressed financial goals and not pushing products that might be inappropriate for the client 





At stage two, Cooper & Phillips decide to commission an online survey of a representative 
group of would-be homebuyers in the region they operate in. The survey starts with a series 
of expressive trust questions, followed by risk-based trust questions. It examines mortgage 
broking as a whole, rather than attitudes to their firm in particular, as none of the firms in the 
market have a great deal of name recognition. The initial survey results make for depressing 
reading for the partners: most respondents dislike brokers and financial advisers, and agree 
with statements like “financial advisers only care about their own profits”, “mortgages are 
confusing” and “normal people can never get the best deals”. However, in the risk-based trust 
exercise, participants transfer similar amounts around risk events involving mortgage brokers 
as they do for banks and building societies. Many are willing to bet that the sector will not 
experience a scandal where mortgage brokers being found to recommend bad products to 
their clients. However, few are willing to bet that no advisers will have been found to be 
taking secret commissions from mortgage providers, biasing their recommendations. 
 
At stage three, the two brokers divide their efforts. Cooper looks at the problem of low initial 
trust at the point of consideration, when participants might be assumed to use Type 1 
processes. She decides to make the initial contact with the firm as simple as possible: 
rewriting the website to make it easier to understand and allowing customers to browse and 
ask questions without having to complete any long forms, sign prior consent agreements, or 
otherwise have to deal with the ‘small print’. A process of A/B testing, with a follow up 
survey using expressive trust questions, helps her identify the design that best drives trust in 
this way. 
 
Meanwhile, Phillips focusses her attention on trust in unbiased recommendations. The point 
when this worry emerges, they have decided, is likely to be when customers are thinking 
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seriously about a purchase, and are using Type 2 processes. She introduces a point in the 
advice process when the client is informed about the stiff regulatory penalties that any broker 
would face if they failed to disclose commissions from the mortgage provider. If the firm 
were larger, this could be trialled experimentally within the firm, but given it is built around 
two key individuals, she doesn’t think this will be possible. Instead, the firm runs a short 
online experiment along the lines conducted in Study 2. Consumers are split into treatment 
and control groups and informed about the mortgage broking process. The treatment group 
receives an extra layer of information saying that mortgage brokers who fail to disclose 
commissions are liable for strict criminal punishments. By measuring the differences in 
different risk-based trust exercises, she can test how effective the intervention is in this 
setting, and from this, draw some inferences into her practical setting. 
 
Applying the model in more contexts 
 
The model set out here does not replace the trust recovery model set out by Gillespie and 
Dietz (2009). That model responds to a specific trust-breaking incident, while this model 
requires no such impetus. Practitioners should pick between them, depending on their 
circumstances. 
 
The model that has been set out in this chapter is versatile, as can be seen from the variety of 
contexts and choices described in the two fictional illustrations. Whether we consider a 
product or a service, an experienced customer or a casual one, and a high stakes transaction 
or an everyday one, this model can not only cope with the variety of different business 
models in the consumer-facing economy today, it should directly respond to those different 
business models and provide advice that links directly to the specific ways that trust might be 
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important to those businesses. It requires practitioner judgement at every stage: it cannot 
simply be taken down from the shelf and used to identify the optimal response. However, it 
does not leave practitioners relying on their judgement alone: it draws their attention to 
particular questions in particular circumstances, and helps them focus on the interventions 
which have the greatest promise for their business. 
 
The ability to shortlist which interventions will have the greatest promise comes directly from 
the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model of trust-building. This approach is consistent with much 
other research on interpersonal trust and communication, as discussed in detail in Chapter 1. 
It is supported in large part by the empirical findings from Studies 1 and 2. While the 
consulting model set out here will no doubt be improved as it is trialled and applied, as 
discussed in the subsequent chapter, the contention here is that no future consulting model on 
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Conclusions, limitations, and applications 
 
“Trusting everyone is as much a fault as trusting no one (though I should call the first the worthier and the 
second the safer behaviour).” 
Seneca, Letters from a Stoic 
 
The core output of this project, described in the previous chapter, is a consulting model that 
practitioners can apply to increase trust in their own idiosyncratic contexts. Rather than 
building that consulting model simply on existing theories about consumer trust, or existing 
practitioner experience, the consulting model is instead built on a new model of how 
consumer trust is built. That new model focusses on how different cognitive processes might 
lead to different trust judgements and, in particular, how appropriate measurement tools and 
the potential of different interventions can both be dependent on the cognitive process a 
consumer is using to make a trust judgement. This model, called here ‘trusting fast and slow’ 
is inspired by the dual process models of cognition (including Kahneman, 2002; 2011), on 
bounded rationality in interpersonal trust (including, Evans & Krueger, 2016) and attitude 
change (including Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The evidence presented in Chapters 2 and 3 
provides the empirical basis for such a model in the arena of consumer trust. 
 
Limitations and further research 
 
There are obvious limitations in the research design undertaken in Studies 1 and 2. Firstly, 
while people participate in the survey from their own homes or via their own mobiles, it is an 
artificial task that shares more with a lab setting than a field one. Subsequent research is 
needed to show how the ideas espoused here apply in a real-world commercial decision 
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making. And while the consulting model is based on the empirical analysis presented in 
Studies 1 and 2, it has not yet been applied to a real business. As can be seen from the 
illustrations in Chapter 4, the consulting model leaves a great deal of room for practitioner 
judgement, and one or more real-world case studies might, in future, help identify ways to 
make it easier and more effective to apply. 
 
While Studies 1 and 2 used relatively large and representative samples, they only examined 
one Western European country. Some research suggests that trust operates somewhat 
differently in different cultures (for example, Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 1998). This might 
give practitioners from outside a Western European context an extra reason to check their 
assumptions when applying the consulting model outside of the situation for which it was 
developed. It also means that researchers may wish to test the model of trust-building holds 
elsewhere in the world. Of particular interest might be the specific heuristic that leads to trust 
judgements under Type 1 processing. Here, the ‘affect heuristic’ has been the key focus, but 
one could imagine other societies where alternative heuristics, for example, based on tradition 
and familiarity rather than liking, could play a similar role, and so produce a different pattern 
of results. 
 
The research touched on three different sectors but focussed more on financial services than 
airlines or retail. There are, of course, many more sectors where trust is a highly relevant 
concern, as can hopefully be seen from the diverse illustrations of the consulting model in 
Chapter 4. There may be some very important sector-specific aspects to trust which this 
research has not identified. For example, food seems to have some particular idiosyncrasies 
when it comes to trust, with the trust-building power of supposedly ‘natural’ foods (Taylor & 
Stevenson, 2018) and the specific role of food-sharing in social bonding (Woolley & 
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Fishbach, 2017), perhaps regulated by a specific ‘disgust system’ (Kelly, 2011). Further 
research could help to establish whether the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model needs to be 
substantially adapted for work in specific sectors. 
 
Study 2 only examined four of the many trust-building interventions considered in Chapter 1. 
There would be value in testing more of those potential interventions, as well as re-testing 
both the successful and unsuccessful interventions used in Study 2. Charitable donations and 
a track record of trusting others could both be credible signals of trustworthiness in certain 
contexts, while not being credible in the context tested in Study 2. Identifying the contexts 
where they do work would have both theoretical and practical value. Attempting to replicate 
the successful interventions around simplicity and competitiveness in both similar and 
different contexts could give greater confidence in the findings presented here, as well as 
potentially identifying additional boundary conditions, on top of the cognitive processes that 
this research has focussed on. 
 
Further research, whether into consumer trust, interpersonal trust, or other trust relationships, 
could test the fundamental pattern that associates affective evaluations with Type 1 processes, 
and complex evidence of trustworthiness with Type 2 processes. Together with interpersonal 
trust research that tells a related story (for example, Evans & Krueger, 2011; Hughes et al., 
2016; Lount, 2010; Murray et al., 2013), this could start to establish a role for dual-
processing in many, perhaps all, trust judgements, which would have significant implications 
for the burgeoning multidisciplinary trust literature that tends not to address cognitive 
processes. As a first step, a more direct heuristic elicitation with a between-subjects design, 
as advocated by Kahneman and Frederick (2002), could provide further evidence of the affect 




There are also specific limits from the analysis of Study 1 and Study 2 that deserve to be 
mentioned here. The order effects found in Study 2 were quite substantial and were not 
envisaged before the analysis took place. There is a coherent explanation, as set out in 
Chapter 3, but it would be preferable if this was tested in a pre-registered replication. In 
addition, partly due to the difficulty in designing a measure of real-world trusting behaviour, 
Study 1 struggled to link trust with behavioural intentions, and may have underplayed the 
predictive power of the risk-based trust measure by only using an expressive measure of 
behavioural intentions. If the risk-based measurement approach is to become a key part of all 
consumer trust measurement, it needs to be able to show a link between behaviour in the 
measure and behaviour in day-to-day commercial transactions. However, any researcher 
wishing to test this link will need to consider the role of different cognitive processes in these 
day-to-day transactions, as well as the range of factors beyond trust which might influence 
them. For example, in purchasing a new car, trust in the brand might be one predictor, but 
income is likely to also play an important role. And in purchases that involve almost no 
prospect of Type 2 processing, such as ‘tapping in’ to a train station during my daily 
commute, we should not expect trust to be at all predictive of behaviour.  
 
Study 1 and 2 also do not give us complete clarity on the role of liking, familiarity, and 
cognitive skills as predictors of Type 2 processing of trust judgements and would benefit 
from more specific research. There is some suggestion in Study 1 that disliked brands 
prompted a reduced reliance on the affect heuristic, but there isn’t evidence that dislike of the 
unnamed brand in Study 2 had the same effect. A dedicated examination, potentially where 
liking is manipulated rather than trust, could provide useful guidance for practitioners 
working with unloved brands. Consistent with the suggestion that novelty prompts Type 2 
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processing, Study 1 found that unfamiliar brands were less likely to be judged in a way 
consistent with the affect heuristic. However, removing the name of the brand in Study 2 did 
not seem to exacerbate this. A more focussed examination, comparing established brands 
with new entrants, could help give greater guidance to practitioners working with either type 
of company. Finally, while the link between cognitive abilities and Type 2 processing is the 
subject of much research (Evans & Stanovich, 2013), the specific question about consumer 
trust has not been explored. In Study 1, there was no suggestion that participants of any level 
of education used Type 2 processing more; however, it might be that different cognitive 
abilities come into play more when dealing with particularly complex products, such as 
pensions and investments. As researchers look at interpersonal differences in Type 2 
processing, practitioners may particularly value those studies which examine these questions 




Looking at the business environment today, trust provides a single lens that can be applied to 
very different questions, from product performance, to branding, to corporate reputation, 
corporate citizenship and social responsibility. The need to persuade uncertain consumers to 
take a risk on your products has been seen as a vital part of business success at least since the 
rise of information economics, starting in the 1970s with authors like Akerlof (1970). Today, 
businesses are increasingly asked questions by consumers about their corporate policies – 
which might run from sustainability (Atkinson & Rosenthal, 2014) to privacy (Aguirre et al., 
2015; Bart et al., 2005) to safety during the Coronavirus pandemic – and consumer behaviour 
may depend on whether they believe the answers they are offered. If new technologies are 
driven, sometimes literally, by artificial intelligence, this will make it harder for consumers to 
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‘see under the bonnet’ – and therefore they will be more reliant on trust (Botsman, 2017). 
More broadly, the increasing complexity of products, services, supply chains and the criteria 
on which companies are assessed are likely to make consumer trust ever more important both 
for the success of individual companies and also the smooth functioning of the economy and 
society. The use of trust as a conceptual approach, including performance risk and relational 
risk, helps to give practitioners and academics a unified view of these different issues, 
enabling them to focus on where trust most needs to be built. 
 
However, the model of trust-building presented here suggests that trust can easily be 
misunderstood by businesses.  Some worry about a crisis of trust in business as a whole (for 
example, Sucher & Gupta, 2019), but the work here shows the importance of distinguishing 
liking from trusting. In this model it might be possible, at the extreme, for many businesses to 
become highly disliked, and for this to be seen as distrust in standard surveys, but for 
consumers to behave quite differently, particularly if they face novel or high stakes 
interactions. Equally, some of the companies that pride themselves on being a highly trusted 
brand might discover that they actually have a well-liked product, and that consumers are 
sceptical when they make promises that go beyond product quality and into, for example, 
claims about their environmental sustainability. 
 
The opportunity that comes from this way of thinking will be different for different firms. 
Some may simply need to catch up on trust, while others might seek sustained competitive 
advantage from being seen as more trustworthy than others (Barney & Hansen, 1994). The 
consulting model presented here, and the model of trust-building that it is informed by, 
should provide a starting point that makes it more likely that trust-building interventions will 
be successful. Many of the potential interventions to increase consumer trust could consume 
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substantial resources for a business, whether in terms of external marketing costs or changes 
to internal processes. The measurement tool developed here is relatively low cost, and the 
consulting model is a simple way to help businesses to avoid expensive mistakes. 
 
This research may also have interesting implications beyond the kind of consumer 
interactions that have been the focus of this paper. Businesses are not the only organisations 
that face questions of trust. Yet questions about trust in political institutions (Inglehart & 
Norris, 2016; OECD, 2017a), charities (Lalak & Harrison-Byrne, 2019; Liang, Wu, & 
Huang, 2019) or technologies like vaccination (Larson et al., 2018), nuclear power (Slovic, 
Flynn, & Layman, 1991 ), or genetics (Siegrist, 2000) are often considered at a society-wide 
level. For practitioners in those sectors, that may not be the level on which they can take 
action. Instead, a consulting model aimed at asking what a single organisation can do to 
increase trust might be a powerful addition. Individual charities, individual political 
institutions or single-issue campaigns might benefit from practical consultancy that takes an 
organisation-level approach. 
 
In particular, trust in public health authorities is expected to be critical to the response to 
Coronavirus (Devine et al., 2020). In the case of vaccination, Larson and colleagues (2018) 
suggest that trust in vaccination can be dependent on beliefs about the incentives of health 
care professionals, which we might consider to involve complex inferences about the future 
behaviour of trustees, but Cummings (2014) argues that public health practitioners should use 
heuristic reasoning to persuade people to comply with complex medical advice. Similarly, 
Rehman and colleagues (2005) advocate that all physicians should wear formal dress and a 
white coat because this is chosen as the most trustworthy option in an expressive trust task. 
The suggestion from this work is that the result might be much weaker in a risk-based trust 
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measure where participants made incentivised gambles on the credibility of formally or 
informally dressed doctors. Taking this further, the medical setting offers many moments 
where the stakes are high for patients, but also where they might be fatigued. The ‘trusting 
fast and slow’ approach would predict that a white coat, or any other heuristic-based 
intervention, would be more effective with patients who are experiencing pain and other 
distracting symptoms, but would have little effect on an undistracted patient’s decision 
whether to undergo a high-risk surgical procedure. The consulting model outlined in Chapter 
Four raises some interesting questions for researchers and practitioners wrestling with this 
problem in a specific set of local circumstances: looking at the key moments for patients, 
deciding which type of processing is likely to be undertaken, and fitting the design of public 
health information campaigns to be congruent with those cognitive processes.  
 
The tool for risk-based trust measurement may also have wider applicability. It allows risk-
based trust measurement to focus on leaders and organisations, rather than just peers. This 
obviously need not be restricted to private sector organisations and could add a new 
methodology to the well-developed literature on measuring trust in institutions (for example, 
Fungacova, Hasan, & Weill, 2017; OECD, 2017b). It could also be an additional tool for 
scholars looking at trust within teams and workplaces (for example, Colquitt et al., 2011; 
Jones & George, 1998) or between organisations (for example, Bottazzi, Da Rin, & 
Hellmann, 2016; Moorman, Deshpandé, & Zaltman, 1993). Questions of trust from potential 
employees (Pirson & Malhotra, 2011; Pirson, Martin, & Parmar, 2017) might be a 
particularly interesting area to deploy an approach like the risk-based trust tool developed 
here, as potential employees might be expected to use one level of cognitive processing when 
searching for a job, and another when deciding whether or not to accept one. Expressive 
measures of trust in government often correlate with simple measures of economic 
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satisfaction and job approval for political leaders (Uslaner, 2014). If some voters use Type 2 
processing to make their final decision in the voting booth, a risk-based tool might also help 
to identify and predict that trusting behaviour better than standard expressive measures. As 
the tool is rolled out to new areas, within and beyond the commercial sphere, there is also the 
opportunity to remove the small element of deception used in both studies.  
 
The assumption underlying all this work has been that companies will generally wish to be 
trusted, and there are few circumstances where they might worry about being too successful 
and trusted to an excessive degree. We could imagine some kind of moral hazard when a car 
company that produces such a strong and safe car that its drivers proceed to simply trust in 
the car’s superior manufacturing, rather than watching out for other traffic. Nevertheless, if 
the company is keen to limit such behaviour and advises against it, then this advice must be 
trusted or distrusted. If a driver continues to act recklessly, we might say that they have high 
trust in the safety measures, but low trust in the advice. That such a convoluted example 
doesn’t escape the need to increase trust might suggest that companies have little reason to 
worry about achieving too high a level of trust. More plausibly, a firm might over-invest in a 
strategy to create trust, beyond its potential to benefit the business (Wicks, Berman, & Jones, 
1999). However, there is no obvious reason to think this is a greater risk than under-investing 
in consumer trust-building strategies. 
 
More importantly, throughout this work it has been assumed that it is legitimate for an 
organisation to want to increase the trust people have in it. While excessive distrust can 
sometimes be seen as a moral flaw (Flores & Solomon, 1998, c.f. Bicchieri, Xiao, & 
Muldoon, 2011), there is a suggestion, grounded in research into social trust, that greater trust 
is, overall, welfare enhancing for societies (Algan & Cahuc, 2010; Zak & Knack, 2001) and 
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individuals (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2004; Slemrod & Katuscak, 2005). But, in specific 
interactions, trust can, of course, be misplaced and enable unethical behaviour (Yip & 
Schweitzer, 2015). Trust in online misinformation is now a widespread concern (Pennycook 
& Rand, 2019a, 2019b), excessive trust might lead to ineffective regulation (Bachmann & 
Hanappi-Egger, 2014) and trust in “fake experts” has been identified as a key part of 
“denialism” of science on climate change and other important topics (Diethelm & McKee, 
2009, p.2). Those who we need to trust most can have the most power to betray that trust: in 
one of the most grim examples, Alsan and Wanamaker (2017) show how African-American 
men are less likely to trust medical professionals today, and how this affects their life 
chances. The authors are able to identify a significant cause of this disparity using 
econometric techniques: the exposure, in 1972, of the Tuskagee Study, where hundreds of 
African-American men were lied to and left deliberately untreated for syphilis by the 
Alabama health authorities. The case shows that there are serious risks when people trust the 
untrustworthy, as in 1972. But it also shows that there are serious risks from lack of trust too, 
with people now missing out on beneficial treatment because of lingering worries about 
medical practitioners. 
 
The consulting model set out in Chapter Four could, of course, be used to the advantage of an 
organisation that does not deserve to be more trusted: for example, by someone seeking to 
commit a fraud. If we think of Type 1 processing and heuristic, trust-building interventions, 
the normative risk comes if people’s heuristics are badly adapted to the environment they 
face. For example, the heuristic ‘trust a business if it has a good-looking website’ (as seen in 
Schlosser, Barnett White, & Lloyd, 2006) might have been adaptive at a point when web 
design was a credible signal of investment and resources, but might be misleading in an era 
when a professional looking website can be thrown together with little effort. Policymakers 
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can try to design-in adaptive heuristics, for example through a ‘kitemark’ approach. While 
Type 2 processing may not perfectly identify those who are trustworthy and those who aren’t, 
it is hard to think of a superior alternative. Encouraging customers to use Type 2 processes in 
trust judgements, while demanding something from them in terms of cognitive resources, 
seems like it will generally be to the customer’s benefit. Indeed, encouraging Type 2 
processing might, by itself, even be a credible signal that the company is not seeking to ‘get 
one over’ on its customers.  
 
The reverse, where customers are using Type 2 processing but are encouraged to use Type 1 
processing, is likely to be harder to achieve and is not advocated in the model in Chapter 
Four. Nevertheless, it is conceivable, and worrying, to think of any company lulling an 
otherwise alert customer into not reflecting on what they are doing (Yip & Schweitzer, 2015). 
There is some reassurance in the idea that, as in Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) work, such 
quick judgements tend to be shorter lived and have a weaker effect on behaviour. In these 
situations, the ‘trusting fast and slow’ model would suggest that regulations such as ‘cooling 
off periods’ might help reduce the harm caused when people are encouraged to temporarily 
use heuristic processing and make bad trust decisions as a result. For all of us as consumers, 
the model suggests we should be wary of any business that tries to make us come to 
important trust judgements too quickly.  
 
Ultimately, increasing our understanding of trust cannot make people or organisations more 
trustworthy. Businesses that want to abuse trust may be able to, while many other businesses 
may be undeservedly distrusted, both of which might harm the interests of consumers. The 
model presented here offers a route map for those businesses who want to be more trusted. In 
completing that journey, the businesses that are, in fact, more trustworthy may have an 
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advantage, at least to the extent that consumers are concentrating on the evidence of 
trustworthiness or applying heuristics that are adaptive for the world they live in. But, as 
Pettit (1995, p.216) argues, the “cunning of trust” is that the desire to be thought trustworthy 
can itself encourage us towards more ethical behaviour. A world where businesses worry 
about trust and do all they can to maximise it might be considerably more desirable than one 




Lewin’s (1943) maxim “there is nothing as practical as a good theory” is something of a 
commonplace observation in social sciences today (McCain, 2016). This project has aimed to 
achieve a practical contribution, in part, by also making advances in our theoretical 
understanding of consumer trust. To an extent, the practical outputs can standalone. The risk-
based measure of trust has been shown to provide additional practitioner insight, as described 
in Chapter 2. The simplicity and competition-based interventions have been shown to 
increase trust in a practitioner context, as described in Chapter 3.  
 
The consulting model that ties the findings together has not been proven in practice. 
However, in the case of something as amorphous as a consulting model, we might be 
sceptical about what that proof could constitute. It necessarily has plenty of room for 
idiosyncratic circumstances and practitioner judgement, meaning that, unless it was adopted 





Instead, this project aims to give practitioners confidence in a better practical model by 
offering a more convincing theory. The evidence from Studies 1 and 2 suggests that 
consumers form trust judgements using two different cognitive processes. The model of 
consumer trust-building that is proposed here has a degree of precision that is not always seen 
in writing about consumer trust, and points towards testable propositions that researchers can 
continue to develop, test, and build on. It is consistent with the latest research on 
interpersonal trust (such as Evans & Krueger, 2016).   
 
The structure of the consulting model aims to flow naturally from the theoretical model of 
consumer-trust building. The successful interventions and the new approach to measurement 
then fit within the same cohesive framework. So the credibility of the consulting model 
comes down to the credibility of the evidence provided in Study 1 and 2, within a wider body 
of research on dual process models of cognition and bounded rationality in trust judgements. 
However, a deep understanding of this evidence is not a pre-requisite for making use of the 
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APPENDIX 1: STUDY 1 QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Text seen by participants is presented in italics. 






Today we'd like to invite you to take part in a new survey. 
 
The questionnaire will take up approx. 10 minutes of your time. 
You will receive 50 mingle points for this survey. 
If this time your profile does not match the participants needed for this survey, you 
will receive 5 mingle points [a nominal amount in the currency used to reward 
participants on the Respondi survey platform]. 
We assure you that all answers will be treated anonymously and confidentially.  
Your statements will be solely used for statistical and analytical purposes. 
Enjoy the survey! 
 






A2. What is your age? 
 
 X years [EXCLUDE ALL <18] 
 
A3. Where do you live? 
 
 North East 
 North West 
 Yorkshire and The Humber 
 East Midlands 
 West Midlands 
 East 
 London 
 South East 
 South West 
 Wales 
 Scotland 
 Northern Ireland 
 I currently live outside the UK (close). 
RANDOMISATION AND RECRUITMENT 
 





Followed by a randomisation of all participants in each SECTOR to a specific BUSINESS.  
 
● For all with SECTOR=AIRLINE, randomise between three BUSINESSES: British 
Airways, Ryanair, Emirates 
● For all with SECTOR=FS, randomise between three BUSINESSES: Nationwide; JP 
Morgan;  Virgin Money 
● For all with SECTOR=RETAIL, randomise between three BUSINESSES: Amazon, 
John Lewis, Carphone Warehouse 
INTRODUCTION AND INITIAL QUESTIONS ON POSITIVITY AND FAMILIARITY 
 
Introduction text:  
 
You will now be asked some questions about different companies as part of some research 
conducted by Teneo Blue Rubicon and Warwick Business School. For the first question, you 
just need to say if you feel positive or negative towards the company but you should make the 
choice as quickly as you can. Click next when you are ready. 
 






Time all responses. 
 
Q2. How familiar or unfamiliar is BUSINESS to you? 
Very unfamiliar, somewhat unfamiliar, somewhat familiar, very familiar. 
 
Q3. Have you bought or used products or services from BUSINESS in the last year? 
Yes, No. 
 








The next six questions are an opportunity to make some extra mingle points. 
 
In one year's time, we will randomly choose one of the mingle members and look at how they 
answered these six questions. We will then see what has happened over the year, because the 
number of points they win depends on what happens in the world over the next 12 months.  
 
With each question, there’s an opportunity to earn up to 6,000 mingle points: so in total over 
the next few questions you could 36,000 points - worth over £280 - if you are the randomly 
chosen mingle member. 
 
[Click next. Record all participants who reach this point and enter all participants, even non-






For each of the next questions, you start off with 4,000 points. You can choose to keep all 
4,000 points if you want. 
   
Alternatively, you can put some of the points into a special account. This special account 
pays out 50 per cent extra on top of what you put into it. That means you can grow your 
4,000 points to up to 6,000 points. 
   
However, there is a risk to putting points into the special account. Points in the special 
account disappear if a particular event happens in the real world over the next year. These 
events are different for each different question. In a year’s time, we will look at which events 
really happened and work out how many points have been won.  
 
If you are the randomly chosen mingle member, in a year’s time, you could earn up to 36,000 









QA1 ALL COMPANY ABILITY.  
This choice is about BUSINESS. The special account pays out 50 per cent more on 
top of what you put into it. But you will lose the points you put in the special account 
if, at any time in the next year, BUSINESS has a major IT problem that causes serious 
disruption to its business for at least 24 hours. 
 
Please choose one of the following: 
 
o Put nothing in the special account and keep all 4,000 points 
o Put 1,000 points in the special account and keep 3,000 points  
o Put 2,000 points in the special account and keep 2,000 points  
o Put 3,000 points in the special account and keep 1,000 points 
o Put all 4,000 points in the special account and keep nothing 
 
QA2 ALL COMPANY BENEVOLENCE. Identical to the question above but replace 
underlined text with receives the lowest ratings for customer service in a survey of different 
companies in its sector. 
 
QA3 ALL COMPANY INTEGRITY.  Identical to the question above but replace underlined 
text with is forced to withdraw an advert because the Advertising Standards Authority rules it 
is misleading 
 
QA4 SECTOR-SPECIFIC ABILITY. Identical to the question above but replace underlined 
text with a new piece of text depending on SECTOR: 
 
IF SECTOR=AIRLINE THEN has a major increase in the number of delayed and cancelled 
flights 
 
IF SECTOR=FS THEN loses the personal financial data of a large number of customers 
 
IF SECTOR=RETAIL THEN repeatedly runs out of stock for over a month on some of its 
most popular products. 
 
QA5 SECTOR-SPECIFIC BENEVOLENCE.  Identical to the question above but replace 
underlined text with a new piece of text depending on SECTOR: 
 
IF SECTOR=AIRLINE THEN is criticised by consumer groups for having very high fares 
during peak periods like school holidays 
 
IF SECTOR=FS THEN is criticised by consumer groups for not explaining fees and charges 
clearly in all their communications with customers 
 
IF SECTOR=RETAIL THEN is criticised by consumer groups for having a difficult process 
for customers to return product. 
 
QA6 SECTOR-SPECIFIC INTEGRITY.  Identical to the question above but replace 
underlined text with a new piece of text depending on SECTOR: 
 
IF SECTOR=AIRLINE THEN decides to break an agreement on pay, pensions or working 




IF SECTOR=FS THEN awards its top management team large cash bonuses even when the 
company has performed poorly 
 
IF SECTOR=RETAIL THEN decides to break an agreement on pay, pensions or working 
hours it has recently made with its staff. 
 
SECTION QB - ATTITUDES TO TARGET BUSINESS 
 
Thinking about BUSINESS, how far do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Please use a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree. 
 
Grid columns with 1-5 scale. 
Grid rows with the following statements displayed in a random order. 
 
This company appears to be successful at the things it tries to do 
I feel very confident about this company’s skills and abilities 
It doesn’t seem this company would knowingly do anything to hurt me 
This company seems to really look out for what is important to people like me 
This company seems to try hard to be fair in dealings with others 
Sound principles seem to guide this company’s behaviour 
SECTION QC - BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS TOWARDS TARGET BUSINESS 
 
Thinking about BUSINESS, do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
 
Grid columns with AGREE, DISAGREE, DON’T KNOW scale 
Grid rows with the following statements displayed in a random order. 
 
If I was looking for the kind of products and services they sell, this is a company I would 
consider 
I would support campaigns to impose strict new regulations and taxes on this company  
I would be pleased if a friend or family member started to work for this company 




FINAL SECTION - ALL BUSINESS TRUST MEASURES 
 
Randomise the order of the following questions: Q4.1, Q4.2, Q4.3. 
 
Q4.1. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree, how far do 
you agree or disagree with the following statement when you think about these different 
companies: This company delivers what it promises. 
 
Grid columns showing 1-5 scale. 
Grid rows with all the company names displayed in a random order: British Airways, 
Ryanair, Emirates; Nationwide; JP Morgan; Virgin Money; Amazon, John Lewis, Carphone 
Warehouse. 
 
Q4.2. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree, how far do 
you agree or disagree with the following statement when you think about these different 
companies: This company’s product claims are believable. 
 
Grid columns showing 1-5 scale. 
Grid rows with all the company names displayed in a random order: British Airways, 
Ryanair, Emirates; Nationwide; JP Morgan; Virgin Money; Amazon, John Lewis, Carphone 
Warehouse. 
 
Q4.3. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree, how far do 
you agree or disagree with the following statement when you think about these different 
companies: This company has a name you can trust. 
 
Grid columns showing 1-5 scale. 
Grid rows with all the company names displayed in a random order: British Airways, 
Ryanair, Emirates; Nationwide; JP Morgan; Virgin Money; Amazon, John Lewis, Carphone 
Warehouse. 
ADDITIONAL RESPONDI DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
You are almost done. To conclude, we would like to learn a little more about you as a person.  
 
What is your highest level of education? 
No formal education or qualifications (yet) 
GCSEs or equivalent 
GNVQs or equivalent 
A levels / AS levels / Scottish Highers / NVQ levels / Int. Baccalaureate 
Professional Qualification 
Undergraduate degree or equivalent 
Postgraduate degree or equivalent 
 
What is your gross annual household income (before deductions)? 
 
Less than £15,000  
£15,000 to £24,999  
£25,000 to £34,999  
£35,000 to £44,999  
306 
 
£45,000 to £54,999  
£55,000 to £64,999  
£65,000 to £74,999  
£75,000 to £84,999  
£85,000 to £94,999  
£95,000 to £124,999 
£125,000 to £199,999 
£200,000 or more 




For all participants except the winner of the free prize draw: Thank you for participating in 
this research. It was designed to look at how people’s trust in different companies varies 
depending on the format of the question that a researcher uses. The research will allow 
researchers at Warwick Business School and Teneo Blue Rubicon  to better understand what 
makes different companies more or less trusted. This will then allow companies to better 
understand why people do or do not trust them, and what they can do to improve the 
situation. It should be noted that as far as the researchers are aware, none of the events 
conceived of in this survey have occurred, and the researchers have no reason to expect them 
to happen in the future. If you have any questions about the project, please contact 
[REDACTED]. 
 
For the winner of the free prize draw, show the above text and then add: 
 
Of all the people who took part, you have been randomly chosen to have your choices played 
out in full. However, because this is the first time we have run this survey, we have decided to 
simply pay you the maximum winnings of 36,000 mingle points now instead of waiting a year 
and seeing which events occurred or not. In future surveys, we have no expectation that we 





APPENDIX 2: STUDY 1 ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 
 
Table A1. Positive bias in expressive trust when a company is the target in Study 1 
 
 Mean expressive trust 
when not target 
(5 point scale) 
Mean expressive trust 
when target 
(5 point scale) 
Uncorrected p value for 
Welch Two Sample t-test 
British Airways 3.501 3.728 <.001 
Emirates 3.601 3.688 .151 
Ryanair 2.366 2.771 <.001 
JP Morgan 3.026 3.310 <.001 
Nationwide 3.718 3.781 .333 
Virgin Money 3.240 3.464 <.001 
Amazon 3.731 3.962 <.001 
Carphone Warehouse 3.125 3.372 <.001 





Table A2. Pairwise comparisons between trust in different companies using the whole 
dataset in Study 1 
P values, using Holm’s (1979) correction, for both the commonly used measure of expressive trust (in italics) and 





Emirates Ryanair JP Morgan Nationwide Virgin Money Amazon Carphone 
Warehouse 
John Lewis 





       
JP Morgan <.001 <.001 <.001 
.010 
      
Nationwide   <.001 
<.001 
<.001      
Virgin Money .022  <.001 
<.001 
 .003     
Amazon  .016 <.001 
.026 
<.001  <.001    
Carphone 
Warehouse <.001 .003 <.001  <.001 
0.002 
0.014 <.001   
John Lewis .031 .009 <.001 
<.001 





Table A3. More detailed summary of Study 1 findings by company 
Means (and standard deviations) except where stated.  
 British 
Airways 





n* 230 222 230 211 227 230 234 231 227 
Positivity  









































measure of trust 




















measure of trust 
(Skewness)** 
-0.65 -0.56 0.13 -0.06 -0.62 -0.42 -0.77 -0.40 -0.51 
Expressive 
measure of trust 
(Kurtosis)** 
0.64 0.68 -0.84 0.26 0.21 0.54 0.63 0.05 -0.24 




gambles, up to a 























(Up to a maximum 
of £48) 













 £16.92  
(£14.56) 
 £18.52  
(£16.84) 
 £16.67  
(£16.63) 
 £13.51  
(£14.75) 





(Up to a maximum 
of £48) 











 £20.67  
(£16.19) 
 £19.67  
 (£17.10) 









(Up to a maximum 
of £48) 
 £19.30  
(£17.71) 













 £20.41  
(£17.03) 
 £16.05  
(£16.70) 





















 £19.72  
(£16.90) 
 £17.32  
(£16.61) 
 £15.69  
(£16.45)  
 £14.13  
(£15.38) 















 £19.56  
(£16.63) 
  
 £22.84  
(£17.38) 
























 £14.62  
(£14.90) 
  
 £17.71  
(£16.94) 









measure of trust 
(Skewness)** 
-0.65 -0.56 0.13 0.37 0.23 0.5 0.51 0.57 0.25 
Risk-based 
measure of trust 
(Kurtosis)** 
0.64 0.68 -0.84 -0.59 -0.81 -0.63 -0.48 -0.55 -0.87 
Percentage not 
transferring 
anything on all six 
risk exercises* 
16% 11% 21% 14% 10% 10% 12% 17% 15% 
*Following exclusions applied as described above 
** Using normalised data for each sector as described above 
*** Experimental currency of ‘mingle points’ is converted to GBP at a 1,000 points to £8 ratio. 
Note that sector-specific risks are not comparable across different sectors, as shaded above. 
 
 
Table A4. Detailed description of regressions testing H1.2 
Significant (p<.05) predictors in bold. 
 Airlines (n=520) Financial services (n=465) Retail (n=545) 

















































































































































































































Mean VIF 1.455 1.149 1.435 1.438 1.250 1.431 1.477 1.266 1.449 
AIC 210.606 309.416 212.374 177.245 237.701 172.294 90.699 136.250 89.831 
In each model, the following controls are used: 
 
- Positivity towards the target company on a -1, 0, 1 scale. 
- An individual’s overall propensity to trust companies can differ (e.g. Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007;  Gill, Boies, Finegan & 
McNally, 2005) and predict their likelihood to trust specific businesses (Pirson, Martin, & Parmar, 2014). A control variable for this 
is calculated by taking the average expressive trust rating that an individual gives to the eight non-target companies they are asked 
about. This is normalised against the average propensity to trust for participants in each subset of data related to a particular sector. 
- Familiarity and customer status - my experience is likely to have a direct effect on trust due to experience of trustworthy or 
untrustworthy behaviour (e.g. Garbarino & Johnson, 1999; Chua, Morris & Ingram, 2009; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2010). 
Familiarity is a single-item, on a four-point scale, normalised for the sector. Customer-status is a binary variable. 
- A number of previous studies suggest that gender is a predictor of trust (e.g. Haselhun, Kennedy, Kray, Van Zant, & Schweitzer, 
2015; Fungacova, Hasan, & Weill, 2017). 
- Some previous studies suggest that income is a predictor of trust (Slemrod & Katuscak, 2005; Fungacova, Hasan, & Weill, 2017). 
245 participants declined to provide their income and are excluded39. Income was recorded using brackets as shown in the survey 
full text (Appendix 1), midpoints in each bracket were used, except for the lowest and highest points on the scale which were set at 




39 The exercise was repeated with these data points replaced with the national average of £43,645 from UK 
National statistics (ONS, 2018). The insights were the same as when these participants were excluded, as 




Table A5. Correlation coefficients (r=.) between different measures of trust aspects in 
Study 1: ability (A), benevolence (B), and integrity (I) 
Where the correlation is between the same aspect, it is highlighted in grey. Where the correlation is between two 
different aspects, it is shown in white. 













  A B I A B I A B I A B I A B I 
Expressive 
measure 
A  .76 .71 .18 .23 .23 .21 .15 .26 .23 .19 .15 .21 .17 .19 
B .76  .77 .18 .22 .23 .16 .12 .24 .25 .24 .21 .23 .21 .22 





A .18 .18. .13  .53 .60 .58 .50 .56 .64 .59 .47 .51 .54 .52 
B .23 .22 .18 .53  .62 .56 .50 .56 .61 .57 .46 .55 .57 .61 





A .21 .16 .18 .58 .56 .55  .56 .57 No comparison possible 
B .15 .12 .14 .50 .50 .50 .56  .49 




A .23 .25 .20 .64 .61 .65 No comparison 
possible 
 .58 .47 No comparison 
possible 
B .19 .24 .20 .59 .57 .58 .58  .51 





A .21 .23 .19 .51 .55 .50 No comparison 
possible 
 .51 .57 
B .17 .21 .19 .54 .57 .55 .51  .55 







APPENDIX 3: STUDY 2 QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Text seen by participants is presented in italics. 






Today we'd like to invite you to take part in a new survey. 
 
The questionnaire will take up approx. 10 minutes of your time. 
You will receive 50 mingle points for this survey. 
If this time your profile does not match the participants needed for this survey, you 
will receive 5 mingle points [a nominal amount in the currency used to reward 
participants on the Respondi survey platform]. 
We assure you that all answers will be treated anonymously and confidentially.  
Your statements will be solely used for statistical and analytical purposes. 
Enjoy the survey! 
 






A2. What is your age? 
 
 X years [EXCLUDE ALL <18] 
 
A3. Where do you live? 
 
 North East 
 North West 
 Yorkshire and The Humber 
 East Midlands 
 West Midlands 
 East 
 London 
 South East 
 South West 
 Wales 
 Scotland 
 Northern Ireland 














Introduction text:  
 
You will now be shown a description of a fairly well-known company and then asked some 
questions about it. The company will not be named and some small details have been 
changed. This means that you will have to rely on what is in the description and what you 
know about companies in this sector in general. 
 




This company is often called a “challenger bank” because they aim to work differently from 
the big banks in the UK today. They were founded in 2016 and they focus on using 
technology to improve the experience for customers. They have a highly rated app and no 
high street branches. They now have over 400 employees in their UK headquarters and 




As control + the following text: 
 
One thing that makes this company unusual is that they have pledged to donate one per cent 




As control + the following text: 
 
More than other banks, this company encourages its staff to use their own judgement to make 
the right decisions for customers. It also offers its employees an unusual amount of 
flexibility.  Employees can arrive when suits them, work from home whenever they like, and 





As control + the following text: 
 
Today, banks have to compete for current account customers. If customers are not happy with 
their bank, it is now very easy for people to switch to a different bank using the Current 
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As control + the following text: 
 
This company aims to be simpler than other banks. Instead of a huge set of different offers, 
they just have one personal account and one business account. Instead of a complex 
bureaucracy, they have just two teams: the money management team and the technology 
team. They have also won the Clear & Simple Mark by Fairer Finance for having easy to 





You will now see some questions about this company. Please answer to the best of your 
ability, even without knowing the company’s name. 
 
QA1. How do you feel towards the company? Please use a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very 




QA2. Thinking about the company that was described earlier, how far do you agree or 
disagree with the following statements? Please use a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly 
disagree and 5 is strongly agree. 
 
Grid columns with 1-5 scale. 
Grid rows with the following statements displayed in a random order. 
 
“This company supports charities” 
“This company trusts its employees.” 
“This company must work hard to win and keep its customers” 













The next six questions are an opportunity to make some extra mingle points. You could walk 
away with an extra £380 - or you could walk away with nothing. 
 
In one year's time, we will randomly choose one of the mingle members and look at how they 
answered these six questions. We will then see what has happened to the company that was 
described before over the year. The number of points they win depends on how they answer 
and on what happens to the company. 
 
With each question, there’s an opportunity to earn up to 8,000 mingle points: so in total over 
the next few questions you could earn 48,000 points - worth over £380 - if you are the 
randomly chosen mingle member. 
 
[Click next. Record all participants who reach this point and enter all participants, even non-






For each of the next questions, you start off with 2,000 points. You can choose to keep all 
2,000 points if you want. 
   
Alternatively, you can put some of the points into a special pot. This special pot quadruples 
what you put into it. That means you can grow your 2,000 points to up to 8,000 points. 
   
However, there is a risk to putting points into the special pot. Points in the pot disappear if a 
particular event happens in the real world over the next year. These events are different for 
each different question. In a year’s time, we will look at which events really happened and 
work out how many points have been won.  
 
If you are the randomly chosen mingle member, in a year’s time, you could earn up to 48,000 
mingle points - worth over £380 - if you make the right choices now. 
 
It should be noted that as far as the researchers are aware, none of the events discussed in 
this survey have occurred to this company in the past, and the researchers have no specific 




Randomise the order of the following questions (QB1-QB6) 
 
QB1 This choice is about the company you read a description of. The special pot quadruples 
what you put into it. But you will lose the points you put in the special pot if, at any time in 
318 
 
the next year, the company has a major IT problem that causes serious disruption to its 
business for at least 24 hours. 
 
Please choose one of the following: 
 
o Put nothing in the special pot and keep all 2,000 points 
o Put 500 points in the special pot and keep 1,500 points  
o Put 1,000 points in the special pot and keep 1,000 points  
o Put 1,500 points in the special pot and keep 500 points 
o Put all 2,000 points in the special pot and keep nothing 
 
 
QB2 Identical to the question above but replace underlined text with receives the lowest 
ratings for customer service in a survey of different companies in its sector. 
 
QB3 Identical to the question above but replace underlined text with is forced to withdraw an 
advert because the Advertising Standards Authority rules it is misleading 
 
QB4 Identical to the question above but replace underlined text with loses the personal 
financial data of a large number of customers 
 
QB5 Identical to the question above but replace underlined text with is criticised by consumer 
groups for not explaining fees and charges clearly in all their communications with 
customers 
 
QB6 Identical to the question above but replace underlined text with awards its top 
management team large cash bonuses even when the company has performed poorly 
 





Randomise order of QC1, QC2, and QC3. 
 
QC1. Thinking about the company that was described earlier,, how far do you agree or 
disagree with the following statements? Please use a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly 
disagree and 5 is strongly agree. 
 
Grid columns with 1-5 scale. 
Grid rows with the following statements displayed in a random order. 
 
This company appears to be successful at the things it tries to do 
I feel very confident about this company’s skills and abilities 
This company seems to be well qualified in the area of online banking 







QC2. Thinking about the company that was described earlier, how far do you agree or 
disagree with the following statements? Please use a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly 
disagree and 5 is strongly agree. 
 
Grid columns with 1-5 scale. 
Grid rows with the following statements displayed in a random order. 
 
It doesn’t seem this company would knowingly do anything to hurt me 
This company seems to really look out for what is important to people like me 
This company seems to try hard to be fair in dealings with others 




QC3. Thinking about the company that was described earlier,how far do you agree or 
disagree with the following statements? Please use a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly 
disagree and 5 is strongly agree. 
 
This company delivers what it promises. 
This company’s product claims are believable. 






QZ1. At the start of this survey, it said that the company described is a real company. How 
confident were you that this was true? 
 
Please use a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not at all confident and 5 is very confident. 
ADDITIONAL RESPONDI DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
You are almost done. To conclude, we would like to learn a little more about you as a person.  
 
What is your highest level of education? 
No formal education or qualifications (yet) 
GCSEs or equivalent 
GNVQs or equivalent 
A levels / AS levels / Scottish Highers / NVQ levels / Int. Baccalaureate 
Professional Qualification 
Undergraduate degree or equivalent 
Postgraduate degree or equivalent 
 
What is your gross annual household income (before deductions)? 
 
Less than £15,000  
£15,000 to £24,999  
£25,000 to £34,999  
£35,000 to £44,999  
£45,000 to £54,999  
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£55,000 to £64,999  
£65,000 to £74,999  
£75,000 to £84,999  
£85,000 to £94,999  
£95,000 to £124,999 
£125,000 to £199,999 
£200,000 or more 





For all participants except the winner of the free prize draw:  
 
Thank you for participating in this research. It was designed to look at how people’s trust in 
different companies varies depending on what they know and on the format of the question 
that a researcher uses. The research will allow researchers at Warwick Business School and 
Teneo to better understand what makes different companies more or less trusted. This will 
then allow companies to better understand why people do or do not trust them, and what they 
can do to improve the situation.  
 
The company described is based on a real company, but some fictional elements have been 
added to see if they affect how trustworthy people think the company is. No one should make 
financial decisions based on information presented to them in this opinion poll. If you have 
any questions about the project, please contact[REDACTED]. 
 
For the winner of the free prize draw, show the above text and then add: 
 
Of all the people who took part, you have been randomly chosen to have your choices played 
out in full. However, because this is only the second time we have run this survey, we have 
decided to simply pay you the maximum winnings of 48,000 mingle points now instead of 
waiting a year and seeing which events occurred or not. In future surveys, we have no 
expectation that we will use this approach again. An extra 48,000 mingle points will be 




APPENDIX 4: STUDY 2 ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 
 
 
 
 
